Distributive Justice

2021 ◽  
pp. 232-257
Author(s):  
Christian Schemmel
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Social Status ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Power Inequality ◽  
Social Goods ◽  
Status Inequality ◽  
Instrumental Reasons ◽  
Do So

This chapter develops the implications of liberal relational egalitarianism for the distribution of goods produced by social cooperation. It shows that there are not only strong instrumental reasons to set stringent limits to inequality of income, wealth, and opportunity, on grounds of both non-domination and social status, but, contrary to what both many critics and proponents of relational equality argue, strong non-instrumental, expressive reasons to do so, as well: since participants in social cooperation are equals, all inequalities in social goods need to be justified by justice-relevant reasons even where they do not lead to domination or social status inequality. Rightly understood, relational egalitarianism thus requires a concentric attack on material inequality in society as well as on its sources in power inequality, through a plurality of rationales.

Justice and Egalitarian Relations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Schemmel
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Social Status ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Liberal Conception ◽  
Social Opportunities ◽  
Status Inequality ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
Health Justice ◽  
Political Value

Why does equality matter, as a social and political value, and what does it require? Relational egalitarians argue that it does not primarily require that people receive equal distributive shares of some good, but that they relate as equals. This book develops a liberal conception of relational equality, which understands relations of non-domination and egalitarian norms of social status as stringent demands of social justice. First, it argues that expressing respect for the freedom and equality of individuals in social cooperation requires stringent protections against domination; develops a substantive, liberal conception of non-domination; and argues that non-domination is a particularly important, but not the only, concern of social justice. These features set it apart from, and provide it with crucial advantages over, neo-republican accounts of non-domination. Second, the book develops an account of the wrongness of inegalitarian norms of social status, which shows how status-induced foreclosure of important social opportunities is a social injustice in its own right, over and above the role of status inequality in enabling domination, and the threats it poses to individuals’ self-respect. Finally, it works out the implications of liberal relational egalitarianism for political, economic, and health justice, showing that it demands, in practice, far-reaching forms of equality in all three domains. In so doing, the book draws on, and brings together, several different literatures: on social justice and liberalism, distributive and relational equality, the distinct value of social equality, and neo-republicanism and non-domination.

The Social and Institutional Bases of Distributive Justice

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Economic Production ◽  
Political Cooperation ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Trade And Exchange ◽  
Cooperative Institutions

This chapter argues that distributive justice is institutionally based. Certain cooperative institutions are basic: they are necessary for economic production and the division of labor, trade and exchange, and distribution and consumption. These background institutions presuppose principles of justice to specify their terms, allocate productive resources, and define fair distributions. Primary among these basic institutions are property; laws and conventions enabling transfers of goods and productive resources; and the legal system of contract and agreements that make transfers possible and productive. Political institutions are necessary to specify, interpret, enforce, and make effective the terms of these institutions. Thus, basic cooperative institutions are social; they are realizable only within the context of social and political cooperation—this is a fixed empirical fact about cooperation among free and equal persons. Given the nature of fair social cooperation as a kind of reciprocity, distributive justice is primarily social rather than global in reach.

scholarly journals A DEFENSE OF HUMEAN PROPERTY THEORY

Legal Theory ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Ira K. Lindsay
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Scarce Resources ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
Humean Theory

ABSTRACT Two rival approaches to property rights dominate contemporary political philosophy: Lockean natural rights and egalitarian theories of distributive justice. This article defends a third approach, which can be traced to the work of David Hume. Unlike Lockean rights, Humean property rights are not grounded in pre-institutional moral entitlements. In contrast to the egalitarian approach, which begins with highly abstract principles of distributive justice, Humean theory starts with simple property conventions and shows how more complex institutions can be justified against a background of settled property rights. Property rights allow people to coordinate their use of scarce resources. For property rules to serve this function effectively, certain questions must be considered settled. Treating existing property entitlements as having prima facie validity facilitates cooperation between people who disagree about distributive justice. Lockean and egalitarian theories endorse moral claims that threaten to unsettle property conventions and undermine social cooperation.

The Effects of Expertise and Social Status on Team Member Influence and the Moderating Roles of Intragroup Conflicts

2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 745-776 ◽  
Author(s):  
Woonki Hong ◽  
Lu Zhang ◽  
Kwangwook Gang ◽  
Boreum Choi
Keyword(s):  
Social Status ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Project Teams ◽  
Team Processes ◽  
Team Members ◽  
Expectation States ◽  
Team Projects ◽  
Expectation States Theory ◽  
Team Project ◽  
Do So

Drawing on expectation states theory and expertise utilization literature, we examine the effects of team members’ actual expertise and social status on the degree of influence they exert over team processes via perceived expertise. We also explore the conditions under which teams rely on perceived expertise versus social status in determining influence relationships in teams. To do so, we present a contingency model in which the salience of expertise and social status depends on the types of intragroup conflicts. Using multiwave survey data from 50 student project teams with 320 members at a large national research institute located in South Korea, we found that both actual expertise and social status had direct and indirect effects on member influence through perceived expertise. Furthermore, perceived expertise at the early stage of team projects is driven by social status, whereas perceived expertise at the later stage of a team project is mainly driven by actual expertise. Finally, we found that members who are being perceived as experts are more influential when task conflict is high or when relationship conflict is low. We discuss the implications of these findings for research and practice.

Justice in a Complex World: An Introduction1

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paulo Barcelos
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Complex World ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
The Web ◽  
National Borders

This introductory chapter provides an overview of global justice. Theorising about global justice starts by questioning the symbolic role classically attributed to national borders as not only physical and administrative circumscriptions but also frontiers demanding the contours of the groups of people that are included and excluded from a scheme of distributive justice, that is, from a system of rules and institutions designed to regulate the distribution of the benefits and burdens originated from social cooperation between the individuals that compose a given community's basic structure. Defenders of global liberal conceptions of justice employ two types of argument to justify the inclusion of all persons worldwide within the web of normative ties between persons that create duties of moral assistance.

The Truth in Political Realism

2020 ◽  
pp. 68-121
Author(s):  
Charles Larmore
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Political Order ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Political Realism ◽  
Religious Traditions ◽  
Primary Object

This chapter analyzes groups that follow different moral or religious traditions that generally have their own internal controversies, such as conflicts in the absence of laws to handle them and render social cooperation difficult or even impossible. It also explains why political philosophy is not properly a province of moral philosophy. It talks about the fundamental task in determining the kind of political order that can justifiably impose authoritative rules for handling the major conflicts in society. The chapter also clarifies why legitimacy and not distributive justice should be the primary object of political philosophy. For legitimacy is involved with the conditions under which enforceable rules may be justifiably imposed on the members of a society.

Stone Soup

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 869-889
Author(s):  
Mark Silcox ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Social Goods ◽  
Economic Distribution

Certain sorts of disputes about principles of distributive justice that have occupied a great deal of attention in recent political philosophy turn out to be fundamentally unresolvable, when they are conducted in ignorance of whether an important subclass of basic social goods exists within any particular society. I employ the folktale ‘Stone Soup’ to illustrate how such distributional goods might come into existence. Using the debate about John Rawls’s Difference Principle as an example, I argue that a proper appreciation for the axiological status of these goods shows that disputes about principles (at least as these have been conducted within the Rawlsian tradition) should be relegated to a subsidiary status relative to other, more fundamental concerns about the ethics of economic distribution.

Theories of Justice Applied to the Pandemic: The Case of Vaccine Distribution

2021 ◽  
Vol 77 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 643-656
Author(s):  
Ricardo Tavares Silva
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
General Problem ◽  
Selection Criterion ◽  
Broad Sense ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Commutative Justice ◽  
Social Goods ◽  
Vaccine Distribution

The problem of the distribution (in a broad sense) of the coronavirus vaccines – concerning the criterion by which the beneficiaries of the vaccine are selected – constitute a particular case of the general problem of the distribution of social goods. For this reason, it is necessary to discuss whether the selection criterion to be adopted is that of commutative justice or that of distributive justice and, consequently, whether the approach to the problem must follow an individualist perspective or a collectivist perspective, such as it happens regarding the general problem of the distribution of social goods. Therefore, problem of the distribution of the coronavirus vaccines is still a problem of social justice. In this essay, I will rehearse an application of each of these criteria to the problem at hand.

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