Sustainable Animal Agriculture and Environmental Virtue Ethics

Author(s):  
Raymond Anthony

Raymond Anthony addresses the role of technology in promoting sustainable agri-food systems and animal well-being. Food production under an industrial model makes it difficult to appreciate the good of animals in their own right, apart from their instrumental use for us. The problem is not merely our attitude toward animals but the very modes of production in which we deal with them. Agricultural technologies reflect our values and norms, for better or worse. Anthony suggests a virtue ethics approach to technology in order to counter the instrumentalist view we typically have about man-made things. If virtues can be embedded within machinery it might be possible to design animal agricultural systems that can recognize the instrinsic good of animals. An environmental virtue ethics of care (EVEC) is the antidote to commodification of humans, animals, and the natural world. EVEC affirms ethical consumerism, which requires that we take others into consideration in our consumer choices. But it also requires that industry technocrats be mindful of how they innovate, what products they market, how they design facilities, and, above all, how they might find better ways to meld business, profit, and technology with care for humans, animals, and the environment.

Author(s):  
Jason Kawall

Environmental virtue ethics is among the most fruitful and influential applications of virtue ethics. This chapter considers the attractions of a virtue-based approach to environmental ethics in particular, before examining how we come to identify environmental virtues and vices. Following consideration of representative environmental virtues (humility and courage), and vices (arrogance and inattention), the chapter turns to a consideration of objections to environmental virtue ethics. While many of these objections are readily answerable, they suggest that greater attention must be paid to political virtues, and to the role of institutions and social structures in shaping possibilities for acquiring and acting upon environmental virtues. There are also significant epistemic worries concerning the ability to identify environmental virtues and exemplars. The chapter closes with a consideration of ways in which appeals to psychology and the social sciences might enrich and enhance environmental virtue ethics, and help to overcome its remaining epistemic problems.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-43
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Frasz

An argument is made that to further develop the field of environmental virtue ethics it must be connected with an account of environmental sentiments. Openness as both an environmental sentiment and virtue is presented. This sentiment is shown to be reflected in the work of Barbara McClintock. As a virtue it is shown to a mean between arrogance and the disvaluing of individuals, a disposition to be open to the natural world and the values found there. Further development of EVE is then shown to require a connection with an account of environmental wisdom.


Author(s):  
Michael Hannis ◽  
Sian Sullivan

The chapter considers the environmental ethics underlying certain practices and beliefs observed in the course of field research with primarily ||Khao-a Dama people in west Namibia. ||Khao-a Dama perspectives embody a type of “relational environmental ethics” that refracts anthropocentric/ecocentric dichotomies, and is characterized by respect for, and reciprocity with, agency and intentionality as located in entities beyond the human (ancestors, spirits, animals, healing plants and rain). The chapter connects this worldview with contemporary environmental virtue ethics, arguing that it is compatible with a theoretical framework of “ecological eudaimonism” as a fitting response to a complex contemporary world of “wicked” environmental problems.


1993 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 259-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey B. Frasz ◽  

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Duncan Christian Martin

<p>In this thesis, I aim to show that virtue oriented approaches to environmental ethics are in a position to provide satisfying answers to two central ethical questions: “What kind of person should I be?”, and “What should I do?” I argue that two such approaches – Rosalind Hursthouse’s environmental virtue ethics and Philip Cafaro’s account of environmental vice – provide insights about how we ought to be with regard to the environment, in terms of character and attitudes. I then defend Hursthouse’s account of right action against several objections. First, I respond to the worry that a shortage of environmental exemplars might count against Hursthouse, by showing that non-virtuous agents can conceive of what to do by seeking to avoid acting from environmental vices. Second, I respond the worry that her account of right action fails to generate the right result for non-virtuous agents in some cases, by showing that such cases can be accounted for by appeal to the distinction between action guidance and action assessment. Third, I consider the worry that her theory will fail to provide concrete action guidance. Theories which seek to provide concrete action guidance in all contexts face serious problems of their own, I respond. Further, I maintain that Hursthouse is not ruled out from providing the sort of action guidance her critics are interested in.</p>


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