Education as a Moral Practice

2021 ◽  
pp. 195-205
Author(s):  
Richard Pring
Keyword(s):  
Moral Practice

scholarly journals Ethical Theory and Moral Practice at 24

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-3
Author(s):  
Lubomira Radoilska ◽  
Emanuela Ceva
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Recent Developments

AbstractThis Editorial outlines recent developments in the Journal’s scope, mission and review policy. It also illustrates the range of topics addressed on the pages of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, which is now entering its 24th year.

scholarly journals The experience of moral interaction of students with other people: a pedagogical aspect

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 274-278
Author(s):  
Anna Aleksandrovna Razumovskaya
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
External Factors ◽  
Structural Components ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Fundamental Structure ◽  
Cognitive Component ◽  
Moral Person ◽  
The World ◽  
Pedagogical Aspect ◽  
The Relationship

The paper actualizes the problem of a persons formation as a moral person with virtues. The directions of moral education, contributing to the formation of a moral personality, are indicated, and the need to highlight the formation of the experience of moral interaction with other people among university students as an aspect of moral education is argued. It is substantiated that the experience of moral interaction of students with other people is the result of the implementation of a special type of relationship in which moral values are actualized, taking the form of motives of actions and actions of students in relation to other people, which in such an experience reflecting moral practice as a set of real actions of a student, the world of morality and its inherent values is being realized. The methodological grounds for identifying the structure of the experience of moral interaction of students with other people are revealed: scientific provisions on the reflection in the fundamental structure of experience of the fundamental structure of the world; scientific provisions on individual morality, mediating the relationship between external factors that determine the behavior of a person and its internal (social, moral) meaning. The structural components of the experience of moral interaction of students with other people are highlighted: cognitive, motivational-value, communicative and behavioral components and the possibilities of identifying these components are argued. It is substantiated that the allocation of the cognitive component is based on the idea of the correspondence of behavior to knowledge; the allocation of a motivational-value component - on the position of the guiding role in human activity of motives, the form of which values take; highlighting the communicative component - on the interpretation of communication as one of the types of interaction that has a moral component; the allocation of the behavioral component - on the provisions of moral practice.

Emotions and Incommensurable Moral Concepts

Philosophy ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-604 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Randel Koons
Keyword(s):  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Moral Concept ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Moral Realist ◽  
Epistemic Role

Many authors have argued that emotions serve an epistemic role in our moral practice. Some argue that this epistemic connection is so strong that creatures who do not share our affective nature will be unable to grasp our moral concepts. I argue that even if this sort of incommensurability does result from the role of affect in morality, incommensurability does not in itself entail relativism. In any case, there is no reason to suppose that one must share our emotions and concerns to be able to apply our moral concept successfully. Finally, I briefly investigate whether the moral realist can seek aid and comfort from Davidsonian arguments to the effect that incommensurability in ethics is in principle impossible, and decide that these arguments are not successful. I conclude that the epistemic role our emotions play in moral discourse does not relativize morality.

The moral dimensions of assessment in early childhood education

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-166
Author(s):  
Cary A Buzzelli
Keyword(s):  
Early Childhood ◽  
Early Childhood Education ◽  
Capability Approach ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Childhood Education ◽  
Technical Practice ◽  
Children’S Agency ◽  
Opportunities For Learning ◽  
Moral Dimensions ◽  
Learner’S Perspective

This article conceptualizes assessment in early childhood education as a moral practice using Amartya Sen’s capability approach and Thomas A Schwandt’s practical hermeneutic approach to assessment and evaluation. After describing the moral connection Sen makes between development and assessment, Schwandt’s conceptualization of evaluation is presented as reframing it from a technical practice to one based on practical moral knowledge, having moral significance for teachers and children. Assessment as a moral practice must be done from two perspectives: from the learner’s perspective to assess children’s agency in guiding their own learning, and from the environment’s perspective to assess the opportunities for learning afforded children by the environment. Balancing assessment from these two perspectives is a moral challenge for teachers. The final section examines the recent work by Margaret Carr and Jennifer Keys Adair, who offer new approaches to assessment in early childhood that incorporate methods consistent with the capability approach and Schwandt. The goal of the article is to outline a moral practice of assessment in early childhood education.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document