Exploring Firm Heterogeneous Effects of Problemistic Search: The Moderating Effects of Top Management Team Pay Dispersion and Long-Term Incentive Plan

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 1129-1157
Author(s):  
Hyunsik Gong ◽  
Jina Kang ◽  
Juil Lee
Keyword(s):  
Top Management Team ◽  
Management Team ◽  
Top Management ◽  
Moderating Effects ◽  
Heterogeneous Effects ◽  
Incentive Plan ◽  
Pay Dispersion

Founder Versus Family Owners’ Impact on Pay Dispersion Among Non-CEO Top Managers: Implications for Firm Performance

2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (5) ◽  
pp. 1524-1552 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Jaskiewicz ◽  
Joern H. Block ◽  
Danny Miller ◽  
James G. Combs
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Top Management Team ◽  
Management Team ◽  
Test Theory ◽  
Top Management ◽  
Panel Analysis ◽  
Top Managers ◽  
Pay Dispersion

Emerging evidence suggests that pay dispersion among non-CEO top management team (TMT) members harms firm performance, which raises questions about why firms’ owners tolerate or even support it. Prior research shows that the key distinction between founder and family owners is that in addition to firm performance and growth goals, family owners pursue socioemotional goals. On the basis of this distinction, we develop and test theory linking founders’ and families’ ownership to TMT pay dispersion. Consistent with our theory, a Bayesian panel analysis of Standard & Poor’s 500 firms shows that founder owners use less TMT pay dispersion and that family owners, relative to founder owners, use more, although that declines across generations. We also provide evidence that TMT pay dispersion harms firm performance. Our theory and results are significant because they help to explain why some owners favor compensation practices that cause TMT pay dispersion, despite evidence that this harms firm performance.

TMT pay dispersion and firm performance: the moderating role of organizational governance effectiveness

2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 436-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregorio Sanchez-Marin ◽  
J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Top Management Team ◽  
Management Team ◽  
Top Management ◽  
Job Complexity ◽  
Organizational Governance ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Pay Dispersion ◽  
Performance Examining ◽  
Organizational Hierarchies

AbstractThis study supports tournament theory in relation to high levels of organizational hierarchies, indicating that the job complexity facing the top management team supposes that pay dispersion positively influences firm performance. Examining a sample of 709 firm-year observations of Spanish listed companies spanning the period 2004–2012, our results indicate that the association between firm performance and top management team pay dispersion is conditional on the effectiveness of corporate governance. High top management team pay dispersion is associated with better performance in owner-controlled firms, where more effective monitoring is exerted by the board of directors.

scholarly journals Top Management Team Risk Taking Propensities and Firm Performance: Direct and Moderating Effects

1970 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-114
Author(s):  
Matthew Gilley ◽  
Bruce Walters ◽  
Bradley Olson
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Top Management Team ◽  
Dynamic Environments ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Performance Outcomes ◽  
Management Team ◽  
Top Management ◽  
Moderating Effects ◽  
Measures Of Risk

We investigate the influence of top management team (TMT) risk takingpropensities on firm performance. Diverging from previous work on the risktaking-performance relationship, we rely on perceptual (rather than archival)measures of risk taking. In addition to financial performance, we examineother performance outcomes of risk taking, such as innovativeness andstakeholder satisfaction. Contrary to the findings of Bromiley (1991J andBowman (1980), we find that risk taking has a strong positive influence onfirm performance. In addition, the risk taking-performance relationship ismoderated by the dynamism of the firm's industry. More specifically, we findthat the benefits of TMT risk taking are reduced in more dynamic environments.

Top Management Team Surface-Level Diversity, Strategic Change, and Long-Term Firm Performance: A Mediated Model Investigation

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 304-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Wu ◽  
Orlando C. Richard ◽  
Xinhe Zhang ◽  
Craig Macaulay
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Strategic Change ◽  
Top Management Team ◽  
Management Team ◽  
Top Management ◽  
Upper Echelons ◽  
Surface Level ◽  
Upper Echelons Theory

Top management team (TMT) heterogeneity research has not yet clearly revealed whether surface-level diversity (i.e., national culture, gender, age) contributes to or detracts from a firm’s financial performance and has not focused on how strategic change frequency (number international diversification or refocusing activities) serves as an intervening mechanism. Based on a sample of 1,993 firms between 2003 and 2015, we examine the mediating role of strategic change frequency in the relationship between surface-level diversity and long-term firm performance. Grounded in the upper echelons perspective, we find that TMT surface-level diversity increases rather than decreases strategic change frequency. Furthermore, our results are consistent with our hypothesized positive relationship between strategic change frequency and long-term firm performance. More important, we also find support for a longitudinal-based mediation model in which strategic change frequency in terms of diversification/refocusing actions (Time 2) transmits the positive effect of TMT surface-level diversity (Time 1) to long-term financial performance (Time 3) without accounting for any moderated conditions suggesting that mediation models warrant more utilization in the upper echelons research and internationalization research domains. Implications for the upper echelons theory in a more global world as if relates to the often unexplored surface-level diversity are offered.

Preventing or encouraging illegal activities by construction firms: effects of top management team compensation and aspiration-performance discrepancies

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ran Wang ◽  
Chia-Jung Lee ◽  
Shu-Chien Hsu ◽  
Jieh-Haur Chen
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Top Management Team ◽  
Management Team ◽  
Economic Losses ◽  
Top Management ◽  
Moderating Effects ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Construction Firms ◽  
Illegal Activities

PurposeCorporate illegal activities may result in fatal injuries and economic losses and have been widely reported in the construction industry. This study is to investigate the relationship between top management team (TMT) compensation and corporate illegal activities with the moderating effects of aspiration–performance discrepancies.Design/methodology/approachUsing a multi-year sample of Chinese construction firms from 2011 to 2017, this paper employed a hierarchical logit regression model with fixed effects.FindingsThis study indicates that TMT compensation is positively related to the likelihood of corporate illegal activities. It also finds performance higher than aspirations would lower the probability of illegal activities while performance lower than aspirations also decreases the occurrence of illegal behaviors. Finally, the positive relationship between TMT compensation and illegal activities is strengthened by aspiration–performance discrepancies.Practical implicationsIt recommended the design of executive compensation may need to be reconsidered. Next, companies need to carefully monitor top management team, especially when performance is lower than the desired level. Finally, debt-to-equity ratio deserves more attention for Chinese construction firms in suppressing illegal activities.Originality/valueGiven the mixed effects of TMT compensation, this study confirms its positive impact on corporate illegal behaviors. Consistent with the behavioral theory of the firm, it unveils the direct and moderating effects of aspiration-performance discrepancies. The findings are beneficial for evaluating firms' performance and considering the prevention of corporate fraudulent activities.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document