Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, eds., The Kalām Cosmological Argument

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 445-449
Author(s):  
Graham Oppy ◽  

2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 81-97
Author(s):  
Drago Djuric

In this paper we shall consider over 30-Years larg disscusion between theistic philosopher of religion William Lane Craig and athestic philosopher Quentin Smith about kalam cosmological argument and big bang cosmological hypothesis. Main issue of their's disscusion is the problem of the cause of the beginnig of the universe. Craig tries to give us arguments for the thesis that the big bang cosmology is compatible with the his kalam kosmological argument, and, consenquently, that God is cause of the big bang. Smith but tries to give us the arguments for the thesis that the kalam cosmological argument is not sound, and that cause of the big bang is not God. At the beginnig of the discussion Smith has defended thesis that big bang has no cause. Lather but he defends the thesis that the universe is self-caused. During this larg and intensive discussion are developed interesting arguments, some of which we shall present here.


Think ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (57) ◽  
pp. 153-165
Author(s):  
Phillip Halper

ABSTRACTIn the late 1970s the big bang model of cosmology was widely accepted and interpreted as implying the universe had a beginning. At the end of that decade William Lane Craig revived an argument for God known as the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA) based on this scientific consensus. Furthermore, he linked the big bang to the supposed biblical concept of creation ex nihilo found in Genesis. I shall critique Craig's position as expressed in a more recent update and argue that contemporary cosmology no longer understands the big bang as the ultimate beginning, seriously undermining the KCA. I will further contend that book of Genesis should not be understood as describing creation ex nihilo anyway.


1991 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Oppy

In ‘Professor Mackie and the Kalam Cosmological Argument’ (Religious Studies, xx (1984), 367–75), Professor William Lane Craig undertakes to demonstrate that J. L. Mackie's analysis of the kalam cosmological argument in The Miracle of Theism (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982) is ‘superficial’, and that Mackie ‘has failed to provide any compelling or even intuitively appealing objection against the argument’ (p. 367). I disagree with Craig's judgement; for it seems to me that the considerations which Mackie advances do serve to refute the kalam cosmological argument. Consequently, the purpose of this paper is to reply to Craig's criticisms on Mackie's behalf.


Author(s):  
William Lane Craig

A survey of recent philosophical literature on the kalam cosmological argument reveals that arguments for the finitude of the past and, hence, the beginning of the universe remain robust. Plantinga’s brief criticisms of Kant’s argument in his First Antinomy concerning time are shown not to be problematic for the kalam argument. This chapter addresses, one by one, the two premises of the kalam, focusing on their philosophical aspects. The notion of infinity, both actual and potential, is discussed in relation to the coming into being of the universe. In addition, the scientific aspects of the two premises are also, briefly, addressed. Among these are the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem, which proves that classical space-time cannot be extended to past infinity but must reach a boundary at some time in the finite past. This, among other factors, lends credence to the kalam argument’s second premise.


2014 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 521-534
Author(s):  
CALUM MILLER

AbstractThere has been a trend within natural theology to present arguments for theism deductively, such that at least one of the premises is likely to be extremely controversial. For those arguments with less controversial premises, the conclusion is usually something short of theism. On these grounds, some have employed probabilistic reasoning to revive classical arguments – to use less controversial premises in achieving a conclusion directly relevant to whether theism is true or not. Here, I formulate the kalam cosmological argument in Bayesian terms, and argue that doing so renders many objections levelled against it obsolete.


Philo ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 196-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnold T. Guminski ◽  

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