Mindfully outraged: Mindfulness increases retribution via moral outrage at third-party injustice

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 11470
Author(s):  
Adam Austen Kay ◽  
Theodore Charles Masters-Waage ◽  
Pavlos Vlachos ◽  
Jochen Matthias Reb
Keyword(s):  
2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik W. Thulin ◽  
Cristina Bicchieri

Abstract:Recent behavioral economics studies have shown that third parties compensate players in Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust games. However, there are almost no studies about what drives third parties to compensate victims in such games. It can be argued that compensation is a form of helping; and helping behavior, in a variety of forms, has been widely researched, especially with regard to motivators. Previous work on helping behavior has focused on empathic concern as a primary driver. In sharp contrast, anger is often seen as an antisocial motivator resulting in aggression. However, other research has shown that moral outrage, anger evoked by the violation of a moral rule or a social norm, can lead to the punishment of a perpetrator, often described as altruistic or pro-social punishment. Some of the motivations for pro-social punishment, namely a concern for justice or the restoration of community values, can also be realized through victim compensation. We therefore propose the hypothesis that moral outrage leads to compensating behavior above and beyond what is predicted by empathic concern, but only when a social norm has been violated. We test this hypothesis in two studies, both of which use modified trust games in which the investor experiences a loss due either to a social norm violation or some other cause. Study 1 shows that trait moral outrage predicts third-party compensatory behavior above and beyond empathic concern, but only when a social norm is violated. To better understand the causal mechanism, Study 2 directly manipulated moral outrage, showing again that moral outrage leads to compensation, but only when a social norm is violated.


2013 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 898-906 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zachary K. Rothschild ◽  
Mark J. Landau ◽  
Ludwin E. Molina ◽  
Nyla R. Branscombe ◽  
Daniel Sullivan

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 147470491100900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niels Holm Jensen ◽  
Michael Bang Petersen
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jillian Jordan ◽  
David Gertler Rand

Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. But why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that reputation is typically at stake, such that reputation concerns can shape moral outrage and punishment even in one-shot anonymous interactions. We then support this account using data from Amazon Mechanical Turk. In anonymous experiments, subjects (total n = 8440) report more outrage in response to others’ selfishness when they cannot signal their trustworthiness through direct prosociality (sharing with a third party)—such that if the interaction were not anonymous, punishment would have greater signaling value. Furthermore, mediation analyses suggest that sharing opportunities reduce outrage by decreasing reputation concerns. Additionally, anonymous experiments measuring costly punishment (total n = 6076) show the same pattern: subjects punish more when sharing is not possible. And importantly, moderation analyses provide some evidence that sharing opportunities do not merely reduce outrage and punishment by inducing empathy towards selfishness or hypocrisy aversion among non-sharers. Finally, we support the specific role of heuristics by investigating individual differences in deliberateness. Less deliberative individuals (who typically rely more on heuristics) are more sensitive to sharing opportunities in our anonymous punishment experiments, but, critically, not in punishment experiments where reputation is at stake (total n = 3422); and not in our anonymous outrage experiments (where condemning is costless). Together, our results suggest that when nobody is watching, reputation cues nonetheless can shape outrage and—among individuals who rely on heuristics—costly punishment.


Emotion ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew R. Ginther ◽  
Lauren E. S. Hartsough ◽  
René Marois
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. 194855062110415
Author(s):  
Hank Rothgerber ◽  
Daniel L. Rosenfeld ◽  
Savannah Keiffer ◽  
Kristen Crable ◽  
Annika Yeske ◽  
...  

Many meat-eaters experience cognitive dissonance when aware that their eating behaviors contradict their moral values, such as desires to protect the environment or animals from harm. One way in which people morally disengage from their behaviors—and thus avoid dissonance—is to displace responsibility onto others. Aligning with this notion, results of three studies (total N = 1,501) suggest that expressing moral outrage at third-party transgressors reduces dissonance and preserves moral identity among meat-eaters. When participants understood their in-group as responsible for factory farming’s negative impact or read about factory farming’s harms to animals, expressing moral outrage at third-party transgressors reduced guilt and elevated self-rated moral character. Moreover, reflecting on the morally troublesome nature of meat-eating led participants to express more moral outrage at a third-party organization responsible for animal abuse, an effect eliminated by self-affirmation. These findings substantiate moral outrage as a new mechanism to justify meat consumption.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Tomasello

Abstract My response to the commentaries focuses on four issues: (1) the diversity both within and between cultures of the many different faces of obligation; (2) the possible evolutionary roots of the sense of obligation, including possible sources that I did not consider; (3) the possible ontogenetic roots of the sense of obligation, including especially children's understanding of groups from a third-party perspective (rather than through participation, as in my account); and (4) the relation between philosophical accounts of normative phenomena in general – which are pitched as not totally empirical – and empirical accounts such as my own. I have tried to distinguish comments that argue for extensions of the theory from those that represent genuine disagreement.


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