Neurophilosophy, Philosophy of Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence: The Problem of Distinguishing

Neurophilosophy is understood as different areas of philosophy, for example, the philosophy of neuroscience, the philosophy of artificial intelligence, or eliminative materialism. This excessive interpretation of the term is due to the fact that the understanding of the subject area of this discipline is still incomplete. For example, one of the earliest definitions of neurophilosophy given by P.S. Churchland stated reduction of psychology to neurosciences. In modern views, the idea of neurophilosophy as an attempt to justify eliminative materialism is outdated and does not correspond to reality. The article analyzes the terms “philosophy of neuroscience,” “neurophilosophy,” and “philosophy of artificial intelligence” and also offers a variant of their differentiation. The authors focus on the common and different features, using the example of G.M. Edelman's theory of consciousness and the concept of connectionism for weak artificial intelligence. It is concluded that integral use of the term “neurophilosophy” should be abandoned. As a result, the term “neurophilosophy” should be understood as a direction in philosophy of the early 21st century, applying neuroscientific concepts to solve traditional philosophical problems, while the philosophy of specific neurosciences can be considered primarily as a field in the philosophy of science that formulates and solves problems of specific neurosciences as well as of the entire neuroscientific direction. The philosophy of artificial intelligence is an area in philosophy that answers the question of what non-biological intelligence is and what makes it possible; in other words, it is a philosophical and methodological basis for the study of non-biological intelligence. In the formation of neurosciences and their scientific and philosophical basis, we are still at the first methodological stage of the analysis and differentiation of hypotheses. After some time, there will emerge a philosophy of neuroscience, as the basis of all existing neuroscientific theories, and then this term will acquire greater significance.

Philosophy of Neuroscience

Contemporary neuroscience is transforming how we know and understand ourselves in the world. Neuroscientists scan human brains to infer what individual persons, and interacting groups of people, are thinking and feeling. They use laser light and designer gene technologies to turn on and off specific circuits in behaving animals. Neuroengineers develop prostheses that can replace damaged neural structures. Philosophers have been taking notice of these developments and sometimes contributing to them. The philosophy of neuroscience investigates foundational questions across this interdisciplinary field and explores their relevance to long-standing philosophical disputes. Such questions cover norms of experimental methods, the nature of neuroscientific explanation, the nature of and relations among levels of theory, phenomena, and mechanisms, whether mind reduces to brain, whether neural states are representations, whether neural processes are computations, and the neural basis of consciousness. The philosophy of neuroscience overlaps so-called neurophilosophy, which is the appeal to neuroscientific results to address traditionally philosophical questions. By most accounts, the topics in this bibliography may be classified as either philosophy of neuroscience or neurophilosophy, depending on terminological preferences. According to Google Ngram Viewer, usage of the term “neurophilosophy” peaked in 2001 and then declined in favor of the term “philosophy of neuroscience.”

The Development and Application of Efficient Coding Explanation in Neuroscience

In the philosophy of neuroscience, much attention has been paid to mechanistic causal explanations, both in terms of their theoretical virtues, and their application in potential therapeutic interventions. Non-mechanistic, non-causal explanatory models, it is often assumed, would have no role to play in any practical endeavors. This assumption ignores the fact that many of the non-mechanistic explanatory models which have been successfully employed in neuroscience have their origins in engineering and applied sciences, and are central to many new neuro-technologies. This chapter examines the development of explanations of lateral inhibition in the early visual system as implementing an efficient code for converting photoreceptor input into a data-compressed output from the eye to the brain. Two applications of the efficient coding approach are considered: in streamlining the vast datasets of current neuroscience by offering unifying principles, and in building artificial systems that replicate vision and other cognitive functions.

Philosophy of Neuroscience

The experimental study of the brain has exploded in the past several decades, providing rich material for both philosophers of science and philosophers of mind. In this chapter, the authors summarize some central research areas in philosophy of neuroscience. Some of these areas focus on the internal practice of neuroscience, that is, on the assumptions underlying experimental techniques, the accepted structures of explanations, the goals of integrating disciplines, and the possibility of a unified science of the mind-brain. Other areas focus outwards on the potential impact that neuroscience is having on our conception of the mind and its place in nature.

Philosophy of Neuroscience

The experimental study of the brain has exploded in the past several decades, providing rich material for both philosophers of science and philosophers of mind. In this chapter, the authors summarize some central research areas in philosophy of neuroscience. Some of these areas focus on the internal practice of neuroscience, that is, on the assumptions underlying experimental techniques, the accepted structures of explanations, the goals of integrating disciplines, and the possibility of a unified science of the mind-brain. Other areas focus outwards on the potential impact that neuroscience is having on our conception of the mind and its place in nature.