Looking for Chamberlain

Author(s):  
Kristopher A. Teters

This study challenges much of the current historical literature about the American Civil War by arguing that western Union officers carried out a practical emancipation policy as part of a pragmatic military strategy, rather than an idealistic moral opposition to slavery. While officers came to accept emancipation as a useful instrument to win the war, their racial attitudes changed very little. In the early stages of the war, the army’s policies towards fugitive slaves were inconsistent and influenced by an officer’s individual attitudes toward slavery. The Second Confiscation Act of 1862 and the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 caused a shift in army policy to become more consistent and emancipationist. Officers, however, carried out emancipation primarily for the army’s benefit, as freed slaves could help the army as pioneers, laborers, servants, and soldiers. Union officers were committed to winning the war and saving the Union, and emancipation proved a practical policy to accomplish these goals.

2005 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-540 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRENT J STEELE

Why did Great Britain remain neutral during the American Civil War? Although several historical arguments have been put forth, few studies have explicitly used International Relations (IR) theories to understand this decision. Synthesising a discursive approach with an ontological security interpretation, I propose an alternative framework for understanding security-seeking behaviour and threats to identity. I assess the impact Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation had upon the interventionist debates in Great Britain. I argue that the Proclamation reframed interventionist debates, thus (re)engendering the British anxiety over slavery and removing intervention as a viable policy. I conclude by proposing several issues relevant to using an ontological security interpretation in future IR studies.


Author(s):  
Megan Kate Nelson

During the American Civil War, Union and Confederate commanders made the capture and destruction of enemy cities a central feature of their military campaigns. They did so for two reasons. First, most mid-19th-century cities had factories, foundries, and warehouses within their borders, churning out and storing war materiel; military officials believed that if they interrupted or incapacitated the enemy’s ability to arm or clothe themselves, the war would end. Second, it was believed that the widespread destruction of property—especially in major or capital cities—would also damage civilians’ morale, undermining their political convictions and decreasing their support for the war effort. Both Union and Confederate armies bombarded and burned cities with these goals in mind. Sometimes they fought battles on city streets but more often, Union troops initiated long-term sieges in order to capture Confederate cities and demoralize their inhabitants. Soldiers on both sides were motivated by vengeance when they set fire to city businesses and homes; these acts were controversial, as was defensive burning—the deliberate destruction of one’s own urban center in order to keep its war materiel out of the hands of the enemy. Urban destruction, particularly long-term sieges, took a psychological toll on (mostly southern) city residents. Many were wounded, lost property, or were forced to become refugees. Because of this, the destruction of cities during the American Civil War provoked widespread discussions about the nature of “civilized warfare” and the role that civilians played in military strategy. Both soldiers and civilians tried to make sense of the destruction of cities in writing, and also in illustrations and photographs; images in particular shaped both northern and southern memories of the war and its costs.


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