Conscious gestalts, apposite responses, and libertarian freedom

2019 ◽  
pp. 44-55
Author(s):  
Laura W. Ekstrom
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Muller

Grace and Freedom addresses the issue of divine grace in relation to the freedom of the will in Reformed or “Calvinist” theology in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century with a focus on the work of the English Reformed theologian William Perkins, and his role as an apologist of the Church of England, defending its theology against Roman Catholic polemic, and specifically against the charge that Reformed theology denies human free choice. Perkins and his contemporaries affirmed that salvation occurs by grace alone and that God is the ultimate cause of all things, but they also insisted on the freedom of the human will and specifically the freedom of choice in a way that does not conform to modern notions of libertarian freedom or compatibilism. In developing this position, Perkins drew on the thought of various Reformers such as Peter Martyr Vermigli and Zacharias Ursinus, on the nuanced positions of medieval scholastics, and on several contemporary Roman Catholic representatives of the so-called second scholasticism. His work was a major contribution to early modern Reformed thought both in England and on the continent. His influence in England extended both to the Reformed heritage of the Church of England and to English Puritanism. On the Continent, his work contributed to the main lines of Reformed orthodoxy and to the piety of the Dutch Second Reformation.


1995 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Widerker ◽  
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Deborah Boyle

This chapter argues that Margaret Cavendish is a libertarian with respect to the freedom of natural individuals. It takes account of the passages within Cavendish’s corpus that seem to imply she is a determinist and compatibilist, by examining debates about freedom and determinism current in her time, and by tracing the development of Cavendish’s views on this topic. This chapter also grapples with the claim that Cavendish lauded libertarian freedom in the political realm, which causes significant difficulties for the idea that she is a Royalist, ultimately rejecting this interpretation by focusing on Cavendish’s interests in the human’s inappropriate drive for fame.


Author(s):  
Brian Leftow

This chapter sketches an argument from the metaphysics of possibility to the existence of something that looks very like God. The argument concerns what is called broadly logical, metaphysical, or absolute possibility. The argument begins by contending that the best theory of this places the truth-makers of absolute possibility claims in the powers of actual existing concrete things: this, it contends, provides the most parsimonious metaphysics of possibility. It shows this inter alia by quick comparison with Meinongian, Platonist and David Lewis’ views. The argument leads to something resembling God: an omnipotent, necessarily existing rational agent. The chapter outlines three factors that lead one to ascribe a mind to this necessary being. It would be less strange to us if it had a mind. This provides the overall most adequate “powers” theory of possibility. And it alone seems to let this being provide the possibility that other beings act with libertarian freedom.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter J. Schultz ◽  
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 497-512
Author(s):  
KATHERIN A. ROGERS

AbstractBoth Molinism and Anselmianism attempt to preserve libertarian freedom for created agents as well as robust divine sovereignty. The two issues intersect in addressing the puzzle of Christ's freedom: If God is necessarily good, how can God Incarnate be free? Anselm answers: while human agents need options for our choices to be up to us, Christ inevitably chooses rightly with perfect freedom. I defend Anselm's answer against a general criticism and then argue that Anselm's position is preferable to the Molinist solution which has recently been championed by Thomas P. Flint.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-86
Author(s):  
Daniel Murphy

Granting that there could be true subjunctive conditionals of libertarian freedom (SCls), I argue (roughly) that there could be such conditionals only in connection with individual "possible creatures" (in contrast to types). This implies that Molinism depends on the view that, prior to creation, God grasps possible creatures in their individuality. In making my case, I explore the notions of counterfactual implication (that relationship between antecedent and consequent of an SCl which consists in its truth) and counterfactual relevance (that feature of an antecedent in virtue of which it counterfactually implies something or other).


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