Part II The Member State Reports on Transposition of the Directive, 9 Ireland

This chapter examines the transposition of the Antitrust Damages Directive in Ireland. It first considers the transposition procedure, focusing on regulations contained in Statutory Instrument (SI) European Union (Actions for Damages for Infringements of Competition Law) Regulations 2017, before discussing the regime set out in this implementing SI. It then describes the scope of the national regime on competition law and the implementing regulations that govern full compensation, disclosure of evidence, the effect of decisions by National Competition Authorities, limitation periods, joint and several liability, the issues of ‘passing on’, the presumption and quantification of damages by cartels, and consensual dispute resolution. Finally, the chapter analyses incorrect or incomplete transposition and possible legal disputes with regard to the Directive and the implementing regulations.

Consequences of Increased Compensation Disclosure Transparency: Evidence From CEO Pay in Acquiring Firms

We investigate the consequences of increased compensation disclosure transparency on the pay for chief executive officers (CEOs) in firms that are more prone to a misalignment between manager and shareholder interests. Prior research documents that acquiring CEOs’ pay is insensitive to poor post-deal performance after firms complete large acquisitions. Using the 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) compensation disclosure regulation as our empirical setting, we find that this result disappears after firms begin to provide more transparent compensation disclosure. Our cross-sectional analyses show that acquiring firms with higher quality compensation disclosure exhibit greater CEO pay sensitivity to poor post-deal performance after 2006. Our findings indicate that increased compensation disclosure transparency helps strengthen the relation between CEO pay and poor performance in acquiring firms.