The Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Human Rights Enforcement and Realization

2014 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Bilateral Investment Treaties ◽  
Investment Treaties

The Right to Unilateral Repudiation of Odious, Illegal, and Illegitimate Sovereign Debt as a Human Rights Defence

2018 ◽  
pp. 536-554
Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Management ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Bilateral Investment Treaties ◽  
National Debt ◽  
Investment Treaties ◽  
The Right

States enjoy the right to unilaterally denounce sovereign debt that is odious, illegal and illegitimate under strict circumstances. This entitlement does not exist where the debt(s) was/were incurred lawfully. A particular form of denunciation is sovereign insolvency, whose unilateral manifestation, is treated in practice by similar principles and responses as those apply mutatis mutandis to other forms of debt management. This chapter identifies, in addition to insolvency, five forms of unilateral debt denunciation that arise from the limited practice of states, which are moreover consistent with general international law. These are: (a) repudiation or non-enforcement of arbitral awards on public policy grounds; (b) denunciation on grounds of executive necessity and/or the right to fiscal/tax sovereignty; (c) direct unilateral repudiation on the basis of reports by national debt audit committees; (d) repudiation of contracts when creditor/investor violates human rights and of unconscionable concession contracts; (e) re-negotiation of bilateral investment treaties and concessions.

scholarly journals Natural Resources, Property Rights, and the Domestic Logic of BIT Signing

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Terence K. Teo ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
Bilateral Investment Treaties ◽  
Investment Treaties

In contrast to the substantial scholarship on whether bilateral investment treaties (BITs) increase foreign direct investment (FDI), there is less work on what drives governments to sign these treaties in the first place. I develop a theory of treaty signing that emphasizes the domestic factors that motivate a government to sign BITs. Using a panel dataset of developing countries from 1960 to 2010, I find that governments scarce in natural resources are more likely to sign BITs compared to their richer counterparts. In addition, governments with middle levels of property rights are more likely to sign BITs compared to those with low or high levels. Finally, the most likely BIT signers are resource-scarce countries with middle levels of property rights. That strategic dynamics exist in BIT signing has implications for assessing the effects of these treaties in other issue areas such as trade, human rights, and the environment.

“If stars are lit, it means — there is someone who needs it”: a new human rights protecting function of bilateral investment treaties

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-174
Author(s):  
Vera Rusinova ◽  
Matvey Tarasov
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Bilateral Investment Treaties ◽  
Legal Analysis ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
Investment Treaties ◽  
Human Rights Norms ◽  
Human Rights Standards

A new trend in both making and interpreting bilateral investment treaties (BITs) consists in a shift towards the protection of human rights of the host-State population. The authors resort to legal analysis to answer three questions related to this trend. First, how treaties, which are inherently programmed for the protection of investors from host-States, can be used to prevent investors from breaching human rights? Second, are BITs capable to effectively carry out this function? Third, who is the actual beneficiary of the values’ change in BITs? The article identifies three ways how human rights standards are included or respected throughout the BITs’ drating and application processes. First, human rights norms can be explicitly mentioned in a BIT. Second, an investment tribunal can directly apply international human rights law during dispute settlement. Third, human rights norms can impact the interpretation of a BIT, or, vice versa, the BIT provisions can be taken into account when international judicial or quasi-judicial human rights bodies interpret human rights’ conventions. Resorting to one or several of these ways leads to various results of the combination of BITs with human rights standards, that differ by a duty-bearer (a State or an investor) and by the legal mechanism of human rights protection. The authors distinguish four such models. The model analysis reveals restrictions and distortions pertinent to the new way of using BITs. Also, it allows evaluating trends from points of view of different stakeholders — home-States, host-States, and the population of the latter.

Potential Effect of the Law of Belligerent Occupation on the Applicability of Investment Treaties in Occupied Territories

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 152-169
Author(s):  
Petr Stejskal
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Potential Effect ◽  
Bilateral Investment Treaties ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
Foreign Investments ◽  
Occupied Territory ◽  
Human Rights Treaties ◽  
Occupied Territories ◽  
Investment Treaties

AbstractThis article focuses on the applicability of bilateral investment treaties on the conduct of the occupying power towards foreign investments situated in the occupied territory. It examines the content of the obligation to respect the laws in force in the occupied territory as prescribed by Art. 43 of the Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. Some authors proposed an idea that this obligation is a gateway provision for the applicability of international treaties which are in force in the occupied territory on the conduct of the occupier. They refer to the case-law dealing with the applicability of human rights treaties in occupied territories. However, after the interpretation of this provision and inquiry into the case-law, this paper reaches the con­clusion that the obligation to respect the laws in force does not have this effect. Instead, it deals with the legislative powers of the occupying power.

Investor Rights versus Human Rights: Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Tilt the Scale?

2018 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 955-977 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Bodea ◽  
Fangjin Ye
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Bilateral Investment Treaties ◽  
Welfare Benefits ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Investment Treaties ◽  
Basic Infrastructure ◽  
Lock In

This article argues that the broad and legally enforceable protection that bilateral investment treaties (BITs) offer to foreign investors worsens the human rights practices of developing countries. BITs lock in initial conditions attractive to investors that are linked to vertical investment flows and investment and trade competition. They also constrain the provision of welfare benefits or basic infrastructure. The lock-in and constraining effects are sources of popular grievance and dissent in states that host foreign investment. BIT-protected investor rights, however, limit the ability of governments to back-down vis-à-vis investors, lowering the relative cost of human rights violations. Finally, this study suggests that democratic regimes mitigate the negative effect of BITs. Evidence from 113 developing countries from 1981 to 2009 supports the hypotheses.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document