scholarly journals Aristoteles Latinus at Prague University in Pre-Hussite Era I: Commentary Tradition on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and the Debate on Felicity From 1409

Aither ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (17) ◽  
pp. 74-104
Author(s):  
Martin Dekarli
Author(s):  
Christopher C. Raymond

In Nicomachean Ethics 4. 9 Aristotle gives two arguments for why aidōs, or a sense of shame, is not a virtue. The chapter has puzzled readers: both arguments seem to conflict with things he says elsewhere in the NE, and neither is persuasive in its own right. This paper reconstructs Aristotle’s position on aidōs by drawing on the ancient commentary tradition, relevant passages from the Eudemian Ethics, and the analysis of ‘civic’ courage in NE 3. 8. It is shown that Aristotle has stronger reasons for denying that aidōs is a virtue than at first appears, given his distinction between acting from the fear of disrepute and acting for the sake of the fine. The paper concludes by arguing that his view is nevertheless untenable, since it ignores the fact that even a virtuous person can be subject to disrepute. This criticism stems from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary in Ethical Problems 21.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-196
Author(s):  
Guy Schuh

Abstract Aristotle tells us that the Nicomachean Ethics is an “inquiry” and an “investigation” (methodos and zētēsis). This paper focuses on an under-appreciated way that the work is investigative: its employment of an exploratory investigative strategy—that is, its frequent positing of, and later revision or even rejection of, merely preliminary positions. Though this may seem like a small point, this aspect of the work’s methodology has important consequences for how we should read it—specifically, we should be open to the possibility that some contradictions in the text are the result of his employment of this investigative strategy. In the paper, I describe this investigative strategy, discuss what motivates Aristotle to employ it in the work, and go through three contradictions that are plausibly identified as examples of its use—specifically, his claims that courageous people do and do not fear death, that friendship is and is not mutually recognized goodwill, and that virtuous people do and do not choose noble actions for their own sake.


Author(s):  
Julia Annas
Keyword(s):  

Much attention has been paid to the issue of whether, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle uses what we would recognize as deontic concepts. On the basis of a study of dei and other constructions I argue that Aristotle’s use of them is often misconstrued and should be interpreted as giving reasons that are reasons of virtue, not a distinct alternative. Many issues remain live in the interpretation (and the translation) of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics; in this essay I offer a contribution to one of these, the nature and role of deontic concepts in the work. I offer this essay with pleasure to a celebration of Terry and Gail’s work.


Author(s):  
David Charles

This paper concerns Aristotle’s discussion of practical truth in Nicomachean Ethics VI.2.1139a17–b5. The essay falls into five sections. In the first three, I outline two styles of interpretation of Aristotle’s remarks and suggest that one of them (which I call ‘the third way’) gives a better reading than that offered by its major competitor (which I call ‘the two-component’ view). In the fourth I consider some texts in the remainder of NE VI which provide additional support for the third way of reading. In a brief concluding section, I seek to locate Aristotle’s view of practical truth, so understood, in a broader philosophical context.


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