Default information sharing, financial incentive and loan repayment: A field experiment

Author(s):  
Haoran He
1983 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 136-152
Author(s):  
Lawrence B. Rosenfeld ◽  
Gene D. Fowler

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
James Kimani

Purpose: Credit information sharing cost positively influenced the profitability of banks in Kenya. The general objective of the study was to evaluate credit information sharing and profitability of banks in Kenya. Methodology: The paper used a desk study review methodology where relevant empirical literature was reviewed to identify main themes and to extract knowledge gaps. Findings: The study stablished that borrower’s credit history information had a positive influence on the profitability in Kenya. The study the respondents agreed that their banks collect information on the number of previous applications that a loan applicant has made, the bank collects information on the number of loans applied and declined, the bank asks for reasons that the loan applied was declined for all applicants, the bank asks loan applicants to indicate the discipline observed when repaying previous loans advanced, the bank asks clients to indicate if they have delayed in remitting their periodic loan repayment in the past, the banks collect more information about the loan applicants credit history from the CRB. Recommendations: The study recommended that while sharing information, the banks should do a cost benefit analysis to ascertain if the sharing of such information is material or not. It should pay its attention to the administrative costs that come with sharing information. This is because the cost of information sharing as seen from the study results have a negative and significant influence on performance Purpose: Credit information sharing cost positively influenced the profitability of banks in Kenya. The general objective of the study was to evaluate credit information sharing and profitability of banks in Kenya. Methodology: The paper used a desk study review methodology where relevant empirical literature was reviewed to identify main themes and to extract knowledge gaps. Findings: The study stablished that borrower’s credit history information had a positive influence on the profitability in Kenya. The study the respondents agreed that their banks collect information on the number of previous applications that a loan applicant has made, the bank collects information on the number of loans applied and declined, the bank asks for reasons that the loan applied was declined for all applicants, the bank asks loan applicants to indicate the discipline observed when repaying previous loans advanced, the bank asks clients to indicate if they have delayed in remitting their periodic loan repayment in the past, the banks collect more information about the loan applicants credit history from the CRB. Recommendations: The study recommended that while sharing information, the banks should do a cost benefit analysis to ascertain if the sharing of such information is material or not. It should pay its attention to the administrative costs that come with sharing information. This is because the cost of information sharing as seen from the study results have a negative and significant influence on performance


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 14856
Author(s):  
Alexandra Feldberg ◽  
Tami Kim

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cátia Batista ◽  
Marcel Fafchamps ◽  
Pedro Vicente

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-11
Author(s):  
Erin Locke ◽  
Frank Dong ◽  
Robert Stiles ◽  
Rick Kellerman ◽  
Elizabeth Ablah

Background. In an effort to redistribute healthcare providersto underserved areas, many states have turned to financialincentive programs. Despite substantial research on theseprograms on a national scale, little is known about the successof such programs in Kansas. The purpose of this studywas to provide insight into the relationship between financial incentive programs and provider retention in Kansas. Methods. A cross-sectional telephone survey was conducted inApril and May of 2011 with participants who had completedtheir obligations to the Kansas State Loan Repayment Program(SLRP), the National Health Service Corps (NHSC) Loan Repaymentprogram, or the National Health Service Corps Scholar shipprogram in Kansas between January 2006 and January 2011. Results. Of the 112 providers included in the study, 54.4% (n = 61)had left their program sites sometime after finishing their commitment,with the mean length of stay after the obligation periodended being 7.3 (median = 3) months. Of the 54 participants whohad left their program sites and whose current locations wereknown, 33.3% (n = 18) were located in new Health ProfessionalShortage Areas (HPSA), 25.9% (n = 14) were in a new non-HPSA,and 40.7% (n = 22) had left the state. Family satisfaction with thecommunity and attending a professional school in Kansas wereassociated statistically with retention of physicians in Kansas. Conclusions. Nearly half of all participants had remained attheir sites even after their obligation period ended, with familysatisfaction with the community appearing to be the strongestpredictor for retention among those who had stayed.Efforts to match a provider’s family with the community successfullyand to support the family through networking mayimprove future provider retention. KS J Med 2016;9(1):6-11.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Di Bu ◽  
Yin Liao

We study the effects of village credit information sharing on individual microloan repayment, using a randomized experiment with loan applicants from 40 villages in rural China. In our main treatment, customers received a message on the loan application form that “overdue payment (40 days after each installment due date) will be considered for public disclosure among the village by showing debtors’ names on a blackboard outside the village office of the microlending institution.” On average, this social appeal reduces the share of delinquents and the individual delinquency rate by 18.6% and 5.6% from baseline rates of 79.5% and 15.2%, respectively. The effects appear more pronounced among male and older borrowers. Additional treatments help to benchmark the effect against lender credit information sharing and separate the effects on adverse selection and moral hazard. Mechanism analysis shows that the publicly disclosed “blacklist” of delinquents affects borrowers’ repayment behaviors, partially through borrowers’ fear of losing informal risk insurance from the village society and predominately through public shaming penalties. Overall, these results support that, in traditional societies, social appeals can provide not only pecuniary, but also psychological incentives to improve loan repayment. Psychological incentives, to some extent, have stronger effects.


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