Introduction

This book is a study of Aristotle’s engagement with Eleatic monism, the theory of Parmenides of Elea and his followers that reality is ‘one’. Parmenides wrote a single philosophical poem, sometime in the early fifth century BCE. This poem, which now survives only in fragments, is widely acknowledged to be a pivotal work in the history of Greek philosophy. It tells the story of a young man who is taken on a journey by the daughters of the Sun. After passing through the gates of the paths of Night and Day, he is greeted by a goddess:...

Aristotle and the Eleatic One

This book examines Aristotle’s response to Eleatic monism, the theory of Parmenides of Elea and his followers that reality is ‘one’. The book argues that Aristotle interprets the Eleatics as thoroughgoing monists, for whom the pluralistic, changing world of the senses is a mere illusion. Understood in this way, the Eleatic theory constitutes a radical challenge to the possibility of natural philosophy. Aristotle discusses the Eleatics in several works, including De Caelo, De Generatione et Corruptione, and the Metaphysics. But his most extensive treatment of their monism comes at the beginning of the Physics, where he criticizes them for overlooking the fact that ‘being is said in many ways’—in other words, that there are many ways of being. Through a careful analysis of this and other criticisms, the book explains how Aristotle’s engagement with the Eleatics prepares the ground for his own theory of the principles of nature. Aristotle is commonly thought to be an unreliable interpreter of his Presocratic predecessors; in contrast, this book argues that his critique can shed valuable light on the motivation of the Eleatic theory and its influence on the later philosophical tradition.

The Refutation of Eleatic Monism

This chapter discusses Aristotle’s refutation of Eleatic monism in Physics 1.2 (185a20–b25). The refutation targets two kinds of monism: entity monism (the view that reality consists of just a single entity) and essence monism (the view that reality is all of the same essence). Aristotle’s refutation of these monistic views starts from his claims that being and one are ‘said in many ways’. This chapter explains how Aristotle’s criticisms work, and asks whether or not they are successful. In particular, it addresses two potential worries for his critique: the worry that he begs the question against his monistic opponents, and the worry that he relies on an uncharitable interpretation of their theory.

On Giving in to the Eleatics

At the end of his discussion of Eleatic monism, Aristotle criticizes some unnamed philosophers for ‘giving in’ to two Eleatic arguments: the argument that ‘all things will be one, if being signifies one thing’, and the argument ‘from the dichotomy’ (Phys. 1.3, 187a1–10). This chapter argues that these anonymous respondents are the Presocratic atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, and that the Eleatic arguments in question are (i) Parmenides’ argument for continuity and uniformity, and (ii) a post-Parmenidean argument for the indivisibility of the universe. The chapter explains why Aristotle thinks that, in their response to these arguments, the atomists conceded too much to the Eleatics.