Museum of Outstanding Figures in Ukrainian Culture

This paper deals with a famous problem of epistemic logic – logical omniscience. Logical omniscience occurs in the logical systems where the axiomatics is complete and consequently an agent using inference rules knows everything about the system. Logical omniscience is a major problem due to complexity problems and the inability for adequate human reasoning modeling. It is studied both informal logic and philosophy of psychology (bounded rationality). It is important for bounded rationality because it reflects the problem of formal characterization of purely psychological mechanisms. Paper proposes to solve it using the ideas from the philosophical bounded rationality and intuitionistic logic. Special regions of deductible formulas developed according to psychologistic criterion should guide the deductive model. The method is compared to other ones presented in the literature on logical omniscience such as Hintikka’s and Vinkov and Fominuh. Views from different perspectives such as computer science and artificial intelligence are also provided.

MJO as a Gestalt

Objectively identifying a phenomenon from observation is often difficult. This essay reflects upon this problem from a philosophical perspective by taking the Madden-Julian oscillation (MJO) as an example. I argue that it can be considered as a problem of Gestalt. This concept is introduced by closely following Ludwig Wittgenstein’s two philosophical works, “Philosophical Investigations (Philosophische Untersuchungen)” and “Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie)”. Reflections upon the concept of Gestalt suggest why an objective identification of a phenomenon is so difficult. Importantly, the problem should not be reduced to that of a “pattern recognition”. Rather a given phenomenon must be considered as a whole, including a question of a driving mechanism.

Philosopher of psychology (to the 100-th anniversary of the birth of M. S. Rogovin)

The article is dedicated to the centenary of the birth of the famous Russian psychologist M.S. Rogovin. His contribution to the development of many branches of psychological science (pathopsychology and medical psychology, military psychology, cognitive psychology, general psychology, history of psychology, methodology of psychology, etc.) is noted. His contribution to the philosophy of psychology is emphasized, it is noted that his research devoted to the logic of the development of psychological science was of the greatest relevance. The article attempts to highlight the main features of the scientist's scientific style. On the basis of the historical and methodological analysis of the development of world psychological science carried out by M.S. Rogovin, an attempt is made to reconstruct the main provisions of the author's philosophy of psychology. It is noted that the researcher's contribution is unique: in the sixties of the twentieth century, M.S. Rogovin wrote his works, clearly and unequivocally referring to world psychology as a unified science (Soviet psychology, contrary to ideology, was considered by the author not as a new stage in the development of psychology, but in no way more than one of the directions in world science), which has its own patterns and development trends, which were the main subject of his scientific analysis. An analysis is given of M.S. Rogovin's warnings about dangerous trends in the development of psychological science, which are still relevant today. The characteristics of the decisions made by M.S. Rogovin and his students of the most important methodological issues of psychological science are given.

The Self

This book is about the ways that the concept of an ‘I’ or a ‘self’ has been developed at different times in the history of western philosophy; it also offers a striking contrast case, the ‘interconnected’ self, who appears in some expressions of African philosophy. If ‘human being’ is a biological classification, ‘I’ is a mental one. What I’s do is think. The most common theme across western accounts of ‘I’s that think’ is that they are self-conscious. A second theme (in the west) is that selves have unity: There is one self who recalls past experiences and anticipates future actions. Despite being self-conscious selves, it has proven difficult to say what a self is without paradox. Normally, the object of consciousness pre-exists the consciousness, but we cannot be a self without being self-conscious, so it seems that a self and the consciousness thereof must be coeval. How can we be self-aware and yet have no idea of what a self is? (It cannot just be a body, since a live human body might not be able to think.) The essays in this volume engage many philosophical resources—metaphysics, epistemology, phenomenology, philosophy of psychology and philosophy of language—to illuminate these puzzles. The Reflections present attempts to approach some aspects of these puzzles scientifically and also provide a sense of how central they are to human life.

THE REVIVAL OF VIRTUE ETHICS AS AN ETHICAL VIEW

<span lang="EN-US">Aristotle and Plato were the chief architects of virtue ethics, but their own formulation of virtue ethics was mostly subdued with the appearance of consequentialism as well as Kantian deontology. However, modem thinkers have attempted to revive virtue ethics in its new form and in this regard the name which is popularly known is G.E.M. Anscombe. In fact Anscombe clearly indicates in what sense virtue ethics can be revived and what was wrong with the traditional virtue ethics as expounded by Aristotle and Plato. Anscombe points out three important issues for which traditional virtue ethics perhaps lost its glory. First, moral philosophy in general cannot survive without an adequate philosophy of psychology and this thing was absent in the traditional virtue ethics. Secondly, without psychological possibility the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty, the moral sense of ought to be jeopardized. Thirdly and importantly, the differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance. This task of this paper is to review the revival of virtue ethics</span>

The Revival of Virtue Ethics As an Ethical View

Aristotle and Plato were the chief architects of virtue ethics, but their own formulation of virtue ethics was mostly subdued with the appearance of consequentialism as well as Kantian deontology. However, modem thinkers have attempted to revive virtue ethics in its new form and in this regard the name which is popularly known is G.E.M. Anscombe. In fact Anscombe clearly indicates in what sense virtue ethics can be revived and what was wrong with the traditional virtue ethics as expounded by Aristotle and Plato. Anscombe points out three important issues for which traditional virtue ethics perhaps lost its glory. First, moral philosophy in general cannot survive without an adequate philosophy of psychology and this thing was absent in the traditional virtue ethics. Secondly, without psychological possibility the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty, the moral sense of ought to be jeopardized. Thirdly and importantly, the differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance. This task of this paper is to review the revival of virtue ethics.