The question whether the functions performed by the prosecutor in the criminal justice system are subject to judicial scrutiny has been a matter for concern in common-law jurisdictions for quite some time. The courts in the Commonwealth generally agree that prosecutors must function independently; act fairly and responsibly in the interests of the public; and must be free from political interference. Their role in the administration of justice is to uphold the rule of law. Therefore, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion should ordinarily not be interfered with by the courts except in rare cases. However, the extent to which the courts, in respective Commonwealth jurisdictions, review prosecutorial discretions differs. A comparative study of the Canadian experience and the South African approach, where the judicial approaches to the review of prosecutorial discretion significantly differ, is a clear illustration. In Canada, the courts hardly interfere with, or review the manner in which the prosecutor performs his or her duties, except that prosecutorial discretion is not immune from all judicial oversight, since it is reviewable for abuse of process (see R v Anderson [2014] 2 SCR 167). In South Africa on the other hand, the exercise of the powers of the prosecutor and their ramifications are, like every exercise of public power, subject to the constitutional principles of legality and rationality. The recent judgments of the Full Bench of the Gauteng Division, Pretoria in Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions 2016 (2) SACR 1 (GP) as affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Zuma v Democratic Alliance 2018 (1) SA 200 (SCA)—the so-called ‘spy-tape’ saga—are the latest illustrations of this approach.
The Attorney General’s Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in Malaysia: A Critique of Scope, Limitation and Challenges