Media effects on information sharing: A field experiment

This note reports the findings of a field experiment designed to assess the persuasive effects of mass media in a hybrid regime. We enlisted a sample of Hungarian young adults [n=775] to a newsletter which included both political and non-political news. Our experiment focused on immigration - a central issue in Hungary since 2015 - and we randomly assigned subjects to versions of the newsletters including either pro-government, anti-government or no coverage of the issue. We estimated the impact of the news stories featured in the newsletter through a panel survey, comparing the attitudes of subjects receiving contrasting coverage of immigration related stories about two weeks after the receipt of the last news. Our findings show little evidence of media effects on either issue importance, issue attitudes or overall government evaluation in this setting.

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Keep It Simple: A Field Experiment on Information Sharing in Social Networks

10.3386/w24908 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Cátia Batista ◽

Marcel Fafchamps ◽

Pedro Vicente

Keyword(s):

Social Networks ◽

Field Experiment ◽

Information Sharing

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Default information sharing, financial incentive and loan repayment: A field experiment

AEA Randomized Controlled Trials ◽

10.1257/rct.5913 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Haoran He

Keyword(s):

Field Experiment ◽

Information Sharing ◽

Financial Incentive ◽

Loan Repayment

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Cooperation or Competition? A Field Experiment on Non-monetary Learning Incentives

The B E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy ◽

10.1515/bejeap-2014-0109 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 15 (4) ◽

pp. 1753-1792 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Maria Bigoni ◽

Margherita Fort ◽

Mattia Nardotto ◽

Tommaso G. Reggiani

Keyword(s):

Experimental Data ◽

Field Experiment ◽

Information Sharing ◽

Monetary Incentive ◽

Gender Effect ◽

Monetary Incentives ◽

Incentive Schemes ◽

Cooperative Scheme ◽

Theoretical Predictions

Abstract We assess the effect of two antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes based on grading rules on students’ effort, using experimental data. We randomly assigned students to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between paired up students, a cooperative scheme that promotes information sharing and collaboration between students and a baseline treatment in which students can neither compete nor cooperate. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that competition induces higher effort with respect to cooperation, whereas cooperation does not increase effort with respect to the baseline treatment. Nonetheless, we find a strong gender effect since this result holds only for men while women do not react to this type of non-monetary incentives.

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