The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric

2020 ◽  
pp. 215-243
Author(s):  
Friedrich Solmsen
Keyword(s):  
Ancient Rhetoric ◽  
Aristotelian Tradition

Walter Benjamin's media theory and the tradition of the media diaphana

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-26
Author(s):  
Antonio Somaini
Keyword(s):  
Sensory Experience ◽  
Media Theory ◽  
Depth Analysis ◽  
Spatially Extended ◽  
The Media ◽  
Aristotelian Tradition

"The article presents an in-depth analysis of Benjamin’s use of the German term Medium, in order to show how his entire media theory may be interpreted as centered on the interaction between the historically changing realm of the technical and material Apparate, and what he calls in the artwork essay the »Medium of perception«: the spatially extended environment, the atmosphere, the milieu, the Umwelt in which sensory experience occurs. This notion of »Medium of perception« is then located within the long, post-Aristotelian tradition of the media diaphana, whose traces can be found in the 1920s and 1930s in the writings of authors such as Béla Balázs, Fritz Heider, and László Moholy-Nagy. </br></br>Der Artikel präsentiert eine eingehende Analyse von Benjamins Gebrauch des deutschen Begriffs »Medium«, um zu zeigen, dass seine gesamte Medientheorie fokussiert ist auf die Interaktion zwischen dem historisch veränderlichen Bereich der technischen und materiellen Apparate einerseits und dem, was er in dem Kunstwerkaufsatz das »Medium der Wahrnehmung« nennt: die räumlich ausgedehnte Umgebung, die Atmosphäre, das Milieu, die Umwelt, in der sinnliche Wahrnehmung erfolgt. Dieser Begriff des »Mediums der Wahrnehmung« wird dann innerhalb der langen, nacharistotelischen Tradition der media diaphana verortet, deren Spuren in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren in den Schriften von Autoren wie Béla Balázs, Fritz Heider und László Moholy-Nagy zu finden sind."

Füchsische Poetologie. Zur Spiegelfiktion im Reynke de Vos (1498)

POETICA ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 193-218
Author(s):  
Hannah Rieger
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Early Modern Period ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Rhetorical Strategies ◽  
Ancient Rhetoric ◽  
Wooden Frame ◽  
Legal Proceedings ◽  
Middle Low German ◽  
Specific Material

Abstract The Middle Low German Beast Epic Reynke de Vos (1498) is about two legal proceedings against the fox Reynke, who is charged by the other animals with the tricks he played on them. When he is sentenced to death, Reynke defends himself by delivering speeches that are constructed as described in ancient rhetoric. Part of those speeches is Reynke’s lie about his treasure, which he would give to the lion if he pardoned him. Reynke describes three pieces of jewellery as part of this made-up possession, one of which is a mirror. When Reynke describes it, he also tells Aesopic fables that are carved into its wooden frame. His fictional artefact, especially the interplay of its specific material and the content of the fables told, has a poetological level. In his description, Reynke hybridizes the political discourse of the early modern period, in which the virtue of prudentia becomes more and more important, with the rhetorical competence to deliver speeches and tell fables. In his fiction of the mirror he draws up a poetological draft that combines the role of a rhetor in court with his well-known properties of being clever and cunning. By describing the artefact, Reynke shows how to use rhetorical strategies, especially to tell fables, as an instrument to gain acceptance and to acquire political influence.

Must Functionalists Be Aristotelians?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert C. Koons ◽  
Alexander Pruss
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Computing System ◽  
Proper Function ◽  
Causal Powers ◽  
Normative Language ◽  
Functionalist Theory ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
Argument Proceeds ◽  
Aristotelian Tradition

Functionalism in the theory of mind requires an account of function that has a normative component—mere conditional connection (whether indicative or sub-junctive) is not enough. For instance, a component of a computing system isn’t an adder just in case its output is always or would always be the sum of the inputs, since any computing system in a world with as much indeterminism as ours can err or malfunction. Two general reductions of normative language have been proposed that one might wish to apply to the problem of defining proper function: the evolutionary reduction (Wright, Millikan) and the agential reduction (Plantinga). We argue that whatever the merits of the reductions in other contexts, a functionalist theory of mind that defines proper function in either of these ways must fail. The argument proceeds by first showing the agential reduction is viciously circular in the context of a functionalist theory of agency. Second, if functionalism about mind is true and proper function is reducible evolutionarily, then it is possible to have a situation in which the presence or absence of mental properties depends in an implausibly spooky, acausal way on remote facts. It is plausible that the only currently avail-able way for the functionalist to meet these challenges is to accept irreducible end-directed causal powers of minds and/or their functional parts, in accordance with a broadly Aristotelian tradition.

scholarly journals The Bundle Theory Approach to Relational Quantum Mechanics

2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Oldofredi
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Bundle Theory ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Relational Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Essential Idea ◽  
Mereological Fusion ◽  
Metaphysical Interpretation ◽  
Aristotelian Tradition

AbstractThe present essay provides a new metaphysical interpretation of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) in terms of mereological bundle theory. The essential idea is to claim that a physical system in RQM can be defined as a mereological fusion of properties whose values may vary for different observers. Abandoning the Aristotelian tradition centered on the notion of substance, I claim that RQM embraces an ontology of properties that finds its roots in the heritage of David Hume. To this regard, defining what kind of concrete physical objects populate the world according to RQM, I argue that this theoretical framework can be made compatible with (i) a property-oriented ontology, in which the notion of object can be easily defined, and (ii) moderate structural realism, a philosophical position where relations and relata are both fundamental. Finally, I conclude that under this reading relational quantum mechanics should be included among the full-fledged realist interpretations of quantum theory.

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