Discrimination in Information Sharing: A Field Experiment

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 14856
Author(s):  
Alexandra Feldberg ◽  
Tami Kim
1983 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 136-152
Author(s):  
Lawrence B. Rosenfeld ◽  
Gene D. Fowler

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cátia Batista ◽  
Marcel Fafchamps ◽  
Pedro Vicente

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 1753-1792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Bigoni ◽  
Margherita Fort ◽  
Mattia Nardotto ◽  
Tommaso G. Reggiani

Abstract We assess the effect of two antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes based on grading rules on students’ effort, using experimental data. We randomly assigned students to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between paired up students, a cooperative scheme that promotes information sharing and collaboration between students and a baseline treatment in which students can neither compete nor cooperate. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that competition induces higher effort with respect to cooperation, whereas cooperation does not increase effort with respect to the baseline treatment. Nonetheless, we find a strong gender effect since this result holds only for men while women do not react to this type of non-monetary incentives.


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