The seven-year war of the French franc (1991-98)

Keyword(s):  
2001 ◽  
Vol 40 (4II) ◽  
pp. 885-897
Author(s):  
Razzaque H. Bhatti

Pak-rupee exchange rates vis-à-vis many currencies of the industrial world have weakened continuously and persistently since Pakistan abandoned fixed exchange rates in April 1982. This proposition is strongly supported by descriptive test statistics, as shown in Table 1, such as mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variation of six Pak rupee exchange rates—against the U.S. dollar, British pound, German mark, Japanese yen, Swiss franc and French franc—over the period 1982q1-2000q4. Based on these descriptive statistics, it is evident that Pak rupee has depreciated persistently against all currencies of the industrial countries in question over the period under investigation; for example, it has depreciated by 324.05 percent against the British pound, 406.360 percent against the U.S. dollar, 344.53 percent against the French franc, 498.48 percent against the Swiss franc, 477.78 percent against the German mark and 986.25 percent against the Japanese yen since April 1982. As evidenced by coefficient of variation, Pak rupee has weakened enormously against all currencies of the industrial world, while it has weakened relatively more alarmingly against the Japanese yen, Swiss franc and German mark.


1938 ◽  
Vol 174 (25) ◽  
pp. 458-459
Author(s):  
Senex
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Leslie E. Grayson ◽  
Golnar Sheikholeslami

This case concerns the troubles that Euro Disney experienced from the start. Euro Disney claimed that the major cause of its poor financial performance was the European recession and the strong French franc. The timing of the park's opening could not have been more inopportune. If the recession had been the only cause of Euro Disney's problems, the financial restructuring would only need to carry the park forward to better economic times. Only when Europeans began spending freely again would investors learn the answers to some uncomfortable questions: Was the whole idea of Euro Disney misconceived? Were there other fundamental cultural problems that could inhibit the park's success? Would Euro Disney fail to recover even though other European companies did? And, if so, why was the Disney theme-park concept successful in Japan and not in France?


1938 ◽  
Vol 175 (4) ◽  
pp. 65-65
Author(s):  
T. O. Mabbott
Keyword(s):  

1948 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 360-362

As early as January 19, 1948, the press reported that the devaluation of the French franc was under consideration by the French Government as a measure to stimulate French exports. Lengthy consultations between the French Director of the Fund (Mendès-France) and other officials of the Fund gave rise to the belief that agreement would be reached whereby the Fund could approve some devaluation of the franc. However, on January 25 the Fund announced that it could not permit the devaluation and that it regretted the decision of the French Government to proceed without the Fund's permission. Following French devaluation the following day, the Fund stated that it would continue to “work with the French Government in seeking a modification of these exchange practices in order to meet French needs within the framework of the international monetary arrangements established by the Fund Agreement.” The Fund subsequently accepted a provisional adjustment in its holdings of the franc from approximately 67,940 million to 122,292 million, representing an 80 per cent increase over January 24, 1948.


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