Nuclear Arms Control Decision Making in the Soviet Union

2020 ◽  
pp. 107-136
Author(s):  
Alan B. Sherr

1996 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 523
Author(s):  
Robert Arnett ◽  
Aleksandr G. Savel'yev ◽  
Nikolay N. Detinov


1995 ◽  
Vol 74 (5) ◽  
pp. 173
Author(s):  
Robert Legvold ◽  
Aleksandr G. Savelyev ◽  
Nikolay N. Detinov


1992 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuel Adler

An American epistemic community played a key role in creating the international shared understanding and practice of nuclear arms control. In the absence of nuclear war, leaders' expectations of nuclear war and of its control were affected by causal theories and abstract propositions and models which, given their “scientific” and technical nature, were developed by an epistemic community. This study, which emphasizes the roles played by epistemic communities in policy innovation and in the diffusion of understandings across nations and communities, analyzes how the theoretical and practical ideas of the arms control epistemic community became political expectations, were diffused to the Soviet Union, and were ultimately embodied in the 1972 antiballistic missile (ABM) arms control treaty. In contrast to those studies that have concentrated primarily on the workings of international epistemic communities, this study stresses the notion that domestically developed theoretical expectations, which were worked out by a national group of experts and selected by the American government as the basis for negotiations with the Soviets, became the seed of the ABM regime. Moreover, by suggesting that the arms control epistemic community was really an aggregation of several factions that shared common ground against various intellectual and policy rivals, this study sheds light on the question of how much coherence an epistemic community requires. The political selection of new conceptual understandings, followed by their retention and diffusion at national and international levels, suggests an evolutionary approach at odds with explanations of international change advanced by structural realism and approaches based on it.



2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 510-511
Author(s):  
Jeffrey W. Knopf

When the Soviet Union disappeared, so did much of aca- demic political science's interest in nuclear arms control. This is unfortunate. First, the risk of nuclear war has not gone away and may be increasing because of nuclear proliferation. Second, U.S.-Soviet cooperation on arms control was in many ways unexpected, and it remains a useful laboratory for testing international relations theory.



2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Akira Kurosaki

This article sheds new light, from a transnational perspective, on the intellectual struggle in Japan over nuclear deterrence. Japanese scientists opposed the Cold War order from the superpowers on down. Against the backdrop of the intensifying nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, Pugwash scientists came to accept a key notion by the mid-1960s; namely, that stable mutual deterrence is a prerequisite for averting nuclear war and promoting nuclear arms control. Under such circumstances, the Japanese Pugwash scientists began to criticize nuclear deterrence in the early 1960s in Japanese society. This article recounts how their challenges to the intellectual hegemony of nuclear deterrence developed not only from antiwar and antinuclear sentiments that they shared with the Japanese public, but also from the transnational transfer of ideas through the Pugwash organization.



This book uses trust—with its emotional and predictive aspects—to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The chapters in this volume look at how the “emotional” side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.



Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-115
Author(s):  
Jon Brook Wolfsthal

America survived the nuclear age through a complex combination of diplomatic and military decisions, and a good deal of luck. One of the tools that proved its value in both reducing the risks of nuclear use and setting rules for the ongoing nuclear competition were negotiated, legally binding, and verified arms control agreements. Such pacts between the United States and the Soviet Union arguably prevented the nuclear arms racing from getting worse and helped both sides climb off the Cold War nuclear precipice. Several important agreements remain in place between the United States and Russia, to the benefit of both states. Arms control is under threat, however, from domestic forces in the United States and from Russian actions that range from treaty violations to the broader weaponization of risk. But arms control can and should play a useful role in reducing the risk of nuclear war and forging a new agreement between Moscow and Washington on the new rules of the nuclear road.



Arms Control ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 50-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Smith


1975 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 415-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Redick

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed in 1967 and is now in force for eighteen Latin American nations (the important exceptions being Argentina and Brazil). Under the terms of the treaty the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) was established in 1969. With headquarters in Mexico City, OPANAL is a sophisticated control mechanism composed of three principal organs: a General Conference, Council and Secretariat. This article examines the effort to establish regional nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America and analyzes the ability of the Tlatelolco Treaty to provide the legal and political framework for containment of the growing military potential of Latin American nuclear energy programs. Particular attention is given to the positions of key Latin American nations within the region, nuclear weapons states, and those nations retaining territorial interest within the nuclear weapons free zone. In addition several policy options are advanced which could facilitate the more complete implementation of regional nuclear arms control in Latin America.



1984 ◽  
Vol 62 (5) ◽  
pp. 1145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold Brown ◽  
Lynn E. Davis


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