Perceptual Expertise I: Mental Architecture

2021 ◽  
pp. 141-172
Author(s):  
Dustin Stokes
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Lindsey M. Kitchell ◽  
Francisco J. Parada ◽  
Brandi L. Emerick ◽  
Tom A. Busey

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (10) ◽  
pp. 31b
Author(s):  
Adam H Dickter ◽  
Chris I Baker

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (10) ◽  
pp. 176-176
Author(s):  
C. Rubino ◽  
E. Ahlen ◽  
C. S. Hills ◽  
H. M. Hanif ◽  
J. J. S. Barton

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Most ◽  
Kim Curby

Although physical salience looms large in the attentional capture literature, stimuli can also capture attention via salience deriving from non-physical factors. Such psychological salience can stem, for example, from the emotional resonance of stimuli or their relevance to a person’s expertise. We consider how insights from a recently proposed framework for attentional capture can be used to advance theory and drive research on the role of emotion-driven attentional biases in clinical disorders and on how attentional allocation changes with the development of perceptual expertise. In return, we wonder how their common framework can be enriched through considerations of psychological salience.


2017 ◽  
pp. 200-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mackenzie Sunday ◽  
Isabel Gauthier

Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Madeleine Ransom

AbstractDoes the scope of beliefs that people can form on the basis of perception remain fixed, or can it be amplified with learning? The answer to this question is important for our understanding of why and when we ought to trust experts, and also for assessing the plausibility of epistemic foundationalism. The empirical study of perceptual expertise suggests that experts can indeed enrich their perceptual experiences through learning. Yet this does not settle the epistemic status of their beliefs. One might hold that the background knowledge of experts is the cause of their enriched perceptual experience – what is known as cognitive permeation – and so their subsequent beliefs are only mediately justified because they are epistemically dependent on this background knowledge. I argue against this view. Perceptual expertise is not the result of cognitive permeation but is rather the result of perceptual learning, and perceptual learning does not involve cognition in a way that entails cognitive permeation. Perceptual expertise thus provides a means of widening the scope of the immediately justified beliefs that experts can form.


2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (9) ◽  
pp. 1757-1767 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricky Van-yip Tso ◽  
Terry Kit-fong Au ◽  
Janet Hui-wen Hsiao
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 750-756 ◽  
Author(s):  
Buyun Xu ◽  
Liam Rourke ◽  
June K. Robinson ◽  
James W. Tanaka

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document