scholarly journals Explanatory perfectionism: a fresh take on an ancient theory

Analysis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Prinzing
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Good For ◽  
Desire Satisfactionism ◽  
Objective List

Abstract The ‘Big Three’ theories of well-being – hedonism, desire-satisfactionism and objective list theory – attempt to explain why certain things are good for people by appealing to prudentially good-making properties. But they do not attempt to explain why the properties they advert to make something good for a person. Perfectionism, the view that well-being consists in nature-fulfilment, is often considered a competitor to these views (or else a version of the objective list theory). However, I argue that perfectionism is best understood as explaining why certain properties are prudentially good-making. This version of perfectionism is compatible with each of the Big Three and, I argue, quite attractive.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerie Tiberius
Keyword(s):  
Life Satisfaction ◽  
Practical Problem ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Other ◽  
Desire Satisfactionism ◽  
Satisfaction Theory ◽  
Objective List

The approach of this book is to defend a theory of well-being that solves a particular practical problem, namely, the problem of how to help others, particularly our friends, attain greater well-being. This introductory chapter sets out this problem, explains why it is a problem, provides some illustrative examples, and introduces the value fulfillment theory as a solution to the problem. The final section of the chapter compares the value fulfillment theory to other theories in philosophy and psychology (hedonism, life satisfaction theory, desire satisfactionism, eudaimonism, objective list theory). The aim here is not to prove the other theories are wrong, but to make space for the value fulfillment alternative.

Does Fairness Require a Multidimensional Approach?

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Arneson
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Multidimensional Approach ◽  
Significant Component ◽  
Multidimensional Assessment ◽  
The Common ◽  
Good For ◽  
Objective List

What is in itself good for you, according to the argument of this chapter, is getting or achieving things that are objectively worthwhile, these being items on an objective list. Although it would be desirable to have a unified explanation of what belongs on the list, for now we rely on intuition. The chapter surveys and finds inadequate a number of alternative accounts of well-being, mainly on the ground that they conflict with the common-sense claims that enjoyment (feeling good) is a significant component of well-being—an entry on the objective list—and that there are additional intrinsic goods besides enjoyment. Since there are plural goods, we are stuck with multidimensional assessment, and with the difficulties of aggregation that involves.

Human Flourishing Versus Desire Satisfaction

1999 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Arneson
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Surprising Result ◽  
Human Flourishing ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Desire Satisfaction ◽  
Individual Good ◽  
Helping Others ◽  
Good For

What is the good for human persons? If I am trying to lead the best possible life I could lead, not the morally best life, but the life that is best for me, what exactly am I seeking?This phrasing of the question I will be pursuing may sound tendentious, so some explanation is needed. What is good for one person, we ordinarily suppose, can conflict with what is good for other persons and with what is required by morality. A prudent person seeks her own good efficiently; she selects the best available means to her good. If we call the value that a person seeks when she is being prudent “prudential value,” then an alternative rendering of the question to be addressed in this essay is “What is prudential value?” We can also say that an individual flourishes or has a life high in well-being when her life is high in prudential value. Of course, these common-sense appearances that the good for an individual, the good for other persons, and the requirements of morality often are in conflict might be deceiving. For all that I have said here, the correct theory of individual good might yield the result that sacrificing oneself for the sake of other people or for the sake of a morally worthy cause can never occur, because helping others and being moral always maximize one's own good. But this would be the surprising result of a theory, not something we should presuppose at the start of inquiry. When a friend has a baby and I express a conventional wish that the child have a good life, I mean a life that is good for the child, not a life that merely helps others or merely respects the constraints of morality. After all, a life that is altruistic and perfectly moral, we suppose, could be a life that is pure hell for the person who lives it—a succession of horrible headaches marked by no achievements or attainments of anything worthwhile and ending in agonizing death at a young age. So the question remains, what constitutes a life that is good for the person who is living it?

An Analysis of Prudential Value

Utilitas ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN M. CAMPBELL
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Good For ◽  
The Relationship

This essay introduces and defends a new analysis of prudential value. According to this analysis, what it is for something to be good for you is for that thing to contribute to the appeal or desirability of being in your position. I argue that this proposal fits well with our ways of talking about prudential value and well-being; enables promising analyses of luck, selfishness, self-sacrifice and paternalism; preserves the relationship between prudential value and the attitudes of concern, love, pity and envy; and satisfies various other desiderata. I also highlight two ways in which the analysis is informative and can lead to progress in our substantive theorizing about the good life.

scholarly journals PEMAHAMAN WELL-BEING DARI PERSPEKTIF FILSAFAT

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 350
Author(s):  
Raja Oloan Tumanggor
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Explanatory Theory ◽  
Library Research ◽  
Objective List

Studi ini menganalisa filsafat ‘keadaan baik’ (well-being) yang tertuang dalam berbagai macam teori, seperti teori hedonisme (hedonism theory), teori pemenuhan keinginan (desire-fulfilment theory) dan teori daftar tujuan (objective-list theory). Ditinjau dari cara menjelaskan, kajian teoretis well-being dibagi dalam dua cara: pertama, teori enumeratif (enumerative theory) yang fokus pada hal-hal apa saja yang menambah well-being. Kedua, teori eksplanatoris (explanatory theory) yang bertujuan untuk menjelaskan mengapa sesuatu itu menambah well-being. Teori hedonisme dan teori daftar tujuan masuk dalam enumeratif, sedangkan teori pemenuhan keinginan masuk dalam eksplanatoris. Dengan metode studi kepustakaan (library research) dan analisis teori penulis menggarisbawahi bahwa pertama, dalam perpektif filosofis terdapat beraneka ragam teori mengenai well-being. Kedua, terdapat perbedaan konsep teoretis antara satu teori dengan teori lainnya. Ketiga, Walaupun ada perbedaan konsep antara masing-masing teori, namun dapat saling memperkaya untuk lebih memahami konsep filosofis well-being secara komprehensif.

The Perfectionist Turn

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas J. Den Uyl ◽  
Douglas B. Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Flourishing ◽  
Living Things ◽  
Good For

This chapter argues against the claim advanced by Daniel Haybron, Daniel C. Russell, and Mark LeBar that human self-perfection is ultimately based on notions of well-being and human flourishing that we bring to our understanding of human nature and in favor of the idea that it is human nature itself that ultimately grounds our understanding of human well-being or human flourishing. In doing so, the question of whether there is some gap between (a) what it is to be a good human being and (b) what is good for a human being is addressed. It is shown that the arguments on behalf of a such a gap fail and that the version of perfectionism that is advanced—that is, individualistic perfectionism—is ideally suited to not only avoid such a gap but also to display their unity, especially when perfection is understood as a process of living things and not as some cosmic or metaphysical process.

Well-Being

Life's Values ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 71-115
Author(s):  
Alan H. Goldman
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Successful Theory ◽  
Desire Satisfaction ◽  
Personal Value ◽  
Good For ◽  
The Individual

Well-being is what makes life valuable or good for the individual whose life it is. It is the all-inclusive category of personal value. This chapter evaluates the leading accounts: hedonism (pleasure is the measure of well-being), perfectionism (development of human capacities is the measure), objective lists (numerous objective goods make up a good life), and desire satisfaction. Fatal objections are raised to the first three, and an idealized desire satisfaction account is defended against objections typically raised by others to this kind of theory. The successful theory must capture our concept, unify and explain why various things are good for individual persons, and show why we are rationally motivated to pursue well-being.

Ye Cannot Serve God and Mammon

2021 ◽  
pp. 158-198
Author(s):  
Hud Hudson
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Stable Set ◽  
Unique Role ◽  
God's Will ◽  
Priming Condition ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Objective List

This final chapter begins by articulating a particular conception of the virtue of obedience and detailing its four components—humility, restraint, response, and love—and by showing how they work together both to nurture an abiding and deeply seated pro-attitude towards uniting one’s will with God’s will and also to create and maintain a robust and stable set of dispositions aimed at succeeding in this aim. It then illustrates the virtue of obedience in action, discusses its relation to happiness, and remarks on the role of perseverance, the difficult mission of anyone who commits to acquiring and developing this virtue in life. A refinement to the objective-list theories of well-being (or flourishing) is then proposed, followed by a formulation and defense of a new objective-list theory that attempts to state the conditions of receptivity in a subject in addition to identifying the range of welfare goods in the world. The virtue of obedience, it is argued, is not only one among many welfare goods, but plays a unique role vis-à-vis the other goods on the list, insofar as it serves as the priming condition under which they can realize the full extent of their value in the subject in which they manifest. Finally, the most worrisome aspects of the views defended in this book are identified, sympathetically presented with force and fairness, and addressed.

CAN UNSTABLE PREFERENCES PROVIDE A STABLE STANDARD OF WELL-BEING?

2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krister Bykvist
Keyword(s):  
General Problem ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Important Lesson ◽  
Good For

How do we determine the well-being of a person when her preferences are not stable across worlds? Suppose, for instance, that you are considering getting married, and that you know that if you get married, you will prefer being unmarried, and that if you stay unmarried, you will prefer being married. The general problem is to find a stable standard of well-being when the standard is set by preferences that are not stable. In this paper, I shall show that the problem is even worse: inconsistency threatens if we accept both that your desires determine what is good for you and that you must prefer what is better for you. After I have introduced a useful toy model and stated the inconsistency argument, I will go on to discuss a couple of unsuccessful theories and see what we can learn from their mistakes. One important lesson is that how you would have felt about a life had you never led it is irrelevant to the question of how good that life is for you. What counts is how you feel about your life when you are actually leading it. Another lesson is that a life can be better for you even if you would not rank it higher, if you were to lead it.

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