Metasemantics for the Relaxed

This chapter discusses how to meet the ‘generalized integration challenge’ as a relaxed moral realist by providing a metasemantics of moral vocabulary which is compatible with relaxing about moral metaphysics and epistemology. Employing normative inferentialism and focussing on evaluative moral terms in particular, it is suggested that evaluative moral terms function to explain proprieties of language exit transitions, where having this function amounts to systematizing language exit transitions through a process of reflective equilibrium. Crucially, this inferentialist take on explanatory function does not engender any substantive metaphysical commitments about moral properties. Moreover, the systematization process on which it is based is undertaken from within moral discourse. As such, understanding evaluative terms as tools that systematize language exits fits perfectly with the relaxed take on moral discourse.

Von der Möglichkeit des moralischen Subjektivismus. Eine Untersuchung zum Einstellungscharakter von Moral und Religion

Moral subjectivism is commonly associated with out-of-favour theories like, e.g., Alfred Ayer’s emotivism or John Mackie’s error theory. This paper approaches the field against the background of the attitudinal character of morality and religion. The possibility of a brand of moral subjectivism is established which is common to Ayer’s and Mackie’s theories in name only but seems to have considerable merits. The perspective from action theory and the philosophy of mind suggests that the problem of moral obligation, central to moral philosophy, is more convincingly dealt with by subjectivism than by its rivals: In contrast to realism or even relativism (with which subjectivism often gets confused), subjectivism can help to explain the peculiarities of obligation without forcing us to disregard the parallel problem in the field of religion. This finding calls into question the rationale for, as well as the success of, central assumptions in ontology and semantics which the realist so freely hands out in order to make his point: If religious facts and the truth-aptness of religious judgements will not explain religious obligation, moral facts and the truth-aptness of moral judgements will not help the moral realist either. So, unless we do not wish to simply cast the problem of moral obligation aside, in future, moral subjectivism must be seriously considered as a worthwhile position in its own right.

Herman Bavinck, Reformed Ethics: Created, Fallen, and Converted Humanity

Herman Bavinck (1854–1921), the Dutch master of dogmatic theology, wrote a systematic treatise in theological ethics. Bavinck is a theistic moral realist whose ethics is deontological and virtue centered. His realism—both ontological and epistemic—is reflected in his understanding of conscience and its relation to the objective moral law. Furthermore, this review article discusses issues in Christian anthropology, particularly the selfhood of the human person, the relation between nature and grace, creation and redemption, and philosophy and theology, and the distinction between objective and subjective religion. It concludes with a brief reflection on Bavinck’s hermeneutics of renewal and reform in the continuity of the catholicity of the Reformed tradition.

Debates acerca das apropriações da ética kantiana

Este artigo procura colocar em foco a interpretação de John Rawls (1921-2002) acerca da ética de Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Sendo Rawls, talvez, o autor contemporâneo que mais ecos encontrou lançando uma teoria política original que reclama para si uma herança kantiana, faz-se de grande importância esclarecer os pontos centrais de sua apropriação e os questionamentos levantados por outros comentadores de Kant que possuem leituras conflitantes do filósofo de Königsberg. Assim, tratarei, em primeiro lugar, do forte formalismo que Rawls atribui a Kant, derivado, em grande parte, de seu foco na primeira formulação do imperativo categórico em detrimento das demais. Em seguida, abordarei a consequência particular que o professor de Harvard extrai daí e que batiza de construtivismo ético: além de o imperativo categórico se constituir num procedimento vazio de teste das máximas particulares, esse procedimento verdadeiramente cria os princípios morais a partir da razão. Anteriormente à atividade racional, inexistem fatos morais. Por fim, trarei um brevíssimo resumo das críticas dirigidas por outros autores a essa caracterização construtivista do pensamento moral kantiano, buscando apresentar os argumentos dos que preferem enquadrar Kant como um realista em moral. Debates surrounding appropriations of Kantian ethics: doubts about John Rawls' constructivism Abstract: This article seeks to throw light on John Rawls’s (1921-2002) interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) ethics. Being Rawls, perhaps, the contemporary author that has found more repercussion proposing a political theory which claims a kantian inheritance, it’s greatly important to clarify the central points of his appropriation and the questionings arisen by others Kant’s commentators which have conflicting views about the German philosopher. Therefore, first of all, I will consider the Strong formalism that Rawls attributesto Kant, derived mainly of his focus on the categorical imperative’s first formulacion, to the detriment of the others. Then, I willl talk about the particular consequence the Harvard’s professor draws from that, which he baptizes ethical constructivism: not only the categorical imperative is simply an empty procedure to test the particular maxims, but also this procedure truly creates the moral principles from reason alone. Previous to the racional activity, there is no moral facts. Finally, I will bring a brief summary of the critics made by other authors to that constructivist caracterization of the kantian moral thought, trying to introduce the arguments of those who prefer to classify Kant as a moral realist.

Moral Realism and the Problem of Moral Aliens

In this paper, I discuss a new problem for moral realism, the problem of moral aliens. In the first section, I introduce this problem. Moral aliens are people who radically disagree with us concerning moral matters. Moral aliens are neither obviously incoherent nor do they seem to lack rational support from their own perspective. On the one hand, moral realists claim that we should stick to our guns when we encounter moral aliens. On the other hand, moral realists, in contrast to anti-realists, seem to be committed to an epistemic symmetry between us and our moral aliens that forces us into rational suspension of our moral beliefs. Unless one disputes the very possibility of moral aliens, this poses a severe challenge to the moral realist. In the second section, I will address this problem. It will turn out that, on closer scrutiny, we cannot make any sense of the idea that moral aliens should be taken as our epistemic peers. Consequently, there is no way to argue that encountering moral aliens gives us any reason to revise our moral beliefs. If my argument is correct, the possibility of encountering moral aliens poses no real threat to moral realism.

Spinoza and Moral Anti-Realism

It is undeniable that the Ethics contains seemingly incompatible claims about the nature of goodness and badness. The text presents its share of challenges to anyone who sets out to construct a coherent interpretation of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. It is not a surprise that these difficulties have led scholars to interpretations that do not agree on every detail. This chapter focuses on what in the author’s judgment is a major difficulty for a charitable interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of goodness and badness and then he examines Michael LeBuffe’s way of meeting this challenge, a way that constitutes an alternative to the moral realist reading defended in chapter 3.

Spinoza’s Moral Realism

This chapter shows that Spinoza is committed to a type of moral realism. By “moral realism” is meant a theory of the way of life that is best for us as human beings, a theory based on a view on which good and bad are objective properties. By “objective property” is meant a property whose instance(s) does (do) not directly depend on anyone’s desires, emotions, or beliefs about its existence and nature. The author argues that, for Spinoza, the properties of goodness and badness are objective properties. Instances of goodness do not directly depend on someone’s desires, emotions, and beliefs about the existence and nature of goodness. The same holds for badness. His argument for this reading hinges on the conception of human nature that Spinoza appeals to in his definition of “virtue” (4D8). This conception of human nature serves as the foundation for the objectivity of the properties of goodness and badness, and the author contends that it is this that makes Spinoza a type of moral realist.

Conclusion

The reconstruction of Schopenhauer’s ethical thought on offer in this book is novel in three main ways. First, it views Schopenhauer as a more faithful Kantian than most commentators have been apt to recognize. Second, it sees Schopenhauer’s philosophy as an evolving rather than static body of thought. Third, it claims that there are really two Schopenhauers—The Knight of Despair and the Knight with Hope—and this distinction helps to capture the real incompatibilities between the resignationist and the compassionate moral realist sides of Schopenhauer’s ethical thought. This reconstructed version of Schopenhauer’s ethical theory—compassionate moral realism—provides an interesting option for the contemporary ethical-theoretical landscape. A Schopenhauerian value ontology of degrees of inherent value puts this theory into the animal rights camp, but in a more moderate way—closer to Mary Anne Warren’s “weak animal rights” position, rather than Tom Regan’s strong theory of animal rights.

Actors and Spectators: Rousseau’s Contribution to the Eighteenth-century Debate on Self-interest

A debate between virtuous self-interest and social morality emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The historical narrative of these ideas has been touched on by others – such as Albert O. Hirschman, Pierre Force, and Eric MacGilvray – with nuance and detail, but broadly one can recognize two camps: those who saw public utility in self-interest through the positive externalities of commerce, and those who had serious concerns over the political outcomes of the entanglement of commerce and virtue. This chapter follows these studies and attempts to locate Rousseau (primarily) and Smith (secondarily) within this debate. By looking at how their particular moral philosophies interact with their political thought it is argued that Rousseau is distinct from Smith in an important, but often confused, way: while some have argued that Rousseau is a moralist and Smith a philosopher of the political and social value of self-interest, it will be argued here that the opposite may be true. That is, despite Rousseau's “general will” and Smith's “impartial spectator” having been identified as similar moral tools used to overcome the negative aspects of self-interest through externalized self-reflection, it is argued that Rousseau is a moral rationalist who is skeptical of reason as a moral motivator, and thus dismisses the general will as a tool which can encourage personal moral action, while Smith is a moral realist, but a particularly soft one in regard to the motivational force of morality, and instead turns to rationality – through the impartial spectator – as a source of moral action. The upshot of this distinction being, Rousseau does not deny the power of commerce and self-interest as motivational forces, simply their social utility; social institutions like English coffeehouses – centres of politeness and doux commerce – should exist, and self-interest should motivate, but both need to be cleansed of the vice of commerce. That is, this chapter argues that Smith is moral realist who relies on reason – specifically that one must be a spectator who can impartially and rationally reflect on situations in order to will moral ends – and Rousseau is a moral rationalist who relies on sentiment – one must have an interest in situations if they are to be a moral actor.

Moral realism

Moral realism is the view that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which wrong, and about which things are good and which bad. But behind this bald statement lies a wealth of complexity. If one is a full-blown moral realist, one probably accepts the following three claims. First, moral facts are somehow special and different from other sorts of fact. Realists differ, however, about whether the sort of specialness required is compatible with taking some natural facts to be moral facts. Take, for instance, the natural fact that if we do this action, we will have given someone the help they need. Could this be a moral fact – the same fact as the fact that we ought to do the action? Or must we think of such a natural fact as the natural ‘ground’ for the (quite different) moral fact that we should do it, that is, as the fact in the world that makes it true that we should act this way? Second, realists hold that moral facts are independent of any beliefs or thoughts we might have about them. What is right is not determined by what I or anybody else thinks is right. It is not even determined by what we all think is right, even if we could be got to agree. We cannot make actions right by agreeing that they are, any more than we can make bombs safe by agreeing that they are. Third, it is possible for us to make mistakes about what is right and what is wrong. No matter how carefully and honestly we think about what to do, there is still no guarantee that we will come up with the right answer. So what people conscientiously decide they should do may not be the same as what they should do.