Normative pluralism and skepticism about ‘ought simpliciter’

Author(s):  
David Copp
Keyword(s):  
1997 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amitai Etzioni

Relativism is in retreat on many fronts; it is much less clear what will replace it. One kind of relativism of special importance to international relations is the notion that members of one culture should not “judge” those of others—especially that the West should not pass judgment on the policies and values of other societies. If this facet of unbounded, normative pluralism is waning, too, what will take its place? Such a matter seems rather abstract, but its policy implications are many.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 382-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mónica Gómez Salazar

This article suggests that an epistemological and ontological pluralist perspective may enable human beings to cooperate each other and live with less injustice. Intercultural cooperation may help for a reformulation of the Human rights in order to consider aspects of different ways of life like the variations of moral, political and judicial norms. I expound that Liberal pluralism does not respond adequately to present day multiculturalism. Additionally, I explain that Human rights are not inclusive norms for all ways of life. I definitely sustain that some communities do not have to agree to live in the same moral world as others, but, that it is indeed necessary to know each other’s differences so as to be able to respect them.


2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 37-48
Author(s):  
Valentin N. Karpovich ◽  
Alexander A. Shevchenko

The paper deals with the phenomenon of normative pluralism - that of several normative orders coexisting in various spheres of our life - law, morality, politics, etc. It shows the root causes of normative pluralism and the causes of its development and proliferation - both internal (overcoming legal and moral syncretism) and external (globalization and the related growth in the number of regulatory subjects). The authors offer a way of understanding and reconciling norms by building out of potentially conflicting norms a non-contradictory system without any normative collisions.


Author(s):  
Derek Baker

There are many different oughts. There is a moral ought, a prudential ought, an epistemic ought, the legal ought, the ought of etiquette, and so on. These oughts can prescribe incompatible actions. What I morally ought to do may be different from what I self-interestedly ought to do. Philosophers have claimed that these conflicts are resolved by an authoritative ought, or by facts about what one ought to do simpliciter or all-things-considered. However, this chapter defends the view that the only coherent notion of an ought simpliciter comes with preposterous first-order normative commitments. It is more reasonable to reject the ought simpliciter in favor of the form of normative pluralism advocated in Tiffany (2007).


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (01) ◽  
pp. 159-179
Author(s):  
Thi Quang Hong TRAN

AbstractNotwithstanding its defining feature of normative pluralism, the socialist state of Vietnam basically adopts a legal centralist approach to regulation. The judiciary is arguably the most illustrative of this approach, since it is the main forum where legal centralism encounters normative pluralism. Our research examines the choice of norms in judicial adjudication in Vietnam to check the effectiveness of its legal centralist approach. It finds that, despite lacking institutional support, judges managed to apply customary norms at their discretion against the state’s emphasis on top-down legal rules. A legitimacy-based analysis explains this phenomenon. It points out that judges conceptualized their legitimacy under the influence of both legal and extra-legal rules, thus making it apart from the legality. Judges attempt to bridge the gap between legitimacy and legality enabled de factor normative pluralism. In looking at the influence of customary norms over judicial adjudication, the article aims to make both theoretical and practical contributions. Theoretically, it enriches the scholarship of normative pluralism by showing how legitimacy-building keeps normative pluralism effective, irrespective of the dominating legal centralism. Practically, it proffers insightful implications for the ongoing court reforms in Vietnam based upon the findings.


Author(s):  
Christopher Rodgers

The governance of common land in England and Wales is shaped by a mixture of customary and legal norms that can shift and change. Notwithstanding the introduction of legislation for the registration of common land and common rights, custom retains an important role in the governance of common land. This chapter situates custom alongside the other normative rules used to structure the governance of common land. It considers reforms introduced by the Commons Act 2006, including provision for the formation of self-regulating commons councils. It concludes that a legal pluralist analysis that focuses on the functionality of differing customary and legal norms, but which is also sensitive to the sources from which rules derive normativity, is essential if we are to position custom in the hierarchy of norms relevant to the governance of common land, to understand their respective roles and how these can change over time and space, and to appraise their effectiveness.


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