Financial regulation in the age of the platform economy

Platform businesses allow for collaboration with nontraditional partners and bring together different categories of customers, in the financial context savers and investors or lenders and borrowers, creating large, scalable networks of users. Their entry into finance promises potential benefits to consumers in the form of new products, lower prices, wider choice, and enhanced consumer experience. At the same time, their new business models and technologies potentially threaten the dominant position of traditional financial services providers and create challenges for regulators. Platform businesses can use their preferential access to customer data to skim off high-quality loans, leaving only low-quality customers for other lenders. Their ability to offer complementary nonfinancial services that cannot be supplied by FinTech start-ups and banks can make it difficult or unattractive for customers to switch to alternative providers. This danger is especially acute when BigTech firms have monopoly power in other markets that complement financial services.

The case for private administration of deposit guarantee schemes

We make the case that the responsibility for appointing board members in Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) for commercial banks should be entrusted to the industry. In doing so, we challenge the position adopted by the International Monetary Fund, which has proposed public DGSs as the best practice. We lay out the comparative advantages of private over public DGS administration, and contend that the role of the government should in principle be limited to regulating DGSs specifically and financial markets in general. We conclude that the current worldwide trend towards greater involvement of government in financial regulation should not be extended to the administration of DGSs.

Governance in the era of Blockchain technology in Qatar: a roadmap and a manual for Trade Finance

Nations worldwide have sought to capitalize on the benefits of distributed ledger technology (DLT) including Blockchain, but struggled to strike a balance between encouraging investment and innovation in the technology while addressing the challenges and uncertainties through regulation. Through its FinTech (Financial Technology) Strategy, Qatar has sought to embrace DLT, but its regulatory approach also remains cautious. Trade Finance is an ideal business process to be disrupted through the benefits of DLT and especially Blockchain technology, since its processes remain antiquated, inefficient and lack digitization. Blockchain as a form of DLT particularly offers the Trade Finance process not only more rapid, secure, cost-effective and efficient procedures, but importantly completely assures trust between importers and exporters and removes the requirement to place such trust in third-party intermediaries. Qatar can reap considerable economic benefits through the enhancement of its Trade Finance regulations enabling the adoption of such Blockchain technology. As such, the authors propose a roadmap and manual for the governance of the Trade Finance Blockchain ecosystem in Qatar. The authors propose multi-layered governance approach to the regulation of Blockchain in Qatar by (1) embracing international regulations and standards; (2) replicating foreign regional and national rules that are appropriate and innovative; and (3) applying sandbox regulations to Blockchain products and services.

Limiting too-big-to-fail: market reactions to policy announcements and actions

Banks considered too-big-to-fail (TBTF) tend to benefit from funding cost advantages as their debt is considered implicitly guaranteed by public authorities, even if the latter have undertaken substantial effort to limit TBTF. This paper focuses on the changes in related market perceptions in response to bank regulatory and resolution reform announcements as well as actual failure resolution actions. It analyses how premia on risky bank debt have reacted to such events, using data for senior and subordinated debt CDS quotes for 45 European banks from January 2007 to May 2020. The empirical results are consistent with progress being made in reducing the value of implicit bank debt guarantees, especially on subordinated bank liabilities. Some earlier bank failure resolution actions appeared to significantly raise risk premia, although more recent failure resolution cases either had no effect on risk premia or moved them in the opposite direction. Several of these events consisted of no-action, that is, in particular, they did not entail any bail-in. As opposed to resolution actions, the reactions of risk premia to policy and regulatory announcements are more difficult to explain and no clear pattern seems to be emerging, confirming the view that action speaks louder than words.