The Translation of First Order Logic into Modal Predicate Logic

2008 ◽  
pp. 65-69
Keyword(s):  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Modal Predicate Logic

Relational and partial variable sets and basic predicate logic

1996 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 843-872 ◽  
Author(s):  
Silvio Ghilardi ◽  
Giancarlo Meloni
Keyword(s):  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Important Case ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Partial Functions ◽  
First Order ◽  
Transition Functions ◽  
Independence Results

AbstractIn this paper we study the logic of relational and partial variable sets, seen as a generalization of set-valued presheaves, allowing transition functions to be arbitrary relations or arbitrary partial functions. We find that such a logic is the usual intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic first order logic without Beck and Frobenius conditions relative to quantifiers along arbitrary terms. The important case of partial variable sets is axiomatizable by means of the substitutivity schema for equality. Furthermore, completeness, incompleteness and independence results are obtained for different kinds of Beck and Frobenius conditions.

scholarly journals Formalization of Linear Space Theory in the Higher-Order Logic Proving System

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Zhang ◽  
Danwen Mao ◽  
Yong Guan
Keyword(s):  
Linear Space ◽  
Theorem Proving ◽  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Space Theory ◽  
Higher Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Important Approach

Theorem proving is an important approach in formal verification. Higher-order logic is a form of predicate logic that is distinguished from first-order logic by additional quantifiers and stronger semantics. Higher-order logic is more expressive. This paper presents the formalization of the linear space theory in HOL4. A set of properties is characterized in HOL4. This result is used to build the underpinnings for the application of higher-order logic in a wider spectrum of engineering applications.

scholarly journals Model theory of monadic predicate logic with the infinity quantifier

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Facundo Carreiro ◽  
Alessandro Facchini ◽  
Yde Venema ◽  
Fabio Zanasi
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Semantic Property ◽  
First Order ◽  
Scott Continuous ◽  
Semantic Properties

AbstractThis paper establishes model-theoretic properties of $$\texttt {M} \texttt {E} ^{\infty }$$ M E ∞ , a variation of monadic first-order logic that features the generalised quantifier $$\exists ^\infty $$ ∃ ∞ (‘there are infinitely many’). We will also prove analogous versions of these results in the simpler setting of monadic first-order logic with and without equality ($$\texttt {M} \texttt {E} $$ M E and $$\texttt {M} $$ M , respectively). For each logic $$\texttt {L} \in \{ \texttt {M} , \texttt {M} \texttt {E} , \texttt {M} \texttt {E} ^{\infty }\}$$ L ∈ { M , M E , M E ∞ } we will show the following. We provide syntactically defined fragments of $$\texttt {L} $$ L characterising four different semantic properties of $$\texttt {L} $$ L -sentences: (1) being monotone and (2) (Scott) continuous in a given set of monadic predicates; (3) having truth preserved under taking submodels or (4) being truth invariant under taking quotients. In each case, we produce an effectively defined map that translates an arbitrary sentence $$\varphi $$ φ to a sentence $$\varphi ^\mathsf{p}$$ φ p belonging to the corresponding syntactic fragment, with the property that $$\varphi $$ φ is equivalent to $$\varphi ^\mathsf{p}$$ φ p precisely when it has the associated semantic property. As a corollary of our developments, we obtain that the four semantic properties above are decidable for $$\texttt {L} $$ L -sentences.

Second- and higher-order logics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaughan Lavine
Keyword(s):  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Third Order ◽  
First Order ◽  
Proof Systems ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Second Order Logic

In first-order predicate logic there are symbols for fixed individuals, relations and functions on a given universe of individuals and there are variables ranging over the individuals, with associated quantifiers. Second-order logic adds variables ranging over relations and functions on the universe of individuals, and associated quantifiers, which are called second-order variables and quantifiers. Sometimes one also adds symbols for fixed higher-order relations and functions among and on the relations, functions and individuals of the original universe. One can add third-order variables ranging over relations and functions among and on the relations, functions and individuals on the universe, with associated quantifiers, and so on, to yield logics of even higher order. It is usual to use proof systems for higher-order logics (that is, logics beyond first-order) that include analogues of the first-order quantifier rules for all quantifiers. An extensional n-ary relation variable in effect ranges over arbitrary sets of n-tuples of members of the universe. (Functions are omitted here for simplicity: remarks about them parallel those for relations.) If the set of sets of n-tuples of members of a universe is fully determined once the universe itself is given, then the truth-values of sentences involving second-order quantifiers are determined in a structure like the ones used for first-order logic. However, if the notion of the set of all sets of n-tuples of members of a universe is specified in terms of some theory about sets or relations, then the universe of a structure must be supplemented by specifications of the domains of the various higher-order variables. No matter what theory one adopts, there are infinitely many choices for such domains compatible with the theory over any infinite universe. This casts doubt on the apparent clarity of the notion of ‘all n-ary relations on a domain’: since the notion cannot be defined categorically in terms of the domain using any theory whatsoever, how could it be well-determined?

Provability with Finitely Many Variables

2002 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 348-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Hirsch ◽  
Ian Hodkinson ◽  
Roger D. Maddux
Keyword(s):  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Algebraic Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Alternative Semantics ◽  
Relation Symbol ◽  
First Order ◽  
Binary Predicate ◽  
Standard Set ◽  
Binary Relation Symbol

AbstractFor every finite n ≥ 4 there is a logically valid sentence φn with the following properties: φn contains only 3 variables (each of which occurs many times); φn contains exactly one nonlogical binary relation symbol (no function symbols, no constants, and no equality symbol); φn has a proof in first-order logic with equality that contains exactly n variables, but no proof containing only n − 1 variables. This result was first proved using the machinery of algebraic logic developed in several research monographs and papers. Here we replicate the result and its proof entirely within the realm of (elementary) first-order binary predicate logic with equality. We need the usual syntax, axioms, and rules of inference to show that φn has a proof with only n variables. To show that φn has no proof with only n − 1 variables we use alternative semantics in place of the usual, standard, set-theoretical semantics of first-order logic.

scholarly journals Possibility Semantics for Intuitionistic Logic

2004 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. J. Cresswell
Keyword(s):  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Semantic Interpretation ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Partial Indices ◽  
Closure Conditions ◽  
First Order Predicate Logic

The paper investigates interpretations of propositional and first-order logic in which validity is defined in terms of partial indices; sometimes called possibilities but here understood as non-empty subsets of a set W of possible worlds. Truth at a set of worlds is understood to be truth at every world in the set. If all subsets of W are permitted the logic so determined is classical first-order predicate logic. Restricting allowable subsets and then imposing certain closure conditions provides a modelling for intuitionistic predicate logic. The same semantic interpretation rules are used in both logics for all the operators.

scholarly journals The completeness of Heyting first-order logic

2003 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 751-763 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. W. Tait
Keyword(s):  
Type Theory ◽  
Disjoint Union ◽  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Predicate Logic

AbstractRestricted to first-order formulas, the rules of inference in the Curry-Howard type theory are equivalent to those of first-order predicate logic as formalized by Heyting, with one exception: ∃-elimination in the Curry-Howard theory, where ∃x: A,F(x) is understood as disjoint union, are the projections, and these do not preserve first-orderedness. This note shows, however, that the Curry-Howard theory is conservative over Heyting's system.

Generalisation of first-order logic to nonatomic domains

1985 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 815-838 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Roeper
Keyword(s):  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Boolean Algebras ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Quantification Theory ◽  
First Order ◽  
General Kind ◽  
Existential Quantification

The quantifiers of standard predicate logic are interpreted as ranging over domains of individuals, and interpreted formulae beginning with a quantifier make claims to the effect that something is true of every individual, i.e. of the whole domain, or of some individuals, i.e. of part of the domain. To state that something is true of all or part of a totality seems to be the basic significance of universal and existential quantification, and this by itself does not involve a specification of the structure of the totality. This means that the notion of quantification by itself does not demand totalities of individuals, i.e. atomic totalities, as domains of quantification. Nonatomic domains, such as volumes of space, or surfaces, are equally in order. So one might say that a certain predicate applies “everywhere” or “somewhere” in such a domain. All that the concept of quantification requires is a totality which is structured in terms of a part-to-whole relation, and appropriate properties that apply to part or all of the totality. Quantification does not demand that the totality have smallest parts, or atoms. There is no conflict with the sense of universal or existential quantification if the domain is nonatomic, if every one of its parts has itself proper parts.The most general kind of quantification theory must then deal with totalities of any kind, atomic or not. The relationships among the parts of a domain are described by the theory of Boolean algebras, which we can regard as the most general characterisation of a totality, of a domain of quantification.In this paper I shall be concerned with this generalised theory of quantification, which encompasses nonatomic domains as well as atomic and mixed domains, i.e. totalities consisting entirely or partly of individuals.

GLIVENKO AND KURODA FOR SIMPLE TYPE THEORY

2014 ◽  
Vol 79 (2) ◽  
pp. 485-495 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHAD E. BROWN ◽  
CHRISTINE RIZKALLAH
Keyword(s):  
Type Theory ◽  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Simple Type ◽  
Universal Quantifier ◽  
First Order ◽  
Simple Type Theory ◽  
Glivenko’S Theorem ◽  
First Order Predicate Logic

AbstractGlivenko’s theorem states that an arbitrary propositional formula is classically provable if and only if its double negation is intuitionistically provable. The result does not extend to full first-order predicate logic, but does extend to first-order predicate logic without the universal quantifier. A recent paper by Zdanowski shows that Glivenko’s theorem also holds for second-order propositional logic without the universal quantifier. We prove that Glivenko’s theorem extends to some versions of simple type theory without the universal quantifier. Moreover, we prove that Kuroda’s negative translation, which is known to embed classical first-order logic into intuitionistic first-order logic, extends to the same versions of simple type theory. We also prove that the Glivenko property fails for simple type theory once a weak form of functional extensionality is included.

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