The Kalam Cosmological Argument

Author(s):  
William Lane Craig

A survey of recent philosophical literature on the kalam cosmological argument reveals that arguments for the finitude of the past and, hence, the beginning of the universe remain robust. Plantinga’s brief criticisms of Kant’s argument in his First Antinomy concerning time are shown not to be problematic for the kalam argument. This chapter addresses, one by one, the two premises of the kalam, focusing on their philosophical aspects. The notion of infinity, both actual and potential, is discussed in relation to the coming into being of the universe. In addition, the scientific aspects of the two premises are also, briefly, addressed. Among these are the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem, which proves that classical space-time cannot be extended to past infinity but must reach a boundary at some time in the finite past. This, among other factors, lends credence to the kalam argument’s second premise.

2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 565-584 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Lane Craig

IntroductionJ. Howard Sobel devotes seventy pages of his wide-ranging analysis of theistic arguments to a critique of the cosmological argument. The focus of that critique falls on the argument a contingentia mundi; but he also offers in passing some criticisms of the argument ab initio mundi, or the kalam cosmological argument.Sobel provides the following Statement of the argument:Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.The universe began to exist.Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence [that did not begin to exist].Sobel will accept the causal premiss (1) only if ‘begins to exist’ means ‘has a first instant of its existence,’ and he disputes the arguments and evidence for (2).Traditional proponents of the kalam argument sought to justify (2) by means of philosophical arguments against the infinity of the past, while contemporary interest in the argument arises from the empirical evidence of physical cosmology for the truth of (2).


2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 81-97
Author(s):  
Drago Djuric

In this paper we shall consider over 30-Years larg disscusion between theistic philosopher of religion William Lane Craig and athestic philosopher Quentin Smith about kalam cosmological argument and big bang cosmological hypothesis. Main issue of their's disscusion is the problem of the cause of the beginnig of the universe. Craig tries to give us arguments for the thesis that the big bang cosmology is compatible with the his kalam kosmological argument, and, consenquently, that God is cause of the big bang. Smith but tries to give us the arguments for the thesis that the kalam cosmological argument is not sound, and that cause of the big bang is not God. At the beginnig of the discussion Smith has defended thesis that big bang has no cause. Lather but he defends the thesis that the universe is self-caused. During this larg and intensive discussion are developed interesting arguments, some of which we shall present here.


Think ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (57) ◽  
pp. 153-165
Author(s):  
Phillip Halper

ABSTRACTIn the late 1970s the big bang model of cosmology was widely accepted and interpreted as implying the universe had a beginning. At the end of that decade William Lane Craig revived an argument for God known as the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA) based on this scientific consensus. Furthermore, he linked the big bang to the supposed biblical concept of creation ex nihilo found in Genesis. I shall critique Craig's position as expressed in a more recent update and argue that contemporary cosmology no longer understands the big bang as the ultimate beginning, seriously undermining the KCA. I will further contend that book of Genesis should not be understood as describing creation ex nihilo anyway.


2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-51
Author(s):  
Drago Djuric

In this paper it will be presented polemics about kalam cosmological argument developed in medieval islamic theology and philosophy. Main moments of that polemics was presented for a centuries earlier in Philoponus criticism of Aristotle?s thesis that the world is eternal, and of impossibilty of actual infinity. Philoponus accepts the thesis that actual infinity is impossible, but he thinks that, exactly because of that, world cannot be eternal. Namely, according to Philoponus, something can?not come into being if its existence requires the preexistence of an infinite number of other things, one arising out of the other. Philoponus and his fellowers in medieval islamic theology (Al-Kindi and Al-Ghazali), called kalam theologians, have offered arguments against the conception of a temporally infinite universe, under?stood as a succesive causal chain. On other side, medieval islamic thinkers, called falasifah /philosophers/ or aristotelians (Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averro?s), have offered arguments in favor of Aristotele?s conception of the eternity of the universe. Decisive problem in disccusion between kalam i falsafa medieval muslim thinkers was the problem of infinity. They have offered very interesting arguments and counterarguments about concept of infinity. In this paper it will be presented some of the crucial moments of that arguments.


Author(s):  
Erik Wielenberg

William Lane Craig’s much-discussed kalam cosmological argument for God’s existence is intended to provide support for a particular theistic explanation of the origin of the universe.  I argue here that Craig’s theistic account of the origin of the universe entails two contradictions and hence should be rejected.  The main contribution of the paper is the identification of some relatively straightforward but previously unrecognized problems in Craig’s hypothesis that the beginning of the universe was a temporal effect of a timeless personal cause.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 225
Author(s):  
Graham Oppy

This is a commissioned review of Copan, P. and Craig, W. (eds.) The Kalām Cosmological Argument Volume Two: Scientific Evidence for the Beginning of the Universe New York: Bloomsbury, US$172.50, ISBN 978-1-50-133587-7


2017 ◽  
Vol 72. (3.) ◽  
pp. 361-361
Author(s):  
Valentin Stuhne ◽  
Dalibor Renić

The question about the beginning of the universe is crucial in philosophy in view of certain cosmological arguments for God’s existence (notably the Kalām cosmological argument), but it is also interesting in itself. This article defends the position that an interpretation of the beginning of the universe in terms of A–theoretical ontology is justified, as opposed to the B–theory. The two strongest objections to the A–theory are the problems of veracity of arguments on past and future events and the incompatibility of the A–theory with the Special Theory of Relativity. We argue that the first objection is resolved upon the A–theorist’s finding a suitable subject for the instantiation of temporal properties. As for the second objection, it is not true that the A–theory is incompatible with the Special Theory of Relativity simpliciter: it is only incompatible with Minkowski’s interpretation. We propose a few steps towards avoiding this interpretation.


2003 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 373-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. P. MORELAND

The first premise of the Kalam cosmological argument has come under fire in the last few years. The premise states that the universe had a beginning, and one of two prominent arguments for it turns on the claim that an actual infinite collection of entities cannot exist. After stating the Kalam cosmological argument and the two approaches to defending its first premise, I respond to two objections against the notion that an actual infinite collection is impossible: a Platonistic objection from abstract objects and a set-theoretic objection from an ambiguity in the definition of ‘=’ and ‘<’ as applied to sets. The thought-experiment involving Hilbert's Hotel is central to the dialectic, and the discussion clarifies its use in supporting the Kalam cosmological argument.


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