Envy-Free Allocation by Sperner’s Lemma Adapted to Rotation Shifts in a Company

This article discusses a theoretical construction based on the graph theory to rework the space of potential partitions in envy-free distribution. This work has the objective of applying Sperner’s lemma to the distribution of three rotating shifts for three workers who are to cover a 24 h job position in a company. As a novel feature, worker’s preferences have been modeled as functions of probability for the three shifts, according to salary offers for said shifts. Envy-free allocation was achieved, since each worker received their preferred shift without the need for negotiation between agents in conflict. Adaptation to the type of dynamic situations that arise with rotating shifts, as well as the consideration of probabilistic preferences by workers are some of the main novelties of this work.

Connection Games and Sperner’s Lemma

This chapter provides an introduction to connection games in general. It also recounts how Sperner's Lemma, a result about labeling a triangulation of a simplex, can be used to prove that someone must win at Hex—the best-known connection game—as well as The Game of Y®, (or simply, Y) another well-known connection game. Moreover, the chapter proves a generalization of Sperner's Lemma and uses it to show that there is always a winner in the many variations of Atoll and Begird, two connection games which can be played on a variety of boards and include Hex and Y, respectively, as special cases. These “must-win” results have significant strategic implications—if one prevents the opponent from making the desired connection, one would be able to make this connection by necessity.

Constructive Proof of the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in a Finite Strategic Game with Sequentially Locally Nonconstant Payoff Functions

We will constructively prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally nonconstant payoff functions. The proof is based on the existence of approximate Nash equilibria which is proved by Sperner's lemma. We follow the Bishop-style constructive mathematics.