China and Climate Change Governance: A Golden Opportunity

Climate change is a threat to all of humankind, yet there is still a leadership vacuum on climate governance. At the same time, the deepening climate crisis also presents a golden opportunity for Beijing to assume the role of a global leader. China has the capacity to do it in a way that the United States, Russia, India, and the European Union do not. Taking swift climate action is in Beijing’s interest. Greater contributions to climate governance will certainly help advance China’s long-term political interest in both raising its political status and demonstrating the claimed superiority of its system of government. Positive rhetoric and robust action by China are likely to have a disproportionate effect on the rest of the world. Policy adjustment and implementation by Beijing will bring benefits to the rest of the world. Climate policy options that Beijing may take in the future are not mutually exclusive. The policy shift on climate change could also be attached more firmly to the idea of sustainable development as a defining factor of China’s approach to tackling the climate change threat.

The Radicalization of Young Protesters in Hong Kong: Under the Context of Globalization and Power Relations

This paper takes the social unrest in 2019 as a case study and identifies three factors that contributed to the radicalization of social protests in Hong Kong: globalization, digitalization and the U.S. meddling in Hong Kong affairs. First, with the deepening of globalization, the worsening of social-economic conditions had bred populism among the youth. Second, digital technologies and social media platforms also made it easy for young people in Hong Kong to protest in a more covert and radical way. Third, the U.S. support for the Hong Kong opposition leaders added fuel to the radicalization of youth protesters. All these factors finally led to radicalized social protests in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, following the implementation of the National Security Law in Hong Kong SAR, violent activities were largely stopped and social order was gradually restored.

Kunming Summit on the Convention on Biological Diversity and China’s Environmental Diplomacy

Beijing’s environmental diplomacy has gained growing momentum in recent years, reflecting China’s activism in a shifting global political and economic landscape. The upcoming 15th Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in Kunming in southwestern China will be the first biodiversity-themed event Beijing will host since it signed up for global biodiversity governance in the early 1990s, offering another opportunity for Beijing to contribute its proposals and perspective to the global response to another slow-moving but deepening crisis. Despite the raised international expectations about the conference and the strategic action plan it is expected to produce, the focus of global biodiversity governance should be on delivering real results on existing pledges by addressing the major institutional shortcomings and building up national capabilities.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: An Emerging Venue for China’s New Diplomacy

China’s increasing strategic investment and continued diplomatic outreach has indicated that it aims to play a larger leadership role in global affairs in the years to come. To project its global power, Beijing has not only tried to bolster its position in existing regional and global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, but also launched its own initiatives, programs, and projects to reinforce and reform the current international order. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) stands out as the only grouping whose inception, expansion, and functioning best showcase China’s rise and ambitions in the region and the larger world. Indeed, the SCO is a key platform for Beijing’s efforts to play such a role; it is a multilateral mechanism that has long provided an effective means for achieving China’s regional and international goals and interests. Yet, internal tensions between member states may pose new challenges, which will be a major test of the SCO’s resilience and capacity in the years to come.

Religion in China’s Public Diplomacy: Transition and Institutionalization

In recognition of religion’s growing role in social life, the Chinese government places ample political trust in religions and encourages religious organizations and leaders to be more deeply involved in Beijing’s public diplomacy. Having completed the transition from prudence to activism, China’s religious public diplomacy now takes many forms, from hosting high-profile international religious forums and participation in international religious organizations to engaging in exchanges of visit and multiple religious dialogues. Beijing has secured an institutionalized role for religion in public diplomacy through a string of legislative actions and policy measures, for example, erecting a legal and policy framework, putting in place a robust multiparty operational mechanism, formulating a well-defined list of targets, and granting religious groups greater autonomy and flexibility. Beijing’s religious public diplomacy also faces significant risks and competition, which will affect its effectiveness and outcomes. Going forward, religious public diplomacy should put more emphasis on its spiritual dimension, build more internationalized organizing platforms, expand its engagement targets, and improve risk control and prevention mechanisms. Moreover, Beijing should increase the institutional stability and creativity for its faith diplomacy and encourage the five state-sanctioned religions and folk beliefs to play a larger role, with a view to consolidating national identity and religious identity among the Chinese people.

Regional Transformation of the Horn of Africa: Implications for BRI Implementation

The Horn of Africa (HoA) is on the threshold of a long-term transformation as the result of a confluence of political, economic, and social changes, namely, generational political leadership turnover as a reflection of the rise of a younger population; a palpable shift in governance approach from a “security-first” model to a “development-centered” one; and the return of geopolitics across the Red Sea, following global and regional political realignments. To steer the transformation in a sustainable and peaceful direction, the HoA has to enlist the assistance of external actors both as a source of trade and investment and as guarantors of regional peace and stability. This region-wide transformation presents challenges and opportunities for the implementation of the Chinese-proposed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Beijing should better align the economic connectivity-focused BRI with the development-centered approach of regional states, build national and regional capacity for HoA security governance, and join local and external actors in a multilateral effort to ensure a peaceful, secure, and economically dynamic HoA.

Beware the Kindleberger Trap in Global Health Governance

The Covid-19 pandemic is both a public health crisis and a stress test for global health governance. Effective health governance hinges on the provision of global public goods for health. Generally, the hegemon underwrites the operation and stability of the global public health architecture by ensuring the sustained supply of global public goods for health. But when the hegemon is unable or unwilling to shoulder this responsibility, global health governance may run the risk of falling into a Kindleberger Trap. The leadership vacuum that is opening up amid the coronavirus pandemic is accelerating the process. At present, China should adopt a three-pronged approach to promote bilateral health cooperation with leading countries like the United States, strengthen regional institution-building with ASEAN, South Korea, Japan, and Belt and Road countries, and improve the performance, credibility, and integrity of global organizations like the WHO and G-20. The Kindleberger Trap in global health governance can be overcome by adapting regional health coordination to make it more agile and effective.

Trilateral Cooperation: China’s and the EU’s Foreign Assistance in Africa

Over the years, China has forged and mastered its own distinctive foreign aid practices as an emerging aid donor. China’s approach to foreign assistance has become highly appreciated as the country’s stature as a provider of economic assistance has matured. In 2013, under President Xi Jinping, Beijing introduced the Belt and Road Initiative, which has become a leading component of China’s foreign policy and triggered a new round of policy reform in its foreign aid agenda. In Africa, China’s foreign assistance has kept in line with the policy of equal treatment. It has shared its development experience, helped many African countries to transition from “poor” to “developing”, from “aid recipients” to “wealth creators,” and many African countries are thus turning their interests from the West to the East. Certainly, the European Union as a traditional aid donor, remains the largest aid distributor in the world, especially in Africa. In other words, the EU’s foreign assistance has become an indispensable source of funding for many African countries. However, foreign aid effectiveness remains low on the African continent because of the absence of native African policymakers in aid programs designed and implemented by Beijing and Brussels. Some critics argue that Chinese and European assistance to Africa is not bringing about the best results as expected. This article argues that a new international architecture of foreign assistance through trilateral cooperation is needed to increase Chinese and European aid effectiveness in Africa. Trilateral cooperation will not only increase foreign assistance efficiency in Africa, but also give a chance to African countries to strengthen their own development capacity through assistance and guidance, reduce Africa’s aid dependence, and hopefully guarantee a smooth “graduation” of African countries from official development assistance.

The China-Italy Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Overview and Pathways to Progress

2020, the year that the world was engulfed by the Covid-19 pandemic, was also the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Italy. The China-Italy comprehensive strategic partnership plays an important role in deepening China-EU cooperation, advancing the Belt and Road Initiative, and building a community with a shared future for humanity. China-Italy relations should be studied within the analytical framework of strategic partnership which has gained traction in China’s foreign policy narrative. Beijing’s pursuit of strategic partnerships aims at forging stable and enduring relations that are driven by common interests in a world of proliferating challenges and geopolitical uncertainties. While making steady progress, the partnership is also facing multi-dimensional challenges. China and Italy should strengthen strategic dialogue to build mutual trust and constantly improve their institutionalized cooperation. Economically, they should work out broader areas for collaboration and better manage their competition to achieve win-win results. At the level of people-to-people exchange, mutual understanding and trust should be enhanced to eliminate misconception and prejudice. At the regional level, the China-EU-Italy trilateral relationship should be consolidated to shield bilateral cooperation from the volatility of China-EU relations. In the global arena, China and Italy should also step up efforts to catalyze international financial reforms and address global challenges such as climate change, economic governance, and global public health emergencies by improving policy coordination and aligning global strategies.

Private Security Companies: Emerging Protectors of China’s Overseas Interests

An increasing number of Chinese enterprises and citizens are going abroad, which exposes them to risks threatening their personal safety and security of their property. With the expansion of Chinese overseas interests, traditional protection methods fall short of a demand for diverse services, revealing a major shortfall in the Chinese government’s capability to provide overseas security protection for its citizens. New service providers are therefore urgently needed, and private security company are becoming an increasingly popular choice. As this is a fairly new demand, only a small number of Chinese private security companies are operating overseas at present. Difficulties abound for them, such as absence of regulatory clarity on business operation and gun control. The presence of private security providers could also pose a challenge to host nation authority and trigger conflicts. To serve as true protectors of overseas Chinese interests, Chinese private security companies have a long way to go.