Dynamic Asset Pricing with Interactions between Short-Sale and Borrowing Constraints

This paper studies the joint effect of borrowing and short-sale constraints under heterogeneous beliefs and risk aversions. Although the constraints never simultaneously bind in equilibrium, interesting economics emerge in the anticipatory effects of potentially future binding constraints. In particular, the risk-free rate and Sharpe ratio experience endogenous jumps at a critical state, where two equilibria coexist. Moreover, a short-sale ban can lead to a lower stock price and higher volatility depending on the relative tightness between the constraints, and tightening the borrowing constraint during a short-sale ban can also make returns more volatile.

Offsetting Disagreement and Security Prices

We propose that investor beliefs frequently “cross” in the sense that an investor may like company A but dislike company B, whereas another investor may like company B but dislike company A. Such belief-crossing makes it almost impossible to construct a portfolio that is composed solely of every investor’s most favored companies. This causes the level of excitement for portfolios to be generally lower than the levels of excitement that individual companies generate among their most fervent supporters. Coupled with short-sale constraints, wherein prices are set by the most optimistic investors, this causes portfolios to trade at discounts. Utilizing several settings whereby the value of a portfolio and the values of the underlying components can be evaluated separately (e.g., closed-end funds), we present evidence supporting our proposition that, in financial markets, the “whole” is often less than the “sum of its parts.” This paper was accepted by Karl Diether, finance.

Analyst Forecast Dispersion and Market Return Predictability: Does Conditional Equity Premium Play a Role?

Prior studies found that analyst forecast dispersion predicts future market returns. Some prior studies attribute this predictability to the short-sale constraints in the market according to the overpricing theory. Using the U.S. data from 1981 to 2014, we find that the return predictive power of aggregate dispersion only exists prior to 2005. The investor sentiment index, as a proxy of short-sale constraints used by many studies, can only explain the dispersion effect prior to 2005. The investor sentiment index and other proxies such as institutional ownership and put options cannot explain the significant weakening of the dispersion effect after the global financial crisis. We argue that the dispersion-return relation is partly driven by the correlation between dispersion and conditional equity premium. Our evidence suggests that the short-sale constrained stocks do not experience a higher dispersion effect, which is contrary to what the overpricing theory predicts.