Sergio Caruso. Curiositas as a Passion

The essay explores the work of Sergio Caruso, whose work moved from theories of justice to citizenship, from the notion of ideology to the role of intellectuals. I will retrace some of the fils rouges of Caruso’s production and adopt two main lenses of observation. First, his work will be presented as an example of immanent critique, and secondly, it will be analysed in the light of its more or less explicit normative outcomes.

Health in the Name of Justice: Does Justice Require a Right to Health

<p>Upholding and seeking justice in society has been important for philosophers and religious thinkers throughout the ages. Debates of different conceptions of justice have ranged from Plato’s conception of the just individual, to Aristotle’s just community where individuals receive what is owed to them according to their merit, to Kant’s claim that justice concerns the “… exercise of will among people; and it is concerned with the possibility and freedom of the exercise of will …” (Hudson, 2003, p. 11). Interpretations of justice and the value of justice in society vary. Fundamentally, however, theories of justice are concerned with answering the question, what do we as a society owe each other by determining the set of rights that are inalienable and vital for a just society to protect. Theories of justice hope to inform us of the rights that are essential for society to defend and uphold. The ever increasing amount of medical knowledge and sophisticated medical treatments now available raise questions of social justice in health and has prompted many to argue whether or not there is a right to health. As Charles Fried (1976) explained over thirty years ago, extending certain medical treatments to the poor seemed possible and inevitable during a period when certain medical advances in treating illness and disease, such as the introduction of antibiotics and vaccines, made a huge difference to the health of the population. He claims that in this “ ‘Golden Age’ we could unambiguously afford a notion of a general right to medical care because there were a number of clear successes available to medicine, and these successes were not unduly costly” (p. 29-30). However, as Fried recognised in the 1970s, and is even truer today with the costs associated with chronic illnesses, extending universal medical care to all in society in cases where treatment is expensive and marginally beneficial is problematic at best.</p>

Health in the Name of Justice: Does Justice Require a Right to Health

<p>Upholding and seeking justice in society has been important for philosophers and religious thinkers throughout the ages. Debates of different conceptions of justice have ranged from Plato’s conception of the just individual, to Aristotle’s just community where individuals receive what is owed to them according to their merit, to Kant’s claim that justice concerns the “… exercise of will among people; and it is concerned with the possibility and freedom of the exercise of will …” (Hudson, 2003, p. 11). Interpretations of justice and the value of justice in society vary. Fundamentally, however, theories of justice are concerned with answering the question, what do we as a society owe each other by determining the set of rights that are inalienable and vital for a just society to protect. Theories of justice hope to inform us of the rights that are essential for society to defend and uphold. The ever increasing amount of medical knowledge and sophisticated medical treatments now available raise questions of social justice in health and has prompted many to argue whether or not there is a right to health. As Charles Fried (1976) explained over thirty years ago, extending certain medical treatments to the poor seemed possible and inevitable during a period when certain medical advances in treating illness and disease, such as the introduction of antibiotics and vaccines, made a huge difference to the health of the population. He claims that in this “ ‘Golden Age’ we could unambiguously afford a notion of a general right to medical care because there were a number of clear successes available to medicine, and these successes were not unduly costly” (p. 29-30). However, as Fried recognised in the 1970s, and is even truer today with the costs associated with chronic illnesses, extending universal medical care to all in society in cases where treatment is expensive and marginally beneficial is problematic at best.</p>

Poverty, justice, and health

Poverty has long been a concern in public health with people living in poor circumstances generally suffering higher burdens of disease. Understanding the persistence of poverty, and of its impacts on health, unavoidably intersects with analyses of how inequalities arise in the distribution of income and wealth, and of the material and psychosocial resources these socioeconomic privileges accord. This chapter reviews different definitions of poverty, trends in the distribution of absolute and relative poverty, and strengths and weaknesses of the different concepts. It touches briefly on how poverty (by whatever definition) influences health, citing natural/social selection, cultural/behavioural, and materialist/structural explanations; and discusses how, in some instances, there is reverse causality with poor health worsening individual or household poverty, particularly in low-income countries suffering high disease burdens and weak health systems. The chapter then turns to a review of major theories of justice and how these argue for interventions, and the role that international human rights might play in furthering actions to reduce poverty-related health inequalities. It concludes with a short discussion of different sociopolitical approaches to poverty reduction, providing three examples of intervention policies.

Theories of Justice Applied to the Pandemic: The Case of Vaccine Distribution

The problem of the distribution (in a broad sense) of the coronavirus vaccines – concerning the criterion by which the beneficiaries of the vaccine are selected – constitute a particular case of the general problem of the distribution of social goods. For this reason, it is necessary to discuss whether the selection criterion to be adopted is that of commutative justice or that of distributive justice and, consequently, whether the approach to the problem must follow an individualist perspective or a collectivist perspective, such as it happens regarding the general problem of the distribution of social goods. Therefore, problem of the distribution of the coronavirus vaccines is still a problem of social justice. In this essay, I will rehearse an application of each of these criteria to the problem at hand.

Economically Unsustainable Drugs and Intergenerational Health Care Justice

"Introduction. The recent introduction of extremely effective drugs in treating diseases, but associated with exorbitant costs raised several issues in terms of distributive justice. However, in this debate justice is widely thought in intragenerational terms. The work will explore the concept of intergenerational health care justice, in particular the argument, often used to justify the introduction of this type of drugs, according to which the vast amount of money spent now will allow to have savings in the long run. The recent introduction of some drugs that are extremely effective in treating diseases but associated with exorbitant costs, raised several issues in terms of distributive justice. However, in this debate justice is widely thought in intragenerational terms. Methods: A review of key documents on intergenerational justice was conducted, followed by a nonsystematic review of peer-reviewed and gray literature. The existing material was analyzed and a draft manuscript was prepared and discussed. Some experts carried out the revision of the manuscript until consensus was reached. Results: The concept of intergenerational health care justice has never been well explored. From an intergenerational point of view, the argument – which is often supported by pharmaco-economic evaluations – according to which the vast amount of money spent now for this type of drugs will allow to have savings in the long run is not in itself coherent with the main theories of justice. Conclusions: Considerations that are extrinsic to the assumptions of the main theories of justice are needed in order to justify the argument above. "

Should we Ascribe Capabilities to Species and Ecosystems? A Critical Analysis of Ecocentric Versions of the Capabilities Approach

Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is today one of the most influential theories of justice. In her earlier works on the capabilities approach, Nussbaum only applies it to humans, but in later works she extends the capabilities approach to include sentient animals. Contrary to Nussbaum’s own view, some scholars, for example, David Schlosberg, Teea Kortetmäki and Daniel L. Crescenzo, want to extend the capabilities approach even further to include collective entities, such as species and ecosystems. Though I think we have strong reasons for preserving ecosystems and species within the capabilities approach, there are several problems with ascribing capabilities to them, especially if we connect it with the view that species and ecosystems are subjects of justice. These problems are partly a consequence of the fact that an ascription of capabilities to species and ecosystems needs to be based on an overlapping consensus between different comprehensive doctrines, in accordance with the framework of political liberalism on which the capabilities approach builds. First, the ascription of capabilities to species and ecosystems presupposes the controversial standpoint that they are objectively existing entities. Second, the ascription of capabilities to ecosystems and species and the view that they are subjects of justice is justified by claiming that they have integrity and agency, but these characteristics have different meanings when applied to collective entities and humans, respectively. Third, the view that species and ecosystems are subjects of justice seems to require the controversial assumption that they have interests of their own, which differ from the interests of the sentient beings that are part of them. However, even if we do not ascribe capabilities to species and ecosystems and regard them as subjects of justice, there are still strong reasons to protect them within the capabilities approach, as the preservation of ecosystems and species is an important precondition for many human and animal capabilities.

Theoretical Background: The Inclusion of Disabled People

This chapter starts by challenging the view of independence in legal theory. It goes on to assess social contract theory, in particular Rawls’s Theory of Justice, as well as criticisms of this theory put forward regarding disability. The aim is not only to expose the vacuum in political theory as well as the failure to offer disabled people equal moral consideration but also to examine what are the possible ways forward. The chapter therefore explores how theories of justice other than the social contract theory can be used in order to determine what is needed for including disabled people. It discusses two such theories, namely capabilities and recognition theories, and investigates both their limits and their potential in making them of benefit to all disabled people. It also proposes a combination of those theories so as to gear them towards the objectives of the CRPD.

Understanding the Ethics of Risk as Used in Epidemiology

This chapter analyzes the concept of risk that is central to epidemiology, since the study of disease or health of populations necessarily requires assessing and determining the probability of the factors that may increase or decrease the likelihood of disease or health. It argues that the purportedly non-normative understanding of risk in epidemiology fails to capture separate but interrelated points, such as the description of risk assessments. It also discusses the importance of risk to a population for disease p to understand the political or economic values that help create the context that led to the increased risk. The chapter delves into the ethical significance for epidemiologists to help analyze and explain who imposed risk onto whom and in what ways this risk imposition occurred. It cites a normative sense of risk in epidemiology, which appeals to most theories of justice and makes sense of the ethics of causation in either more modest or stronger terms.