Cross-border internal security cooperation between Poland and Germany

Author(s):  
Karina Paulina Marczuk
2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 569-593 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Yom

The 2011–2012 Arab Spring posed an existential threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council’s six monarchies. A major response was the 2012 GCC Internal Security Pact, an innovative project to enhance cross-border repression of domestic opposition and thus bolster collective security. Yet despite its historic weakness, ongoing domestic unrest, and initial enthusiasm for the agreement, Kuwait’s monarchy did not ultimately ratify the accord. Building on theories of foreign policy roles and identity, this article presents an ideational explanation for this puzzle. The Security Pact failed because it sparked identity contestation. For many Kuwaitis, the prospect of the Sabah monarchy imposing this scheme for greater repression was incompatible with the regime’s historical role of tolerating domestic pluralism and protecting Kuwait from foreign pressures. This role conception of a tolerant protector flowed from historical understandings and collective memory and was cognitively tied to a national self-conception of “Kuwaiti-ness.” The mobilizational scope and symbolic power of this popular opposition convinced the regime to acquiesce, despite possessing the strategic incentive and resources to impose the treaty by force. The Kuwaiti case therefore exemplifies how domestic contestation over regime identities and roles can constrain foreign policy behavior, even in authoritarian states facing severe crises of insecurity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 05 (01) ◽  
pp. 65-79
Author(s):  
Jin Wang ◽  
Dehang Kong

As Islamic extremist threats have grown to be a common issue of focus and a major cooperation area between China and Central Asian states since the 1990s, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) provides China with an important regional and even international counter-terrorism platform. Highlighting sustainable security cooperation and countering terrorism in a peaceful way under the “Shanghai Spirit,” the SCO helps stabilize China’s internal security environment while enhancing the country’s economic and cultural cooperation with its Central Asian neighbors. This article reviews the Islamic extremist and terrorist challenges to China and the counter-terrorism cooperation between China and Central Asian states under the framework of the SCO, with a focus on how to tackle the weaknesses of such cooperation. It is concluded that SCO member states must be prudent in taking further steps in counter-terrorism cooperation, especially with regard to whether the organization should be transformed into a quasi-military and political alliance.


Significance The move emphasises the intense importance of the Taliban takeover for neighbouring Iran. Tehran is balancing fears of potential cross-border violence, immigration and illicit economic activity against opportunities for increased diplomatic leverage, security cooperation and and economic ties. Impacts Tehran’s moves to legitimise the Taliban may further alienate Western countries, not least on human rights grounds. Iran will use Taliban links to leverage closer ties with Russia and China, as both will welcome it as a regional intermediary. The experiences of Islamic Revolution Guard Corps Quds Force head Ismail Ghani in 1990s Afghanistan may influence policy choices.


2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-259
Author(s):  
Kyungwon Choi

AbstractThe purpose of this article is to clear up the security relation between Japan and Korea which was formed through dealing the “security crisis” of 1968, which became the origin of the Japan-ROK security cooperation later called “Security Economic Cooperation.” The “security crisis” of 1968 has occurred when reunification by all-out war became impossible due to the establishment of the divided system of the Korean Peninsular. North Korea’s purpose was to bring down South Korea from within by armed guerrilla struggle and achieve the peninsula unity. Therefore, what Korea and Japan emphasized in dealing with this crisis was not how to all-out attack, but rather respond to the indirect aggression, such as guerrilla infiltrations. ROK asked Japan for cooperation concerning the enhancement of equipment of the police engaged in counter guerrilla operations. They have explained Japan that the possibility of an all-out war was low, and that even if war happened to occur, they could respond with the mutual defense treaty with the US. They wanted to respond by strengthening their police equipment and this is why they have requested special assistance from Japan. The Ministry of foreign affairs of Japan and the Prime Minister Sato decided to cooperate to Korea. One reason behind this decision was that they had recognized that ROK was not assuming a conventional war, but just seeking to secure national security by dealing with guerrilla activity. However, ROK ultimately withdrew its request. The pressing issue of drought damage inside the country and the “distrust toward Japan” doubting how willing Japan is toward ROK security, were the cause of the change of ROK’s position. The fact that both countries have discussed and found possible areas of cooperation, and security cooperation has been sought, are significant. Its characteristics are as follows. First, it has clarified the political position of both countries to counter North Korean indirect aggressions. Japan and ROK have shared their perception of the internal security situation problem of ROK due to the indirect aggressions from North Korea, and have inserted the sentence “Ministers of both countries recognize that ROK’s security and prosperity have significant impact on Japanese’s ones” to the Joint Statement at the second Korea-Japan regular ministerial summit. Secondly, in order to ensure the internal security of ROK, Japan and ROK have sought for cooperation to enhance the equipment of the police engaged in counter guerrilla operations. ROK and Japan, while premising on the treaty of alliance with the US, identified new threats from indirect aggressions and tried to find areas of possible cooperation. This has showed the potentiality of security cooperation between Japan and Korea. Thirdly, is the fact that South Korea has ultimately withdrawn the request for police equipment cooperation and eventually switched to a request for emergency economic assistance to focus on domestic stability. This is how a typical pattern of security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, later called “Security Economic Cooperation” has developed.


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