On the Promise and Limits of Prosocial Neoclassical Economic Approaches to Shareholder Primacy

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 11977
Author(s):  
Santiago Mejia
2007 ◽  
pp. 87-103
Author(s):  
R. Nureev

The article is devoted to the history of reception and interpretation of the ideas of Marx and Engels. The author considers the reasons for divergence between Marxist and neoclassical economic theories. He also analyzes the ways of vulgarization of Marx’s theory and the making of Marxist voluntarism. It is shown that the works of Marx and Engels had a certain potential for their over-simplified interpretations. The article also considers academic ("Western") Marxism and evaluates the prospects of Marxist theory in the future.


1995 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Mouck

This paper provides an overview of the influence of Newtonian mechanics on the development of neoclassical economic theory and highlights Fisher's role in the popularization of the resulting mechanical conception of economics. The paper also portrays Fisher's The Nature of Capital and Income — a work which has been aptly characterized as the “first economic theory of accounting” — as the first move toward the colonization of accounting by economics. The result of Fisher's influence has been a paradigmatic linkage between the Newtonian world view of science, neoclassical economics, and mainstream academic accounting thought. The picture that emerges from this linkage is then used as a backdrop against which the emerging challenges to economics-based accounting thought are highlighted.


Author(s):  
Simon Deakin

The debate over corporate governance is skewed by the common misunderstanding that shareholders are the owners of companies, and are entitled to have them run in their interest. The legal model of the firm is more nuanced, seeing the corporation as a complex entity characterized by co-operation between the suppliers of capital and labour, with a co-ordinating role for management. The elevation of shareholder primacy as a focal point for corporate strategy over recent decades is the result of government deferring to financial interests in the making of rules governing takeovers and board structure. Reversing financialization, and the negative impact it is having on social cohesion and innovation, will require a new legislative framework for corporate governance, with a greater role for employee voice and a reorientation of investment priorities.


2003 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-555 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Armour ◽  
Simon Deakin ◽  
Suzanne J. Konzelmann

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