PAY DISPERSION AND TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM TURNOVER: ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.

2007 ◽  
Vol 2007 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAKE G. MESSERSMITH ◽  
JAMES P. GUTHRIE
2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (5) ◽  
pp. 1524-1552 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Jaskiewicz ◽  
Joern H. Block ◽  
Danny Miller ◽  
James G. Combs

Emerging evidence suggests that pay dispersion among non-CEO top management team (TMT) members harms firm performance, which raises questions about why firms’ owners tolerate or even support it. Prior research shows that the key distinction between founder and family owners is that in addition to firm performance and growth goals, family owners pursue socioemotional goals. On the basis of this distinction, we develop and test theory linking founders’ and families’ ownership to TMT pay dispersion. Consistent with our theory, a Bayesian panel analysis of Standard & Poor’s 500 firms shows that founder owners use less TMT pay dispersion and that family owners, relative to founder owners, use more, although that declines across generations. We also provide evidence that TMT pay dispersion harms firm performance. Our theory and results are significant because they help to explain why some owners favor compensation practices that cause TMT pay dispersion, despite evidence that this harms firm performance.


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 436-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregorio Sanchez-Marin ◽  
J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler

AbstractThis study supports tournament theory in relation to high levels of organizational hierarchies, indicating that the job complexity facing the top management team supposes that pay dispersion positively influences firm performance. Examining a sample of 709 firm-year observations of Spanish listed companies spanning the period 2004–2012, our results indicate that the association between firm performance and top management team pay dispersion is conditional on the effectiveness of corporate governance. High top management team pay dispersion is associated with better performance in owner-controlled firms, where more effective monitoring is exerted by the board of directors.


2017 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pankaj C. Patel ◽  
Mingxiang Li ◽  
María del Carmen Triana ◽  
Haemin Dennis Park

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