Opinion 117 of the Court of Justice on the legality, under EU law, of the investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism included in the CETA agreement. A case of legal pragmatism or the dawn of a new era?

2021 ◽  
pp. 37-68
Author(s):  
Sonja Boelaert
2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (7) ◽  
pp. 71-79
Author(s):  
A. Bolshakov

Sovereignty does not imply regulatory autonomy. After Brexit, the UK should align its regulatory policy with European norms, if it is interested in close partnership with the EU. Compromises must be made by both sides in order to ensure stability of the partnership. The EU will have to acknowledge the UK’s right to diverge from European rules. Britain will have to partly accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. The structure of dispute settlement mechanism which will be created under the partnership agreement should be a product of a compromise. The present study shows that optimal structure of dispute settlement mechanism must include two different procedures: one for political issues and the other for commercial issues. The central role for the European Court of Justice must be envisaged as a part of politically oriented procedure. There must be no role for the European Court of Justice or any Union to set the pace of political communication. The latter reflects the interest of Great Britain to simplify economic relations, which means that, firstly, disputes are resolved by independent arbiters; secondly, the EU acknowledges the UK’s right to diverge from European regulations; and thirdly, the UK accepts the EU’s right to impose countervailing duties to compensate for adverse effects of divergence on competition. This article also examines the main problems of future British regulatory policy, especially in the field of state aid. Boris Johnson’s government has decided not to form a full-fledged regulatory regime in the area of state aid. Its stance is politically appropriate since Conservative party manifesto for the 2019 general election promised to support local industries without limitations. But that decision created a great deal of economic risk. Firstly, the absence of a domestic subsidy control regulator can cause chaos within regulation system because workable norms and rules can only be sustained by a tight enforcement mechanism. Secondly, the EU can cite lack of subsidy control as an obstacle for British business to have unrestricted access to the European market.


2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
JASON HOUSTON-MCMILLAN

AbstractPrior to 2011, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade had been somewhat neglected as a dispute-settlement mechanism, due in part to the lack of previous interpretation of the Agreement by WTO DSB Panels. In 2012, the Appellate Body adjudicated on three TBT disputes:US–Clove Cigarettes, US–Tuna II, andUS–COOL, aiming to officially interpret and clarify Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Agreement by creating a distinct test for a measure's consistency with these Articles. This paper explores the relevant decisions of both the Panel and Appellate Body in the three disputes which led to the creation of the ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’ test. The substance behind this phrase, placed in context, is dissected along with the associated idea of ‘even-handedness’. The test attempts to simplify future interpretations regarding what will constitute unjustifiable discrimination, but at the cost of the necessary distinction between the GATT and the TBT Agreement being blurred. The result is a test which is incomplete and which fails to take account of the special circumstances surrounding the TBT Agreement.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (XX) ◽  
pp. 33-49
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Czermińska

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) serves as a forum for co-operation, currently for as many as 164 countries, and in addition, it allows for the resolution, also amicably, of trade conflicts between parties, consequently, settling disputes between them. One of essential provisions of the Uruguay Round (UR) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) included the introduction of a new dispute settlement mechanism, that is to say, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which became effective on 1 January 1995. Member States of the European Union were not only actively involved in developing the rules of the international trade system, but they also influenced, to a large extent, the form of both such rules and of ongoing trade negotiations, as well as they assumed and still assume responsibility for the final arrangements. Hence, their role in the multilateral trade system is both active and passive. This paper aims to demonstrate the functioning of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and show the role which the European Union serves in this system. The Article employs an analytical and descriptive method. It draws on sources from the national and international literature and WTO’s databases.


1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 424-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes L. Schloemann ◽  
Stefan Ohlhoff

The 1994 Uruguay Round revision of the dispute settlement mechanism under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) has made it a forum both for traditional trade issues and for interests ranging from environmental protection to national security. The limits of GATT jurisdiction have become important issues of dispute settlement within the WTO, especially as the emergence of the WTO and its rule-based, quasi-obligatory dispute settlement system has spurred a significant shift toward legalism. Constitutional structures are developing much faster in international trade law than in any other area of international law and, in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round, are integrating ever more aspects of economic relations among states. Within the WTO regime the dispute settlement mechanism established by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) plays a prominent role in enforcing its rules and reconciling a wide array of the members’ interests. The limits of the reach of the dispute settlement mechanism, given its obligatory character, are, to a certain degree, the limits of the constitutionalization of the organization as a whole.


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