Comments on Toby Eugene Bollig’s “Desire Satisfactionism and Not-So-Satisfying Deserts: The Problem of Hell”

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 57-59
Author(s):  
Liz Goodnick ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Desire Satisfactionism

Desire Satisfactionism and Time

Utilitas ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDER SARCH
Keyword(s):  
Desire Satisfactionism

In this article, I aim to clarify how Actual Desire Satisfactionism should accommodate the ways in which desire and time are connected. In particular, I argue that Weak Concurrentism represents the most promising way for the Desire Satisfactionist to capture the temporal nature of desire. I consider the Desire Satisfactionist's other main options, but argue that none succeeds. This leaves Weak Concurrentism looking attractive. However, Weak Concurrentism might also be thought to have some implausible consequences of its own. Nonetheless, I argue that, on closer inspection, these consequences are not implausible at all – at least by the lights of the Desire Satisfactionist. I do not offer a full-blown defence of Weak Concurrentism, but rather aim to defend only a conditional conclusion: in so far as one is committed to Actual Desire Satisfactionism, Weak Concurrentism represents the best way to tackle the problems raised by the temporal nature of desires.

scholarly journals How to Use the Paradox of Hedonism

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 387-411
Author(s):  
Alexander Dietz
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Desire Satisfactionism ◽  
Hybrid Theory

Abstract The paradox of hedonism is the idea that intrinsically desiring nothing other than pleasure can prevent one from obtaining pleasure. In this article, I show how the paradox of hedonism can be used as the basis for an objection against hedonism about well-being, and one that is more defensible than has been commonly recognized. Moreover, I argue that the challenge presented by the paradox can be used to target not only hedonism about well-being, but also desire satisfactionism and the hybrid theory. However, I argue that certain sophisticated versions of all three theories can escape it.

Asymmetrism about Desire Satisfactionism and Time

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eden Lin
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Desire Satisfaction ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Desire Satisfactionism ◽  
New View

Desire-satisfaction theories of welfare must answer the timing question: when do you benefit from the satisfaction of one of your desires? There are three existing views about this: the Time of Desire view, on which you benefit at just those times when you have the desire; the Time of Object view, on which you benefit just when the object of your desire obtains; and Concurrentism, on which you benefit just when you have the desire and its object obtains. This paper introduces a new view, Asymmetrism, on which you sometimes benefit at the time of desire and sometimes benefit at the time of object. On this view, if the time at which you have a desire is later than the time at which its object obtains, then you benefit at the time of the desire. On the other hand, if the time of object is later than the time of desire, then you benefit at the time of object. Three arguments are given for the conclusion that Asymmetrism is superior to the Time of Desire and Time of Object views. It is argued that Asymmetrism and Concurrentism are the most credible answers to the timing question.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerie Tiberius
Keyword(s):  
Life Satisfaction ◽  
Practical Problem ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Other ◽  
Desire Satisfactionism ◽  
Satisfaction Theory ◽  
Objective List

The approach of this book is to defend a theory of well-being that solves a particular practical problem, namely, the problem of how to help others, particularly our friends, attain greater well-being. This introductory chapter sets out this problem, explains why it is a problem, provides some illustrative examples, and introduces the value fulfillment theory as a solution to the problem. The final section of the chapter compares the value fulfillment theory to other theories in philosophy and psychology (hedonism, life satisfaction theory, desire satisfactionism, eudaimonism, objective list theory). The aim here is not to prove the other theories are wrong, but to make space for the value fulfillment alternative.

The Experience Machine Objection to Desire Satisfactionism

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-263
Author(s):  
DAN LOWE ◽  
JOSEPH STENBERG
Keyword(s):  
Experience Machine ◽  
Desire Satisfactionism

ABSTRACT:It is widely held that the experience machine is the basis of a serious objection to hedonistic theories of welfare. It is also widely held that desire satisfactionist theories of welfare can readily avoid problems stemming from the experience machine. But in this paper, we argue that if the experience machine poses a serious problem for hedonism, it also poses a serious problem for desire satisfactionism. We raise two objections to desire satisfactionism, each of which relies on the experience machine. The first is very much like the well-known experience machine objection to hedonism. The second asks whether someone who accepts desire satisfactionism should want to form a desire to plug into the experience machine.

PRUDENCE, MORALITY, AND THE HUMEAN THEORY OF REASONS

2014 ◽  
Vol 65 (259) ◽  
pp. 220-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eden Lin
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Novel Variant ◽  
Humean Theory Of Reasons ◽  
Desire Satisfactionism ◽  
Humean Theory

Abstract Humeans about normative reasons claim that there is a reason for you to perform a given action if and only if this would promote the satisfaction of one of your desires. Their view has traditionally been thought to have the revisionary implication that an agent can sometimes lack any reason to do what morality or prudence requires. Recently, however, Mark Schroeder has denied this. If he is right, then the Humean theory accords better with common sense than it has been thought to. I argue that Schroeder is mistaken, even if welfare (and thus prudence) is understood in terms of the satisfaction of one's desires: any Humean must concede that one can sometimes lack any reason to act morally or prudently. I also identify a novel variant on Humeanism that could perhaps avoid its revisionary implications about prudence (but not morality) if desire satisfactionism is the correct theory of welfare.

Desire Satisfactionism and Not-So-Satisfying Deserts

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-227
Author(s):  
Toby Eugene Bollig ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Post Mortem ◽  
Human Welfare ◽  
Compelling Argument ◽  
Objective Theory ◽  
Subjective Theory ◽  
Desire Satisfactionism

This paper appeals to certain popular doctrines about human welfare and morality to offer a new response to the problem of hell. In particular, I contend that the combination of desire satisfactionism, a subjective theory about welfare, with an objective theory of morality leads to a surprisingly intuitive and compelling argument for the consistency of the post-mortem punishment of people in hell with the existence of an omniperfect God. In fact, under these conditions, the existence of such a divine being may actually require that there be at least some type of hell/post-mortem punishment. Finally, I suggest that positing the existence of hell can strengthen desire satisfactionism against an objection tied to base or immoral desires.

scholarly journals Asymmetrism and the Magnitudes of Welfare Benefits

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew T. Forcehimes
Keyword(s):  
Time Interval ◽  
Welfare Benefits ◽  
Desire Satisfactionism ◽  
Vexing Question

One vexing question for Desire Satisfactionism is this: At what time do you benefit from a satisfied desire? Recently Eden Lin has proposed an intriguing answer. On this proposal – Asymmetrism – when past-directed desires are satisfied, the time interval during which you benefit is the time of the desire; and, when future-directed desires are satisfied, the time interval during which you benefit is the time of the object. In this essay, I argue that Asymmetrism forces us to give implausible answers to a different question: To what extent does a given satisfied desire benefit you?

scholarly journals Explanatory perfectionism: a fresh take on an ancient theory

Analysis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Prinzing
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Good For ◽  
Desire Satisfactionism ◽  
Objective List

Abstract The ‘Big Three’ theories of well-being – hedonism, desire-satisfactionism and objective list theory – attempt to explain why certain things are good for people by appealing to prudentially good-making properties. But they do not attempt to explain why the properties they advert to make something good for a person. Perfectionism, the view that well-being consists in nature-fulfilment, is often considered a competitor to these views (or else a version of the objective list theory). However, I argue that perfectionism is best understood as explaining why certain properties are prudentially good-making. This version of perfectionism is compatible with each of the Big Three and, I argue, quite attractive.

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