Introduction

This book is a study of Aristotle’s engagement with Eleatic monism, the theory of Parmenides of Elea and his followers that reality is ‘one’. Parmenides wrote a single philosophical poem, sometime in the early fifth century BCE. This poem, which now survives only in fragments, is widely acknowledged to be a pivotal work in the history of Greek philosophy. It tells the story of a young man who is taken on a journey by the daughters of the Sun. After passing through the gates of the paths of Night and Day, he is greeted by a goddess:...

Parmenides’ Argument for Monism

This chapter reconstructs Aristotle’s interpretation of Parmenides’ argument for monism. After asking how Aristotle conceives of the Parmenidean One, the chapter focuses on his ‘solution’ to Parmenides’ argument (Phys. 1.3, 186a23–8). This solution makes excellent sense if we see it as targeting Parmenides’ argument at B 8.22–5 for the continuity and uniformity of what is. Accordingly, it is proposed that Aristotle reads these lines as containing Parmenides’ principal argument for monism. If this is right, Aristotle has a much more appealing interpretation of Parmenides’ argument than has previously been thought. The proposal receives additional support from the discussion of Eleatic arguments in De Generatione et Corruptione 1.8.

Problems of One and Many

In the middle of Aristotle’s discussion of the Eleatics in Physics 1.2–3, we find a short excursus on some post-Eleatic thinkers (Phys. 1.2, 185b25–186a3). These ‘more recent’ thinkers inherited certain Eleatic concerns about how the same thing can be both one and many at the same time. This chapter examines Aristotle’s account of the more recent thinkers’ struggles with two problems of one and many: the ‘predication problem’ and the ‘whole–parts’ problem. The first is a problem arising from our characteristic way of ascribing properties to things; the second is a problem arising from the assumption that a whole is identical to its parts. The final section of the chapter makes a proposal about the function of the excursus.

Did Aristotle Change His Mind about Parmenides?

This chapter asks whether Aristotle’s interpretation of Parmenides stays the same throughout the corpus. Some commentators have denied this on the basis of Aristotle’s discussion of the Eleatics in Metaphysics A 5. This passage has been thought to show that he comes to read the cosmological section of Parmenides’ poem, the Doxa, as presenting Parmenides’ own views of the (really existing) natural world. If this is correct, then Aristotle comes to favour an interpretation of Parmenides that is very different from the interpretation he adopts in Physics 1.2–3. This chapter argues that there is no evidence that Aristotle’s interpretation of Parmenides changes in this way. He consistently reads the Doxa as a ‘way of falsity’ and consistently regards Parmenides as a radical monist.

Resisting Parmenides’ Argument

This chapter analyses the complex response to Parmenides’ argument at Phys. 1.3, 186a23–b35. Aristotle puts forward two main objections: first, the argument relies on an overly narrow conception of being (‘being is said in a single way’); second, even if we were to grant Parmenides his basic ontological assumptions, it still would not follow that reality is one. Aristotle concentrates on explaining why Parmenides’ assumptions do not establish that reality is one ‘in account’. In this connection, he raises a series of problems stemming from Parmenides’ failure to recognize properties as entities distinct from the things that have them.

Criticisms of Melissus’ Argument

This chapter examines Aristotle’s reply to Melissus (Phys. 1.3, 186a10–22). Melissus’ monism is based on his argument that anything that exists must be unlimited in extent. Aristotle challenges this argument, alleging that it commits a logical fallacy. He then goes on to criticize Melissus’ argument from monism to the impossibility of change. Aristotle thinks of Melissus’ monistic argument as ‘crude’ in comparison with Parmenides’, but at the same time he suggests that some similar criticisms can be made of both philosophers. This means that his response to Melissus can also shed some light on his understanding of Parmenides.

The Refutation of Eleatic Monism

This chapter discusses Aristotle’s refutation of Eleatic monism in Physics 1.2 (185a20–b25). The refutation targets two kinds of monism: entity monism (the view that reality consists of just a single entity) and essence monism (the view that reality is all of the same essence). Aristotle’s refutation of these monistic views starts from his claims that being and one are ‘said in many ways’. This chapter explains how Aristotle’s criticisms work, and asks whether or not they are successful. In particular, it addresses two potential worries for his critique: the worry that he begs the question against his monistic opponents, and the worry that he relies on an uncharitable interpretation of their theory.

Eleaticism and the Philosophy of Nature

This chapter considers Aristotle’s preface to his critique of the Eleatics (Phys. 1.2, 184b25–185a20). In this preface, he denies that it is the job of the physicist or natural philosopher to examine the Eleatic theory. Aristotle’s argument shows that he regards Parmenides and Melissus as entity monists (that is, as claiming that reality consists of just one entity) and as rejecting the possibility of change. The chapter situates the critique of the Eleatics within the overall argument of Physics 1, and explains why Aristotle engages with their theory at the beginning of the Physics, despite the fact that this task falls beyond the scope of natural philosophy.

Conclusion

In the preceding chapters I have offered a comprehensive account of how Aristotle understands Parmenides’ and Melissus’ monism, how he tries to refute their position, how he interprets their arguments for monism, and where he thinks these arguments go wrong. I have argued that Aristotle reads Parmenides and Melissus as defending two kinds of monism: entity monism, the view that reality consists of just a single entity, and essence monism, the view that reality is all of the same essence....

On Giving in to the Eleatics

At the end of his discussion of Eleatic monism, Aristotle criticizes some unnamed philosophers for ‘giving in’ to two Eleatic arguments: the argument that ‘all things will be one, if being signifies one thing’, and the argument ‘from the dichotomy’ (Phys. 1.3, 187a1–10). This chapter argues that these anonymous respondents are the Presocratic atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, and that the Eleatic arguments in question are (i) Parmenides’ argument for continuity and uniformity, and (ii) a post-Parmenidean argument for the indivisibility of the universe. The chapter explains why Aristotle thinks that, in their response to these arguments, the atomists conceded too much to the Eleatics.