scholarly journals Obligations erga omnes: Jus cogens in statu nascendi? A theory inspired by the nature of International Law

Pravni zapisi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 577-593
Author(s):  
Ana Zdravković

This paper is a follow-up to a debate on the book "The Nature of International Law" by Miodrag A. Jovanović. First, the approach towards erga omnes obligations adopted in the book is analyzed, after which a different perspective towards the concept is offered. The curious case of erga omnes obligations can be summed up by stating that there has hardly been more elucidated concept in international law but with so little clarification achieved. With the aim of shedding more light on this conundrum, the concept is compared to others of a similar nature, primarily jus cogens norms, only to identify that erga omnes obligations could be defined as jus cogens in statu nascendi. Respectively, it is argued that according to the current state of affairs in the international community, the International Court of Justice is an instance of last resort when distinguishing between jus cogens norms and obligations erga omnes. Finally, the view concerning the three-layered nature of the international legal hierarchy is accepted, with jus cogens norms having the highest rank, followed by erga omnes obligations and with the jus dispositivum of international law in third place.

2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 753-769 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Andenas ◽  
Thomas Weatherall

This case1 marks the first pronouncement by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare) in international law. It is the second contentious case in which the ICJ has held the defendant country in breach of its obligations under a human rights convention. The ICJ both added to the corpus of norms it has formally recognized as peremptory norms (jus cogens) and also reinforced the principle that former heads of state are subject to universal jurisdiction for grave violations of international law.


1999 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to examine whether the possibility of a genuine non liquet is ruled out by a so-called ‘closing rule’underlying public international law. The answer to this question largely determines the relevance of the debate on the legality and legitimacy of the pronouncement of a non liquet by an international court. This debate was recently provoked by the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons. In this opinion, the Court held that it could not definitively conclude whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was contrary to international law in an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which the survival of a state is at stake. Nevertheless, some authors have argued that, since international law contains a closing rule stating that the absence of a prohibition is equivalent to the existence of a permission (or vice versa), the Court had in fact decided the legality of nuclear weapons. By virtue of this closing rule, the pronouncement of a non liquet would be impossible. In our analysis, we have taken issue with this view and claim that there are no a priori reasons for the acceptance of a closing rule underlying international law. It is possible indeed that a legal system is simply indifferent towards a certain type of conduct. Moreover, even if a closing rule would be assumed, this rule would be of no help in determining the legality or illegality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons, since the Court asserted that the current state of international law and the facts at its disposal were insufficient to enable it to reach a definitive conclusion. Nothing follows from this assertion, except the assurance that international law cannot definitively settle the question of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons: to be permitted or not to be permitted, that is still the question. Hamlet's dilemma precisely.


2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 1103-1119 ◽  
Author(s):  
HUGH THIRLWAY

AbstractThe International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) continues to hear and determine the contentious cases submitted to it, keeping up what has been referred to as an acceptable ‘cruising pace’. After recalling the extent to which the demands on the Court have increased, and the practical means available to it have been greatly extended, the author (following up an earlier article on the subject in the Netherlands International Law Review) examines the Court's recent case-law (decisions given since 2010) to show how each decision, besides furthering settlement of the specific dispute, has contributed to the enlargement or development of international law. Attention is concentrated, however, on particular questions: the role of peremptory norms (jus cogens); interpretation of treaties; questions of jurisdiction (including the problem of the existence of a justiciable dispute in each case); and certain incidental proceedings contemplated by the Court's Statute and Rules, namely provisional measures and intervention under Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute.


Author(s):  
John G. Merrills

In 2015 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave three judgments and made a number of orders. In various ways this jurisprudence, although modest in extent, contributed to the elucidation of international law on several procedural, as well as substantive matters. In that year no new cases were begun, but one case was discontinued. At the beginning of 2016 there were therefore ten cases on the Court’s docket. The Court’s work in 2015 demonstrates that through its decisions it continues to assist states to resolve their international disputes peacefully and at the same time to contribute to the clarification and development of international law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-349
Author(s):  
Iliriana Islami ◽  
Remzije Istrefi

Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008. Subsequently, one of the aims of Kosovo’s foreign policy was to further consolidate this position and to justify Kosovo’s prospective membership in the United Nations. This article examines the issue of recognition, elucidating how Kosovo is different from other countries and comparing it with the case of the former Yugoslavia. Other aspects in the state-building process such as ‘building constitutionalism’ will be presented as a step toward justifying recognition and membership. Furthermore, the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 8 October 2008 will be presented as evidence of Kosovo’s strengthening international position in its quest for further recognition. Thus, the article will discuss and analyze the arguments in favor of Kosovo being admitted to the UN.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 79-82
Author(s):  
Maria Flores

I first became involved with international law while I was at university. After graduating, I decided to teach public international law. As an undergraduate, I particularly enjoyed this branch of study. I was attracted to it because it helped me to understand the problems, challenges, and breakthroughs in the field of international relations on a global scale. Therefore, after facing a competitive entry process, I joined the international law department of the Universidad de la República. It was a small department, but the university had produced some well-known scholars like Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, who became a judge at the International Court of Justice, and Hector Gross Espiell, who served as a judge at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 641-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
MASSIMO LANDO

AbstractIn 2009, the International Court of Justice introduced plausibility as a requirement for indicating provisional measures under Article 41 of its Statute. Upon its introduction, plausibility was conceived as a test to establish that the rights asserted by applicant states might exist under international law. However, the Court subsequently developed the plausibility test into a higher standard, which requires the Court also to assess that the alleged conduct of the respondent state might breach that applicant state's asserted rights. This development has important implications for provisional measures proceedings before the Court. First, one could distinguish two aspects of plausibility, legal and factual. Second, plausibility has different functions in requests for provisional measures depending on whether the applicant state asserts rights arising under a treaty or under customary international law. Third, the Court's enquiry into plausibility could overlap with the enquiry into prima facie jurisdiction ratione materiae, although these two requirements conceivably entail different thresholds. Fourth, plausibility in provisional measures indicated in interpretation proceedings could be seen to be different from plausibility in provisional measures indicated in ordinary contentious proceedings.


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