PRAGMATISM AND PROBABILITY: RE-EXAMINING KEYNES’S THINKING ON PROBABILITY

As we celebrate the centenary of John Maynard Keynes’s Treatise on Probability (1921), we are still faced with unresolved, fundamental questions about his foray into the philosophy of probability. One of these unresolved questions concerns whether Keynes (1931) later changed his mind in response to intense criticism from Frank Ramsey (1922, 1931) and abandoned the logical theory of probability. This essay draws from Cheryl Misak’s recent biography of Frank Ramsey (2020) to argue that Ramsey had an even wider influence on Keynes’s work than has been recognized, and that this influence was not just on his philosophy of probability but also on his economics. Understood in this fuller context, it seems even more clear that Keynes embraced and built upon Ramsey’s subjective theory of probability in The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936).

KRITIK ATAS KRITIK MATAN JONATHAN A.C. BROWN

This paper examines the thesis of Jonathan A.C. Brown in his article, entitled The Rules of Matn Criticism: There Are No Rules. One of the critical issues highlighted by Jonathan A.C. Brown in this paper that deserves to be investigated is the potential for subjectivity in the practice of matn criticism. The matn criticism referred to here is more directed to the criticism of the substance of matn; that the content of a hadith must be in line with or not contradict several arguments (dalil) such as verses of the Koran, more authentic hadiths, historical facts, reason and senses or science. Up to now, scholars have not agreed on what can be used as indicators of matn criticism. The potential for subjectivity can also occur in determining the coherence of the content of a hadith with the arguments mentioned earlier (dalil). Using an analytical approach and the perspective of hadith sciences as an analytical tool, the author assesses what Jonathan A.C. Brown has discussed in his article as a scientific finding that deserves to be examined in depth. In addition, this paper provides a scientific argument as to why scholars place more emphasis on sanad criticism as the initial and primary step in the hadith validation process rather than matn criticism. The author also finds that the authoritative subjective theory proposed by Jonathan A.C. Brown to tackle the element of subjectivity is an idea that scientifically deserves to be used as a standard of reference and further discussion. Tulisan ini menelaah ulang pemikiran Jonathan A.C. Brown dalam karyanya The Rules Matn Criticism: There Are No Rules. Salah satu problem penting yang diangkat oleh Jonathan Brown dalam tulisan ini yang layak untuk dikaji adalah adanya potensi subjektifitas dalam praktek kerja kritik matan. Kritik matan yang dimaksud di sini lebih mengarah kepada kritik substansi matan bahwa kandungan sebuah hadis haruslah sejalan atau tidak bertentangan dengan sejumlah dalil seperti ayat al-Quran, hadis yang lebih sahih, fakta sejarah, akal dan indera atau ilmu pengetahuan. Para ulama hingga kini belum bersepakat atas apa saja yang dapat dijadikan indikator yang harus koheren, potensi subjektifitas tersebut juga dapat terjadi pada praktek menentukan koherensi kandungan sebuah hadis dengan dalil yang telah disebutkan tadi. Dengan menggunakan pendekatan analitis dan cara pandang ilmu hadis sebagai payung besar, penulis menilai apa yang diangkat oleh Jonathan A.C. Brown merupakan temuan ilmiah yang layak untuk dikaji secara mendalam. Selain itu pula, tulisan ini memberikan argumentasi ilmiah kenapa para ulama lebih menitik beratkan kritik sanad sebagai langkah awal dan pokok dalam proses validasi hadis dibanding kritik matan. Penulis juga menemukan teori subjektif otoritatif yang diajukan oleh Jonathan Brown untuk menanggulangi unsur subjektifitas merupakan sebuah gagasan yang secara ilmiah layak untuk dijadikan bahan acuan dan penelitian lebih lanjut.

Can Subjectivism Account for Degrees of Wellbeing?

Wellbeing describes how good life is for the person living it. Wellbeing comes in degrees. Subjective theories of wellbeing maintain that for objects or states of affairs to benefit us, we need to have a positive attitude towards these objects or states of affairs: the Resonance Constraint. In this article, we investigate to what extent subjectivism can plausibly account for degrees of wellbeing. There is a vast literature on whether preference-satisfaction theory – one particular subjective theory – can account for degrees of wellbeing. This is generally taken to be problematic. However, other subjective theories – namely, desire-satisfaction, judgment- and value-fulfillment theories – do not suffer from the same difficulties. We introduce two models of degrees of wellbeing a subjectivist can employ: the Relative and the Absolute Model, and defend the claim that both models face difficulties. In particular, we argue that a subjectivist theory should describe instances of depression as instances of low degrees of wellbeing. We also argue that a reduction of desires may sometimes improve one’s degree of wellbeing, an idea we call the Epicurean Intuition. We then argue that the Relative Model fails to account for the disbenefit of certain types of depression, while the Absolute Model fails to meet a central commitment of subjectivism – the Resonance Constraint – and is unable to accommodate the Epicurean Intuition. The upshot of the paper is that subjectivist theories cannot account for degrees of well-being in a plausible way.

L’ordre de marché comme croyance

This article proposes a radically subjective theory of market order. It argues that we should reject the theories that construct a rigid notion of order around a pre-existing model (equilibrium theory and the theory of self-organising orders) (2) in favour of a conception of order from the point of view of the agents (3). In this context, order is no longer defined in terms of criteria imposed ex ante by the observer, but in terms of the rules of which it is constituted. Market order is then approached as a sui generis order which is by nature invisible, because it is mental. The market is an order because agents possess the motivation and desire to believe that it is. Under these conditions, the market order can only survive as long as it is perceived as such by individuals seeking to carry out projects of production and consumption through exchange. Key words: equilibrium, order, and trust. Clasificación JEL: D50. Résumé: Cet article propose une théorie radicalement subjective de l’ordre de marché. Il propose d’écarter, d’une part, les théories qui figent l’ordre autour d’un modèle qui lui préexiste (théorie de l’équilibre et théorie des ordres auto-organisés) (2) et de développer, d’autre part, une conception de l’ordre qui prend le point de vue des acteurs (3). L’ordre n’est pas défini dans cette perspective en référence à un critère posé ex ante par l’observateur, mais par rapport aux règles qui le constituent. L’ordre de marché est alors pensé comme un ordre suis generis qui est invisible par nature puisque mental. C’est parce que les hommes ont des motifs de croire et la volonté de croire que le marché est un ordre qu’il en est un. L’ordre de marché ne se perpétue, dans ces conditions, que s’il est perçu comme tel par les individus qui cherchent à réaliser leur projet de production et de consommation par l’échange.

Is utility a measure of commodity value? On two different approaches to the subjective theory of value

This paper reviews two theories of utility. In Jevons’ theory, utility denotes an abstract quality of a commodity and value is derived from the knowledge of the utility of a commodity. Menger, however, argued that the concept of value cannot be associated with the fact that things are useful. Goods themselves are worthless unless a human assigns value to them. It is shown that utility as a measure of commodity value is a vague concept.

Bruno de Finetti economista corporativo: dall’economia programmata alla costruzione della funzione di preferenza sociale

Bruno de Finetti (1906-1985) is well known as the founder of the subjective theory of probability. Less known, with a few exceptions, is his contribution to economic theory during the early stage of his scientific career. In the second half of the 1930s, de Finetti was passionately involved in the field of welfare economics. To provide a theoretical framework for evaluating social welfare and to help in designing public policies, he developed a new mathematical tool: the theory of simultaneous maxima. Using this analytical approach, he also advanced the idea of a social welfare function, albeit quite different from the one introduced in 1938 by Abram Bergson, reflecting the debate on the economic planning among Italian economists.

The Early Mathematics of Welfare

Bruno de Finetti (1906–1985) is well known as the founder of the subjective theory of probability. Less known is his contribution to economic theory. The article presents the contributions of de Finetti in the field of welfare economics. He advanced a new mathematical tool: the theory of simultaneous maxima. On this base, he criticized the laissez-faire interpretation of the Paretian theory and advanced the idea of a social welfare function, reflecting the debate on economic planning among Italian corporatist economists.

El concepto de cultura en la ensayística de Georg Simmel

This article analyzes Georg Simmel’s concept of culture by reconstructing the genealogy of his theory within its historical, political, and economic context. It examines to what extent Simmel’s ideas on value and division of labor cement his conception of cultural alienation. Finally, it argues that Simmel’s cultural theory is significantly biased by a subjective theory of value, which entails apologetic traits.

El concepto de cultura en la ensayística de Georg Simmel

This article analyzes Georg Simmel’s concept of culture by reconstructing the genealogy of his theory within its historical, political, and economic context. It examines to what extent Simmel’s ideas on value and division of labor cement his conception of cultural alienation. Finally, it argues that Simmel’s cultural theory is significantly biased by a subjective theory of value, which entails apologetic traits.