ENHANCING EUROPEAN SECURITY: MODERN CHALLENGES POSED BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The proposal of Europeanising French deterrence was revived by French President Emmanuel Macron, who declared in February 2020 that French nuclear forces reinforce European security simply by existing and suggested a strategic dialogue with all EU partners regarding the role of French nuclear weapons in European security. Macron further reasoned that this issue is increasingly urgent nowadays as the EU must jointly realise that, because of the lack of a legal structure, they may easily find themselves vulnerable to the resumption of a traditional, even nuclear, arms race on their land. The prospects of global control of weapons and disarmament efforts are very blurry in the times of rising political tensions, revived nuclear arms races, and weakening trust in multilateralism. Nevertheless, this all leads to the necessity to support active actions towards nuclear risk reductions, whichhave recently appeared in some of the multilateral forums. The elimination of nuclear risk is nothing but an intermediate measure to reduce nuclear proliferation dangers until they are liquidated. It is essential to review the risks of accidents involving nuclear weapons and their influence on European security, along with focusing on the role of European nuclear weapon states (NWS), their place in global security and possible scenarios for their future: the authors considered the possible prospects of the EU as another entity with nuclear weapons, as well as the likelihood of the EU as another regional nuclear-free zone and discussed whether the real change is possible.

Nuclear Weapons

A new nuclear arms race is underway between Russia and the United States, one that focuses on the technology of delivery of nuclear warheads. This book describes how and why this race is happening, who still possesses nuclear weapons, and what constraints apply to those weapons under international law. A global nuclear ban treaty entered into force in January 2021, but the nuclear powers kept distant. The last remaining treaty restraining the arsenals of the two nuclear superpowers will expire in less than five years' time and the risk is that other States will turn to nuclear arms for their defence, further fracturing the non-proliferation regime installed after the Cuban missile crisis.

Dwight Eisenhower

Assessments of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s performance as the Supreme Allied Commander during World War II and the nation’s thirty-fourth president have evolved across the more than seventy-five years from the conclusion of World War II in 1945 to the dedication in 2020 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial in Washington, DC. Historians have sought to explain Eisenhower’s unlikely rise from his modest upbringing in Abilene, Kansas, to his ascendance to command of western allies in the European theater. Selected over several senior officers in 1942 to command the invasion of North Africa (Operation Torch), Eisenhower initially experienced a series of setbacks and controversies resulting from inexperienced troops, incompetent subordinate leaders, a formidable enemy, and political deals with leaders of Vichy France. Although historians continue to debate his decisions regarding command and strategy in the European theater, they generally praise Eisenhower’s ability to maintain the western alliance amid national rivalries, professional jealousies, strong personalities, and competing political ambitions. Assessments of Eisenhower’s performance as president have undergone a remarkable transformation. Initially ranked in 1961 near the bottom in assessments of presidential leadership, he currently appears within the top tier. Initial accounts in the 1960s portrayed Eisenhower as a bumbling, docile president who appeared to be out of touch with the basic policies and operations of his administration. He appeared unwilling to address the major issues confronting American society, and to defer to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, on matters of foreign policy and national security. For his critics, Eisenhower perilously, inflexibly, and imprudently relied upon the superiority of the nation’s nuclear arsenal to contain communist expansion, then allowed the Soviet Union to beat the United States into space and create a missile gap. Scholars collectively labeled “Eisenhower Revisionists” assessing declassified documents beginning in the mid-1970s forged a revised consensus that Eisenhower was clearly thoughtful, informed, and firmly in command of his administration. Moreover, the nation’s nuclear arsenal retained and even strengthened its predominance of power. “Postrevisionist” analysts generally concur that Eisenhower was clearly the dominant decision-maker and developed an effective policy development process, but they question the efficacy of some of his decisions and policies, including his management of crises in this dangerous period of the Cold War, his increased use of covert operations and propaganda, his approach to decolonization, and his efforts to ease tensions and slow the nuclear arms race.

INTERPRETASI INTERNATIONAL COURT of JUSTICE (ICJ) PADA PASAL VI PERJANJIAN NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 1968 (NPT)

It has been 50 years since the Non-Proliferation Treaty was made by America, England, and the Soviet Union to prevent the nuclear arms race in the future. However, Article VI of NPT consisted of ambiguity and has sparked long-lasting debate questioning NPT electiveness. Article VI at least has been examining twice by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1996 and 2014. Unfortunately, those examinations were unsatisfied regarding when Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) should cease and disarmament their nuclear weapon? If referring to “an early date,” it should be done years long ago and not taking more than 50 years with pathetic achievement. Finally, this article will examine the current development of NWS using a normative juridical method according to existing nuclear regulation, ICJ Commentary, which resulting in a suggestion when NPT 1968 parties should fulfil their obligation under Art VI NPT 1968.

Whence and W(h)ither Technology Ethics

Will there be a future for technology ethics as a respected academic discipline among philosophers, scientists, engineers, and the general public? We hope that the answer is, “Yes.” But for that to be so, the field must undertake a frank assessment of its historical origins in Heidegger’s ideology-laden, technology critique and in the environmental crisis of the 1960s and 1970s, along with the nuclear arms race and protests against newer technologies of war deployed in Vietnam. Moreover, technology ethics for the twenty-first century will thrive and will have an impact on technologists and policymakers only if it finds its way to complement its traditional emphasis on risk with an analytical framework that foregrounds the promotion of the human and the common good independent of received assumptions about the moral valence of technology, itself.

BOOK REVIEW_NUCLEAR SUKARNO: INITIAL STUDY OF INDONESIAN ATOMIC POLITICS 1958-1967_NUKLIR SUKARNO: KAJIAN AWAL ATAS POLITIK TENAGA ATOM INDONESIA 1958-1967

“Nuklir Sukarno: Kajian awal atas politik tenaga atom indonesia 1958-1967” is one of Teuku Reza Fadeli's works published in 2021. This book explains how Sukarno's desire to have nuclear weapons. This book itself has three chapters explaining in detail and coherently how this incident happened, starting from the first chapter, which describes the state of the cold war that caused Indonesia to become involved in it and how President Sukarno's attitude towards nuclear technology. The second chapter describes the formation of LTE, which later turned into BATAN due to changes in Sukarno's thinking in addressing the global political constellation and Western imperialism, which continued to hinder nuclear power. The third chapter describes Sukarno's ambition to have nuclear weapons in Indonesia, then the world response to these conditions, and the last one regarding the end of Sukarno's nuclear politics as it coincided with Suharto's downfall.This book intends to look back on nuclear technology that came to the world's attention in the nuclear arms race after the end of the second world war to inform readers of Soekarno's ideas about nuclear technology, which impacted determining his government in the 1960s. Which at that time, not a few Western countries gave a cautionary attitude. In addition, this book also aims to encourage interest in writing the history of technology in Indonesia because there are still many who ignore science and technology in influencing Indonesian history.This book intends for those who are thirsty for knowledge and always want more insight. Sukarno's Nuclear Book is also very suitable for those who like Indonesian history, especially the history of technology in Indonesia which has had much influence in it. Then for those who like compilation, this book is very suitable because, in the book Nuclear Sukarno, the CIA has been involved in Indonesian history. After reading the book Nuclear Sukarno, much information is obtained by readers, such as in the economic, political, social, and cultural fields that are the reasons for writing Indonesian history; it turns out that technology itself also influences the current situation in Indonesia. The reader also knows that Indonesia wants to have nuclear weapons because of the influence of the cold war that occurred at that time. However, this never happened because of the fall of President Suharto in his leadership.

Italian Physicists and the Bomb: Edoardo Amaldi’s Network for Arms Control and Peace during the Cold War

This article investigates the contribution of the Italian physicist Edoardo Amaldi to the anti-nuclear peace movement at national and international level. Amaldi (1908–89) was one of the leading nuclear physicists of the twentieth century. He grew up in the extraordinary environment of the ‘Via Panisperna Boys’, a group of young physicists active in Rome during the late 1920s and 1930s, under Enrico Fermi’s leadership. Yet Amaldi was not only a renowned academic but also an avid supporter of the movement against the nuclear arms race. He advocated the peaceful and industrial use of nuclear energy and tenaciously opposed its military exploitation. The only Italian invited to the first Pugwash meeting in 1957, he soon played a leading role in the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and other similar events throughout his life. During the 1970s and 1980s, Amaldi – and many others among his colleagues – campaigned for a different security policy based on détente and broad transnational dialogue across the Cold War blocs. This essay focuses on some practical initiatives of the Italian community of physicists, underlying the political and civil use of their scientific expertise.

Nuclear verification in a Middle East WMD-Free Zone: Lessons from Past Verification Cases and Other Precedents

Verification will be of critical importance to achieving and maintaining a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction (ME WMD). Effective verification arrangements would serve a vital national security objective for each state in the region by reducing tensions, removing the motivation to proliferate, and mitigating the risk of a virtual nuclear arms race (or war). In view of the high levels of tension and mistrust within the zone, ensuring effective verification will be especially demanding. The paper examines specific elements of the future nuclear verification of the zone, including: Which states should be included? What prohibitions and obligations should apply in the zone and how would they be verified? How could elimination of nuclear weapons in the zone be achieved? On what basis would the zone treaty enter into force? The paper also examines a number of existing treaties and arrangements as well as the lessons learned from past verification cases which regional states can draw on in developing verification for a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Threats and Challenges of the Nuclear Arms Race on the Current Stage

Contemporary issues of nuclear weapons and the nuclear arms race in the modern world are examined, based mainly on the assessments of the German “Statista” company, the American Federation of Scientists and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. It is emphasized that invented more than seventy years ago, nuclear weapon has not lost its basic qualities of the most massive and large-scale destruction, but also added to this the latest factors of global threat of its proliferation and the challenges of innovative technological advances in its means of delivery. The latter is increasingly imposed on the growing conflict of the modern multipolarworld order, thereby giving impetus to global competition in the accumulation of all forms of nuclear weapons and allocating unprecedented financial resources from nuclear and non-nuclear powers. It is shown that the most fierce competition in the nuclear arms race is developing in the triangle of relations and national interests between the US, Russia and China. On the same fact base, it is argued that China cannot be compared to the other two nations in the accumulated nuclear weapon arsenals, but that its technological positions and growing military potential lead to major changes in the bilateral concepts of international security and even to the termination of a number of Russian-American treaty agreements, above all in development of medium- and short-range ground-based missiles. There is also a gradual transition to a new deployment of forces and global strategies in the field of nuclear arms. World awareness of these changes is needed in a kind of the Swedish proposal on implementation of strategy for the “step-by-step” approach to nuclear disarmament. In general, challenges and threats should stimulate international dialogue in defense of the principle of peace-sharing in a global age

Russell on technology and common sense

This article examines the distinction that Russell drew between his work as a philosopher and his work as a journalist. It explains why, when warning against the threat posed by a nuclear arms race, Russell thought it better to write as a journalist (speaking on behalf of common sense) rather than as a philosopher. It is argued that to put aside philosophy in favour of common sense is, in this instance, a mistake.