The Argument from Possibility
This chapter sketches an argument from the metaphysics of possibility to the existence of something that looks very like God. The argument concerns what is called broadly logical, metaphysical, or absolute possibility. The argument begins by contending that the best theory of this places the truth-makers of absolute possibility claims in the powers of actual existing concrete things: this, it contends, provides the most parsimonious metaphysics of possibility. It shows this inter alia by quick comparison with Meinongian, Platonist and David Lewis’ views. The argument leads to something resembling God: an omnipotent, necessarily existing rational agent. The chapter outlines three factors that lead one to ascribe a mind to this necessary being. It would be less strange to us if it had a mind. This provides the overall most adequate “powers” theory of possibility. And it alone seems to let this being provide the possibility that other beings act with libertarian freedom.