Multiple Realization and Reductionism

2021 ◽  
pp. 9-34
Author(s):  
Wei Fang
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Aizawa ◽  
Carl Gillett

This article examines massive multiple realization (MMR) in the context of neurobiology. It highlights the differences in the conception of multiple realization and its methodological implications by researchers in the philosophy of psychology and those in the philosophy of neuroscience. It discusses neurobiological findings about MMR and shows that there is plausibly important individual variation at every physiologically significant level of organization in the nervous system. It explores philosophical concerns about the MMR hypothesis and proposes a framework for realization and multiple realization.


Synthese ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 167 (3) ◽  
pp. 473-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert C. Richardson

Author(s):  
Samir Okasha

What exactly is scientific explanation? ‘Explanation in science’ begins with Carl Hempel's covering law model of explanation, which says that to explain a phenomenon is to show that its occurrence follows deductively from a general law, perhaps supplemented by other laws and/or particular facts, all of which must be true. This model does not deal with symmetry or irrelevance. The covering law model implies that explanation should be a symmetric relation, but in fact it is asymmetric. Also, a good explanation of a phenomenon should contain information that is relevant to the phenomenon's occurrence. Causality-based accounts of scientific explanation and the concepts of reduction and multiple realization are also explained.


2009 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENNETH AIZAWA ◽  
CARL GILLETT
Keyword(s):  

Synthese ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 196 (8) ◽  
pp. 3337-3353 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Zerilli
Keyword(s):  

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