Securitization Theory or a Well Overlooked Old: On the Philosophical and Theoretical Premises and Origins of the Theory

More than 20 years have passed since B. Buzan, O. Wver and J. de Wilde published their Security: A New Framework for Analysis, which has become a classic in the discipline of security studies. Although Russian scholars increasingly attempt to use the securitization theorys conceptual apparatus in their research, the knowledge of the theory itself remains rather fragmentary. The overwhelming majority of existing papers refer to the so-called Copenhagen Schools (CS) intellectual heritage, while more comprehensive approaches and recent studies remain almost unknown among Russian scholars. The author attempts to fill this gap. This article is first in line of a series of studies, entirely devoted to the phenomenon of securitization: from the earliest milestones to the modern stage of development of the theory. The paper examines the theoretical and philosophical premises, as well as the ideas and assumptions of the securitization theory, first formulated by O. Wver in the late 1980s. The author refers to the original texts of the main figures of the CS: O. Wver and B. Buzan, conceptualizing the history of the concept of securitization and immersing the reader into the atmosphere of security studies field at the end of the 20th century. As a result, it becomes possible to determine the key elements of the early theory of securitization: security as a speech act, national security as a main focus of study, post-structural realism as a research agenda of O. Wver, and the idea of security as a negative meaning. The article concludes that despite the shortcomings of the early theory of securitization noted by many critics, it was based on a valuable and fruitful idea - an attempt to go beyond the notion of security as an absolute good or a metaphysical entity, which was typical of traditional and many alternative approaches to the definition of security.

Indonesia’s China and US Approach: Crafting Policies Out of Standard Operating Procedures

This article examines Indonesia’s perceptions, strategies and policies towards the USA and China under the presidencies of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014) and Joko Widodo’s first term and early second term (2014–2020). It argues that on a strategic level, Indonesia’s behaviours are in line with structural realist principles, where it adopts a prudent approach of maintaining its strategic autonomy. However, deviations from structural realism are identified in the operationalisation of this strategy into specific foreign and security policies. This article explains such deviations by employing Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow’s models of decision-making, and argues that such suboptimal policies are driven by two domestic political factors, namely, organisational behaviour and governmental politics. Specifically, the article highlights two key tendencies: (a) that policy makers tend to stick to some a priori guidelines within their organisations, despite changes in external pressures; and (b) that policies tend to be by-products of competition between government organisations. In Indonesia–China relations, these tendencies are most apparent in Indonesia’s approach in the South China Sea, where policies and narratives articulated by the government have been largely stagnant, despite increased intensity of China’s activities in Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. With regard to the USA, these factors manifest in the lack of tangible progress in defence and security cooperation between the two countries, due to a static interpretation of Indonesia’s Free and Active foreign policy maxim.

The metaphysics of perception: enactivism, phenomenology and information.

Enactivism is a major research programme in the philosophy of perception. Yet its metaphysical status is unclear, since it is claimed to avoid both idealism and realism yet still has aspects of both within it. One attempt to solve this conundrum is based on the fusion of enactivism with phenomenology and the mathematical concept of symmetry breaking (Moss Brender, 2013). I suggest this is not entirely successful and propose it needs the addition of a multi-level, non-reductive metaphysics (for example, Informational Structural Realism). The processes we commonly call ‘perception’ are causal transfers of information at certain levels in the hierarchy of meaningful structures that comprise physical reality. Phenomenologists could use the word ‘perception’ metaphorically across all levels, although realists need not do so.

The United Kingdom against Russia’s attempts to maintain the zones of influence on the example of the Ukrainian crisis

The subject of the paper are the United Kingdom’s actions against Russia's attempts to maintain its zones of influence, based on the example of the Ukrainian crisis. The introduction consists of a synthetic outline of the geopolitical rivalry between Russia and Great Britain. The next section discusses the attitude of the United Kingdom towards Russia’s attempts to maintain its zones of influence in the 21st century. The main section of the paper focuses on the United Kingdom’s actions against Russia’s military policy in Ukraine. The main thesis of the paper assumes that during the Ukrainian crisis, the UK has taken the most far-reaching measures so far to oppose Russia’s attempts to maintain zones of influence. The consequence of this is a significant deterioration in Russian-British relations due to the Ukrainian crisis. The leading paradigm is structural realism. The method of text source analysis was used in the paper.

Quantum Entanglement Undermines Structural Realism

Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that an extrinsic property of an object is determined by its intrinsic properties. So structural realists might be tempted to cite quantum entanglement as evidence for structural realism. I argue, however, that quantum entanglement undermines structural realism. If we classify two entangled electrons as a single system, we can say that their spin properties are intrinsic properties of the system, and that we can have knowledge about these intrinsic properties. Specifically, we can know that the parts of the system are entangled and spatially separated from each other. In addition, the concept of supervenience neither illuminates quantum entanglement nor helps structural realism.

Subatomic Particles, Epistemic Stances, and Kantian Antinomies

In Scientific Ontology, Chakravartty diagnoses a “dramatic conflict” between empiricism and metaphysics and aims to overcome that conflict by opting for a modern-day variant of Pyrrhonism, i.e. by appreciating the equal strength (isostheneia) of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, and by achieving tranquility (ataraxia) by suspending judgment or remaining speechless in the face of that isostheneia. In this paper, I want to argue that instead of remaining speechless in the face of the isostheneia of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, we should adopt a position that remains underrated in Chakravartty’s analysis: a position that amounts to a modern-day variant of the Kantian combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism, and that like the original Kantian combination, is capable of solving many instances of the dramatic conflict between empiricism and metaphysics and, in particular, a conflict that is the talk of the town in philosophy of science these days—the conflict between ontic-structural realism and Lewisian metaphysics.