Institutional Investor Activism and Employee Safety: The Role of Activist and Board Political Ideology

Although prior research on shareholder activism has highlighted how such activism can economically benefit the shareholders of targeted firms, recent studies also suggest that shareholder activism can economically disadvantage nonshareholder stakeholders, notably employees. Our study extends this research by exploring whether shareholder activism by institutional investors (i.e., institutional investor activism) can adversely affect employee health and safety through increased workplace injury and illness. Furthermore, deviating from the assumption that financially motivated institutional investor activists are homogeneous in their goals and preferences, we investigate whether the influence of institutional investor activism on employee health and safety hinges on the political ideology of the shareholder activist and of the board of the targeted firm. Using establishment-level data, we find that institutional investor activism adversely influences workplace injury and illness at targeted firms and that this influence is stronger for nonliberal shareholder activists and for firms with a nonliberal board. Our study contributes to shareholder activism research by highlighting how the political ideology of shareholder activists and boards affects the impact of shareholder activism on stakeholders and how shareholder activism can adversely affect the health and safety of employees. Furthermore, our paper also contributes to research on workplace safety and the management of employee relations and human capital resources by highlighting the detrimental effect of a firm’s ownership by investor activists on its employees and how the board’s political ideology may enable a firm to reduce this risk.

Shareholder activism, corporate social responsibility and financial performance

<p>The thesis examines the influence of shareholder activism on corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure of targeted firms and its spillover effects on CSR disclosure, corporate social performance (CSP) and financial performance (FP) respectively in peer firms. The research is motivated by filling the research gaps in prior literature and providing insights to shareholders, the management and regulatory bodies in practice. The thesis consists of three parts. Firstly, this thesis reviews the literature surrounding shareholder activism by conducting narrative reviews of 92 working papers and publications and meta-analysis on 55 working papers and publications, published during 2000-2017 period. Theories from prior literature, namely agency theory, stakeholder theory and stakeholder salience theory are analysed through narrative review analysis at the beginning of the chapter. Then, the analysis of narrative review also documents mixed findings of the associations among shareholder activism and FP and CG and CSP, including spillover effects. That is, the associations could be positive, negative and not significant in prior literature. The results of meta-analysis indicate that shareholder activism improves FP and CSP respectively. In addition, the thesis also examines the major types of shareholder activists and main forms of shareholder activism. Overall, through the analysis, the thesis identifies the research gaps of prior literature, thereby pointing out future research directions. Secondly, by employing shareholder proposals from Standard & Poor's 1,500 (S&P 1,500, hereafter) companies in the United States as a proxy of shareholder activism during 2006-2014 period with 13,572 separate observations, this thesis examines whether the whole sample of shareholder activism, institutional shareholder activism and coordinated shareholder activism could influence CSR disclosure level respectively. Simultaneously, this thesis also investigates whether shareholder activism affects CSR disclosure level given the other corporate governance mechanisms, namely board size, the presence of female directors, outside directors and CEO incentives. The results typically demonstrate that: (1) while shareholder activism negatively relates to CSR disclosure level, larger board size or the presence of female directors combined with shareholder activism directly relates to maintaining better CSR transparency; (2) coordinated shareholder activism could decrease social disclosure level. The findings also indicate that CSR disclosure provides an approach to strategically manage risks. Thirdly, the thesis explores spillover effects from different types of shareholder activism on CSR disclosure level, CSP and financial performance by using data gathered from S&P 1,500 companies during 2007-2014 period. The findings show that shareholder activism increases social disclosure level and environmental disclosure level in peer firms. It also shows that there is a weak positive association between shareholder activism and CSP. It therefore demonstrates the weak influences of shareholder activism in changing firms’ CSP. It also illustrates that institutional shareholder activism has an advantage over coordinated shareholder activism in terms of increasing corporate transparency. In this manner, it indicates that the collective action problem among coordinated shareholders could also attenuate the impact of shareholder activism in peer firms. The thesis contributes to the literature on shareholder activism practically and theoretically. The findings provide useful insights to shareholders, management teams and regulatory bodies for their policy-making. Beyond the practical contribution, the thesis also provides empirical evidence to stakeholder salience theory and analyses the collective action problem.</p>

Shareholder activism, corporate social responsibility and financial performance

<p>The thesis examines the influence of shareholder activism on corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure of targeted firms and its spillover effects on CSR disclosure, corporate social performance (CSP) and financial performance (FP) respectively in peer firms. The research is motivated by filling the research gaps in prior literature and providing insights to shareholders, the management and regulatory bodies in practice. The thesis consists of three parts. Firstly, this thesis reviews the literature surrounding shareholder activism by conducting narrative reviews of 92 working papers and publications and meta-analysis on 55 working papers and publications, published during 2000-2017 period. Theories from prior literature, namely agency theory, stakeholder theory and stakeholder salience theory are analysed through narrative review analysis at the beginning of the chapter. Then, the analysis of narrative review also documents mixed findings of the associations among shareholder activism and FP and CG and CSP, including spillover effects. That is, the associations could be positive, negative and not significant in prior literature. The results of meta-analysis indicate that shareholder activism improves FP and CSP respectively. In addition, the thesis also examines the major types of shareholder activists and main forms of shareholder activism. Overall, through the analysis, the thesis identifies the research gaps of prior literature, thereby pointing out future research directions. Secondly, by employing shareholder proposals from Standard & Poor's 1,500 (S&P 1,500, hereafter) companies in the United States as a proxy of shareholder activism during 2006-2014 period with 13,572 separate observations, this thesis examines whether the whole sample of shareholder activism, institutional shareholder activism and coordinated shareholder activism could influence CSR disclosure level respectively. Simultaneously, this thesis also investigates whether shareholder activism affects CSR disclosure level given the other corporate governance mechanisms, namely board size, the presence of female directors, outside directors and CEO incentives. The results typically demonstrate that: (1) while shareholder activism negatively relates to CSR disclosure level, larger board size or the presence of female directors combined with shareholder activism directly relates to maintaining better CSR transparency; (2) coordinated shareholder activism could decrease social disclosure level. The findings also indicate that CSR disclosure provides an approach to strategically manage risks. Thirdly, the thesis explores spillover effects from different types of shareholder activism on CSR disclosure level, CSP and financial performance by using data gathered from S&P 1,500 companies during 2007-2014 period. The findings show that shareholder activism increases social disclosure level and environmental disclosure level in peer firms. It also shows that there is a weak positive association between shareholder activism and CSP. It therefore demonstrates the weak influences of shareholder activism in changing firms’ CSP. It also illustrates that institutional shareholder activism has an advantage over coordinated shareholder activism in terms of increasing corporate transparency. In this manner, it indicates that the collective action problem among coordinated shareholders could also attenuate the impact of shareholder activism in peer firms. The thesis contributes to the literature on shareholder activism practically and theoretically. The findings provide useful insights to shareholders, management teams and regulatory bodies for their policy-making. Beyond the practical contribution, the thesis also provides empirical evidence to stakeholder salience theory and analyses the collective action problem.</p>

Hedge Fund Activism and Financial Performance

The magnitude of changes in observable quantities of interest at hedge fund activism targets are economically small and unimportant except when the company is up for sale. When it can facilitate the sale of companies, hedge fund activism is likely to benefit target shareholders, though investors must consider whether the companies acquiring the targets are also in their portfolios and merely overpaying, so that money is simply shifting from one part of their portfolio to another. But the rest of hedge fund activism finds itself sitting with past rounds of shareholder activism of which it is only the latest manifestation. Like those past forms of shareholder activism, it just doesn’t seem to matter much.

Investor activism strategies of private equity firms: evidence from continental Europe

Purpose This paper aims to deal with the issue of shareholder activism of private equity investors in public companies. The study identifies characteristics of target firms and investors related to the likelihood of private equity activism. The research also examines whether shareholder activism strategy of private equity investors is associated with the better performance in future and value creation of target firms. Design/methodology/approach The paper applies econometric modeling to hand-collected data on private equity investments in listed companies, in the form of private investment in public equity and open-market share purchases, from eight Continental Europe’s countries for the period 2005–2014. Findings The findings indicate that the probability of shareholder activism is higher if the target firm’s industry corresponds to the private equity investor’s industry specialization, if the private equity firm is older, if the target is larger and the average ownership share purchased by the investor is higher. Conversely, the probability of shareholder activism is lower where a private equity firm invests in the target for the first time. A target firm with an activist investor has poorer operational performance results one year following the investment compared to a target firm with a passive private equity investor. Research limitations/implications Results from the analysis of transactions in Continental Europe countries with French and German legal origin may be not generalizable to other markets with the different legal tradition and institutional environment. Originality/value This research provides new empirical evidence on private equity activism in listed companies of Continental Europe. By distinguishing between active and passive investments, testing rarely considered characteristics to provide valuable insights and analyzing the effect of activism on the target firm’s performance, the study contributes variously to the still-limited body of literature on private equity activism in public companies with a governance structure based on concentrated ownership. The findings emphasize the relationship between shareholder activism and both target and investor’s characteristics from perspective of mitigating agency problem and value creation in target firms. By simultaneously investigating investments in public companies from several European markets, the study complements empirical evidence mostly obtained from studies of a single national market.