The Makeover of Ḥayy

This paper focuses on the literary relationship between Ibn Ṭufayl’s Ḥayy and Avicenna’s (the latter being ostensibly the immediate source of inspiration of the former), and on the philosophical implications of this literary relationship. While Ibn Ṭufayl borrowed Avicenna’s protagonists and framework, he eliminated the figure of the guiding sage, thus breaking sharply not only from Avicenna but also from the conventions of the literary genre that served as his model, the initiation story. This paper is primarily dedicated to presenting this dramatic, yet hitherto under-estimated, change, and to examining possible explanations for Ibn Ṭufayl’s revolutionary move.

AN EXCEPTIONAL SAGE AND THE NEED FOR THE MESSENGER: THE POLITICS OF FIṬRA IN A 12TH-CENTURY TALE

This paper argues that Ibn Ṭufayl (d. 1185) in his Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān offers a surprisingly intellectual reading of the term fiṭra (pl. fiṭar) and one that has significant consequences for our understanding of the story. We will see that at crucial junctures in the text, fiṭra emerges solely in an intellectual context, implying a gulf amongst humanity that defies common understandings of the term as egalitarian. This gulf, I argue, illuminates the political implications of the tale. For while he emphasizes the broad compatibility of the more established, revealed and the philosophical path recently arrived in Andalusia, Ibn Ṭufayl, with the help of fiṭra, shows that the philosophical life is one for the very few. Attention to Ibn Ṭufayl's use of fiṭra might thus explain one of his reasons for writing this tale for the court. Its overall message heightens the role of religion and tempers the political significance of philosophy in two ways: by arguing that only select individuals have the capacity to access truth independently from revelation; and by denying these exceptionally gifted the ability to communicate their findings to the masses.

La filosofía andalusí frente al sufismo

Frente al reto del sufismo a la filosofía, sistematizado por Algazel, en cuanto al modo de conseguir el conocimiento y la felicidad del hombre, reaccionan los filósofos andalusíes de diferente modo: Avempace niega totalmente las pretensiones de los sufíes y hace de la filosofía el único medio capaz de dar cumplida satisfacción a todas las potencialidades humanas. Ibn Ṭufayl asume la vía sufí dentro de su filosofía, aunando el éxtasis buscado por los sufíes con el éxtasis plotiniano. Averroes reconoce la validez de la vía sufí, pero sólo para unos pocos. La vía normal y accesible al hombre inteligente es sólo la filosofía. Filosofía en la que la experiencia del éxtasis no es contemplada. En el Occidente islámico no tuvo continuidad la síntesis de filosofía y sufismo realizada por Ibn Ṭufayl, siendo finalmente la filosofía eliminada del horizonte intelectual por el sufismo, fenómeno perfectamente apreciable en Ibn Jaldūn.