The Radical Left Party Family in Western Europe, 1989-2015

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Chiocchetti
2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manès Weisskircher

Recently, scholars have shown a growing interest in radical left parties (RLPs). In terms of electoral success, the rise of the KPÖ Graz, the Communist Party in Austria’s second biggest city, represents perhaps the most counterintuitive case in Western Europe. Adding to previous studies, the rise of the KPÖ Graz contradicts many of the claims made and patterns found about the conditions for the electoral success of RLPs. While the national KPÖ was voted out of parliament in 1959, the Graz branch has been a member of local government since 1998. Since then, the party has managed to gain 20 per cent of the vote in three out of four elections. In 2017, the KPÖ defended its place as the second largest party in local legislature and stayed ahead of the radical right FPÖ, on the rise at the national level. In stark contrast to the Communists’ current strength, however, they did not gain even 2 per cent of the vote in 1983. This analysis shows how the party has managed to ‘own’ the issue of housing and to exploit local political opportunities in order to be electorally successful. The findings point to the importance of agency and the subnational level for RLPs, and highlight more general questions in the study of this party family.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 49-53
Author(s):  
A.V. Kuznetsova ◽  
◽  
S.V. Kuzmina ◽  

A round table on the evolution of the Western European radical left parties and movements was held online on November 19, 2020. The participants of the round table presented reports and discussed such key cases of the radical left parties as Podemos, the Unconquered France and SYRIZA. In addition, they discussed what impact the Latin American experience had on the radical left in Western Europe. In the early 21st century, radial left parties and movements in Western Europe experienced an upsurge, which was largely triggered by the 2008 financial crisis. The rise of the several radial left parties was also fueled by the mass protests that continued in Europe throughout 2010. Currently, the radical left party Podemos in Spain has lost some of its supporters and faced the need to either sacrifice its principled position or be replaced by other parties. The Unconquered France also lost a significant number of votes in the 2017 elections. Finally, the most successful of the European radical left parties - SYRIZA in Greece - also lost parliamentary elections in 2019 and was forced to become the main opposition party. The roundtable participants agreed that with the rise to power, left radicals are forced to significantly change their political discourse, deradicalize and adapt to the existing rules of the game. Radical left movements in Latin America have had an undeniable impact on the Western European left. The speakers also noted that the development of the radical left ideas in Russia differs significantly from those in Western Europe. Today, the Russian radical left has no significant influence on the political arena. This article summarizes the main aspects of the academic presentations and the discussions that accompanied them.


2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giorgos Charalambous ◽  
Iasonas Lamprianou

So far little has been done to explore similarities and differences between radical left parties and other traditionally perceived party families of the left at the societal level. A noticeable gap thus remains in the study of the European radical left: whether and in what ways social divides form the basis of radical left party support. Using data from the fourth round of the European Social Survey (2008), for five West European countries, we investigate radical left party supporters’ socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics, juxtaposing them with those of social democratic party supporters and green party supporters. Our approach departs from related studies by distinguishing three cognitional operations within the economic left-right axis, that are based on the distinction between ideals and their effects on reality; and by testing for intra-left divides revolving around trust. Based on insights from cleavage research, we devise a number of hypotheses, most of which test positively. Our findings suggest left party families across Western Europe do reflect certain lines of division in society, albeit with qualifications. While structural divides are not found to be significant, there appears to be correspondence between political and attitudinal divides on a three-dimensional space. These concern the cognitive divisions within the economic left-right axis, issues of political trust, and attitudes towards the environment. Our findings have conceptual and empirical implications both for the left and for investigations into cleavage politics.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthijs Rooduijn ◽  
Tjitske Akkerman

How is populism distributed over the political spectrum? Are right-wing parties more populist than left-wing parties? Based on the analysis of 32 parties in five Western European countries between 1989 and 2008, we show that radical parties on both the left and the right are inclined to employ a populist discourse. This is a striking finding, because populism in Western Europe has typically been associated with the radical right; only some particular radical left parties have been labeled populist as well. This article suggests that the contemporary radical left in Western Europe is generally populist. Our explanation is that many contemporary radical left parties are not traditionally communist or socialist (anymore). They do not focus on the ‘proletariat’, but glorify a more general category: the ‘good people’. Moreover, they do not reject the system of liberal democracy as such, but only criticize the political and/or economic elites within that system.


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