Teaching About Criminal Sentencing Decisions: The Crime and Punishment Simulations

Purpose The legal system’s use of risk assessment has grown exponentially over the past several decades. Empirically validated risk measures are commonly implemented in parole, bail, civil commitment, and presentence proceedings. Despite their growing popularity, both policy-makers and legal scholars question their moral and legal acceptability, particularly in presentence proceedings. The purpose of this paper is to assess the current role of risk assessment in sentencing through an examination of the instrument currently under construction in the state of Pennsylvania. Design/methodology/approach Drawing on the current state of the literature, this paper evaluates the current use of risk assessment in criminal sentencing and discusses its consequences, both positive and negative. Findings Four areas for improvement in the use of risk assessment in sentencing were identified. Recommendations for change are proposed. Practical implications While the use of risk assessment within the legal system has significantly increased over the past several decades, the incorporation of risk assessment in presentence proceedings is a relatively new practice. This paper provides readers with insight on the appropriateness of using risk assessment in this context and provides suggestions for reducing ethical concerns. Recommendations for increasing the validity and clinical utility of these instruments are also discussed. Originality/value Although the literature on the use of risk assessment in legal proceedings is dense, relatively little is written about their use in criminal sentencing. This paper introduces readers to this concept by examining a risk measure proposed for use in the state of Pennsylvania’s presentence proceedings. The authors discuss concerns and propose recommendations for the future use of risk assessment in this setting.

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When in Rome... on Local Norms and Sentencing Decisions

Journal of the European Economic Association ◽

10.1093/jeea/jvab038 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

David Abrams ◽

Roberto Galbiati ◽

Emeric Henry ◽

Arnaud Philippe

Keyword(s):

North Carolina ◽

Optimal Design ◽

Spatial Variation ◽

Criminal Sentencing ◽

Sentencing Decisions ◽

Local Practices ◽

Local Norms ◽

Judicial Systems

ABSTRACT We study spatial variation in criminal sentencing. We show the existence of local sentencing practices varying widely even across geographically proximate areas. Using compulsory rotation of judges in North Carolina, we find that judges arriving in a new court gradually converge towards local sentencing practices. We provide evidence that convergence in sentencing corresponds to a process of learning about local practices, which is accelerated by the presence of senior judges in the district, and that these sentencing practices are correlated with local norms of behavior. Finally, we discuss the theoretical implications of these results for the optimal design of judicial systems.

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Preferences and Incentives of Appointed and Elected Public Officials: Evidence from State Trial Court Judges

The American Economic Review ◽

10.1257/aer.103.4.1360 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 103 (4) ◽

pp. 1360-1397 ◽

Cited By ~ 64

Author(s):

Claire S. H Lim

Keyword(s):

Human Capital ◽

State Court ◽

Policy Outcomes ◽

Criminal Sentencing ◽

Public Officials ◽

Trial Court ◽

Voter Preferences ◽

Sentencing Decisions ◽

Selection Systems

We study how two selection systems for public officials, appointment and election, affect policy outcomes, focusing on state court judges and their criminal sentencing decisions. First, under appointment, policy congruence with voter preferences is attained through selecting judges with homogeneous preferences. In contrast, under election, judges face strong reelection incentives, while selection on preferences is weak. Second, the effectiveness of election in attaining policy congruence critically depends on payoffs from the job, which implies that the effectiveness of election may vary substantially across public offices. Third, reelection incentives may discourage judges with significant human capital from holding office. (JEL D72, K41)

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The Judge, the Politician, and the Press: Newspaper Coverage and Criminal Sentencing across Electoral Systems

American Economic Journal Applied Economics ◽

10.1257/app.20140111 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 7 (4) ◽

pp. 103-135 ◽

Cited By ~ 33

Author(s):

Claire S. H. Lim ◽

James M. Snyder ◽

David Strömberg

Keyword(s):

Political Institutions ◽

Sentence Length ◽

Newspaper Coverage ◽

State Court ◽

Criminal Sentencing ◽

Public Officials ◽

Trial Court ◽

Sentencing Decisions ◽

The Press ◽

Media Environments

We study how media environments interact with political institutions that structure the accountability of public officials. Specifically, we quantify media influence on the behavior of US state court judges. We analyze around 1.5 million criminal sentencing decisions from 1986 to 2006 and new data on the newspaper coverage of 9,828 trial court judges. Since newspaper coverage is endogenous, we use the match between newspaper markets and judicial districts to identify effects. We find that newspaper coverage significantly increases sentence length by nonpartisan elected judges for violent crimes. For partisan elected and appointed judges, there are no significant effects. (JEL D72, H76, K41, L82)

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