Governance Quality, Financial Reporting, and Shareholder Activism: On the Economic Effects of Mandatory Executive Compensation Disclosure

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Schantl
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Shareholder Activism ◽  
Economic Effects ◽  
Governance Quality ◽  
Compensation Disclosure

Does Executive Compensation Disclosure Promote High Pay at the Expense of Incentives?

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xianming Zhou ◽  
Peter L. Swan
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Compensation Disclosure

The Hole in the Doughnut: Accounting for Acquired Intangibles at Krispy Kreme

2006 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Holder-Webb ◽  
Mark Kohlbeck
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Real World ◽  
Intangible Assets ◽  
Purchase Price ◽  
Real World Setting ◽  
Exit Costs ◽  
Accounting Courses ◽  
Public Offering

Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc. used a 2000 initial public offering (IPO) to embark on an active expansion and franchise reacquisition program. This case focuses on this high-visibility franchise reacquisition program and several associated and highly controversial accounting issues, and provides an opportunity to examine numerous technical and conceptual issues in a real-world setting. In the case, you will encounter a variety of financial reporting issues—from identification and valuation of uncommon intangible assets in Part 1, to acquisition accounting, purchase-price allocations, contingent consideration, exit costs, executive compensation, and loan impairments in Part 2. The case is appropriate for use in intermediate and advanced accounting courses.

Gender Differences in Executive Compensation on British Corporate Boards: the Role of Conditional Conservatism

2020 ◽  
Vol 55 (01) ◽  
pp. 2050002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Habiba Al-Shaer ◽  
Mostafa Harakeh
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Potential Effect ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Female Representation ◽  
Equity Compensation ◽  
Conditional Conservatism ◽  
Women On Boards ◽  
Reported Earnings ◽  
Executive Level

We exploit the effectiveness of the [ Davies Report ( 2011 ). Women on Boards. London: Department for Business, Innovation & Skills], which urged FTSE 350 companies to increase female representation on corporate boards, to examine the potential effect that this may have on the gender pay differential at the executive level. To this end, we employ a multivariate regression and a difference-in-differences approach that compare executive compensation between all-male executive boards and boards with at least one female executive. Using a sample of FTSE 350 companies that spans the period 2008–2015, we find that differential executive compensation exists in bonus and equity compensation following the Davies Report ( 2011 ). Given that the differential compensation exists in the components primarily determined by the firm’s reported earnings and that female directors are prone to exhibit higher conditional conservatism in their financial reporting, we examine whether the firm’s financial reporting practice plays a role in determining the differential executive compensation. Our investigation reveals that the presence of female executive directors on the board makes the effect of conditional conservatism more prominent, resulting in lower bonus and equity-based compensation.

Why do Restatements Decrease in a Clawback Environment? An Investigation into Financial Reporting Executives' Decision-Making during the Restatement Process

2015 ◽  
Vol 90 (6) ◽  
pp. 2515-2536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan S. Pyzoha
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Archival Studies ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Auditor Quality

ABSTRACT Prior archival studies find that firms that voluntarily adopted clawback policies have experienced a reduction in restatements. I experimentally examine this outcome by investigating the influence of two key factors (i.e., executive compensation structure and auditor quality) on financial reporting executives' (hereafter, “executives”) decision-making regarding a proposed restatement that will lead to a clawback of their incentives. I find that executives (i.e., CFOs, controllers, and treasurers) facing a lower quality auditor are less likely to agree with amending prior financial statements when a higher proportion of their pay is incentive-based. However, this tendency is reduced when executives face a higher quality auditor, indicating that higher quality auditors can act as effective monitors. My results identify an ex post unintended consequence of clawback regulation that could at least partially offset the benefits of the ex ante deterrent effects of clawbacks, and that could contribute to findings of less frequent restatements when clawback policies are in place. I discuss potential implications regarding the role of executives during restatement decisions and auditors' risk assessments in a clawback environment. Data Availability: Data are available from the author upon request.

scholarly journals Earnings quality and governance quality: A comparative analysis between traditional and new Brazilian capital markets

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 605-610
Author(s):  
Helena Isidro ◽  
Maria Manuela Martins ◽  
Ilídio Tomás Lopes
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Traditional Market ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Governance Quality ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Empirical Analysis

This research focuses on the relationship between the quality of financial reporting and the level of corporate governance of Brazilian firms, particularly between New Market and Traditional Market. We measure earnings quality based on a widely used accruals model. Governance quality is represented by the type of market the firms chooses to be listed in. Firms that opt for the New Market must apply more stringent governance principles. The empirical analysis shows evidence of a positive relationship between the quality of financial reporting and the level of corporate governance. Thus, firms listed on the New Market characterized by better governance practices evidence better quality financial reporting.

scholarly journals Corporate Social Responsibility And The Quality Of Executive Compensation Disclosures

2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 625
Author(s):  
Walid Ben-Amar ◽  
Nadia Smaili ◽  
Eustache Ebondo Wa Mandzila
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Social Engagement ◽  
Disclosure Quality ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Compensation Disclosure ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
The Relationship

This paper examines the relationship between corporate social responsibility and executive compensation disclosure quality. We test whether socially responsible firms disclose more transparent and detailed information about their executive compensation packages than firms that are less committed to social responsibility initiatives. Using a sample of 187 publicly listed Canadian firms, we find a positive relation between CSR and executive compensation disclosure quality. We also document a positive (negative) association between firm size (ownership concentration) and executive compensation disclosure. These findings support the conclusion that increased disclosure transparency reflects a companys social engagement towards its stakeholders.

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