scholarly journals Significados de los bienes sociales: alcances en la justicia distributiva / Meanings of social goods: scope in distributive justice

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (27) ◽  
pp. 161-175
Author(s):  
María Teresa Ramírez Martínez ◽  
María del Rosario Guerra González
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Social Goods

Los principios éticos de la justicia distributiva se establecen mediante la importancia y sentido que diversas posturas teóricas le confieren a los bienes sociales. Se presenta un análisis sobre las limitantes en una sociedad plural y equitativa, al favorecer un solo tipo de bien social. El objetivo es contrastar tres corrientes filosóficas que abordan la teoría de la justicia, mediante propuestas de diversos precursores en el tema y concluir con una propuesta donde se incluyan distintos bienes que garanticen la diversidad de planes de vida y circunstancias. La primera pertenece al utilitarismo de Bentham y Mill; la segunda es de Rawls, filósofo liberal; en la tercera se incorpora “las capacidades” de Sen; la cuarta propuesta corresponde al filósofo de la tradición comunitarista Walzer. Por último, se integra la “teoría contractualista moral” de Scanlon. Por consiguiente, es imposible privilegiar un solo tipo de bien social, se propone la inclusión de la diversidad de significados y contextos como elementos que integren principios éticos filosóficos para el desarrollo de una sociedad justa e incluyente. Se utiliza como método el análisis y comparación de los autores con la finalidad de encontrar convergencias y divergencias entre éstos, lo cual permite ampliar la investigación para poder contextualizar cada postura teórica.

Stone Soup

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 869-889
Author(s):  
Mark Silcox ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Social Goods ◽  
Economic Distribution

Certain sorts of disputes about principles of distributive justice that have occupied a great deal of attention in recent political philosophy turn out to be fundamentally unresolvable, when they are conducted in ignorance of whether an important subclass of basic social goods exists within any particular society. I employ the folktale ‘Stone Soup’ to illustrate how such distributional goods might come into existence. Using the debate about John Rawls’s Difference Principle as an example, I argue that a proper appreciation for the axiological status of these goods shows that disputes about principles (at least as these have been conducted within the Rawlsian tradition) should be relegated to a subsidiary status relative to other, more fundamental concerns about the ethics of economic distribution.

Theories of Justice Applied to the Pandemic: The Case of Vaccine Distribution

2021 ◽  
Vol 77 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 643-656
Author(s):  
Ricardo Tavares Silva
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
General Problem ◽  
Selection Criterion ◽  
Broad Sense ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Commutative Justice ◽  
Social Goods ◽  
Vaccine Distribution

The problem of the distribution (in a broad sense) of the coronavirus vaccines – concerning the criterion by which the beneficiaries of the vaccine are selected – constitute a particular case of the general problem of the distribution of social goods. For this reason, it is necessary to discuss whether the selection criterion to be adopted is that of commutative justice or that of distributive justice and, consequently, whether the approach to the problem must follow an individualist perspective or a collectivist perspective, such as it happens regarding the general problem of the distribution of social goods. Therefore, problem of the distribution of the coronavirus vaccines is still a problem of social justice. In this essay, I will rehearse an application of each of these criteria to the problem at hand.

Discrimination as Negligence

2010 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 123-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophia Moreau
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Equal Access ◽  
Philosophical Literature ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
Social Goods ◽  
Principles Of Justice

There is a rich philosophical literature on the value of equality: on whether and why it matters, what its “currency” ought to be, and whether it should be balanced against other important values, such as freedom, or conceptualized in terms of equal access to them. Most of this literature is a contribution to debates about distributive justice: it is concerned with how we should understand equality when our aim is to arrive at general principles of justice that could guide social or political authorities in distributing goods under their control. But there is also a different context in which we can, and do, ask about equality. Sometimes, when we ask whether someone has been treated equally, our aim is to assess whether they have faced discrimination. This is, of course, what courts and human rights tribunals do when interpreting constitutional or statutory equality rights – for these rights are usually understood not as general rights to equal treatment in the distribution of social goods, but rather as rights not to be discriminated against on the basis of a select number of prohibited grounds.

Distributive Justice

2021 ◽  
pp. 232-257
Author(s):  
Christian Schemmel
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Social Status ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Power Inequality ◽  
Social Goods ◽  
Status Inequality ◽  
Instrumental Reasons ◽  
Do So

This chapter develops the implications of liberal relational egalitarianism for the distribution of goods produced by social cooperation. It shows that there are not only strong instrumental reasons to set stringent limits to inequality of income, wealth, and opportunity, on grounds of both non-domination and social status, but, contrary to what both many critics and proponents of relational equality argue, strong non-instrumental, expressive reasons to do so, as well: since participants in social cooperation are equals, all inequalities in social goods need to be justified by justice-relevant reasons even where they do not lead to domination or social status inequality. Rightly understood, relational egalitarianism thus requires a concentric attack on material inequality in society as well as on its sources in power inequality, through a plurality of rationales.

Distributive Justice Scale

1980 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert D. Enright ◽  
Christina C. Franklin ◽  
Lesley A. Manheim
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice
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